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ABSTRACT 
DEVELOPING A CASE STUDY SIMULATION FOR GRADUATE LEVEL 
BUSINESS EDUCATION 
SEPTEMBER, 1989 
GUIDO H, SLANGEN M. A., PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN 
BELGIUM 
M.A., EDUCATION, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICAL, 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
M. S., MANAGEMENT, RENSSELAR POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, 
TROY, NEW YORK 
M. A., PSYCHOLOGY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK 
EdD., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Byrd L. Jones 
Rapid changes in business and technology conditions challenge graduate 
level business education. Many graduates will succeed or fail in the business world 
on the basis of their ability to deal with this dynamic environment. Multinational 
corporations find themselves involved in negotiations entailing issues they never 
faced before. 
This study presents the design and implementation of a comprehensive 
simulation of international business negotiations. The course was designed for 
managers who have completed all MBA course requirements, who have at least 
three years experience as a manager in any one or two functional areas of busi¬ 
ness, and who want to learn about the dynamics of international business negotia¬ 
tions. The focus is on multinational negotiations involving both profit-making 
firms and government agencies entering major investments and long-term commit 
ments over technically advanced equipment. 
The IMAS (International Military Aircraft Sales) course was offered as an 
elective course in the MBA curriculum on an experimental basis during the Fall 
1987 semester. The experimental design of the course allowed for the necessary 
flexibility to try out different types of materials and teaching methods to determine 
workable strategies and content. The situation was designed in such a way that no 
single teacher could be expert or teach the subject matter. This encouraged stu¬ 
dents to discriminate between different behaviors and strategies in order to find 
the strategy providing the most favorable consequences for all parties involved. 
Twenty five participants for the IMAS course were selected from a list of students 
who were in their last semester of graduate school, majoring in International Busi¬ 
ness. In order to offer the course, the researcher developed over two hundred 
pages of materials to support the international negotiations and the roles that 
members of the class would play. The course was fifteen weeks in duration, meet¬ 
ing eight hours on alternate Saturdays for a total of forty five instructional hours. 
Students were also required to meet outside scheduled class meetings to prepare 
for the sessions or to meet with individual representatives. 
The IMAS sumulation presented a rather complex problem, and there was, 
in contrast to the textbook problem, usually more than one winning strategy. At 
the same time unlike the ’’discussion,” some strategies are clearly much superior to 
others. This kind of problem is often encountered by managers in real life situ¬ 
ations. 
The evidence presented in this study supported the hypothesis that experi¬ 
ence-induced learning is an effective way to resolve ill-structured problems. The 
kind of experience-induced learning with which this study was concerned was that 
in which the consequences of certain behavior were demonstrated to the students. 
vi 1 
The author witnessed two basic kinds of changes: changes in cognitive 
growth and changes in affective growth. Most students came into this experimen¬ 
tal course expressing verbal and nonverbal fears about participating in a non- 
structured class, but in observations of these students throughout the semester, 
some of these fear were assuaged. Students who were frightened began to steadily 
develop positive feelings and attitudes about the non-structured sessions. 
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PART ONE 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CASE STUDY 
SIMULATION 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This case study presents the design and implementation of a comprehen¬ 
sive simulation of international business negotiations. The course was designed 
for managers who have completed all MBA course requirements, who have at 
least three years experience as a manager in any one or two functional areas of 
business, and who want to learn about the dynamics of international business 
negotiations. The focus is on multinational negotiations involving both profit¬ 
making firms and government agencies entering major investments and long¬ 
term commitments over technically advanced equipment. 
The amount and complexities of considerations and the limited knowledge 
held by anyone individual raises a key question: how can any facilitator ’’teach” 
a case in which no one, including the instructor, can know all the pertinent in¬ 
formation or the most probable outcome? Many graduate students have consid¬ 
erable in-depth experience in particular issues—technical design, financing joint 
ventures, legal aspects of international agreements, liaison with government 
agencies (notably Defense), and so on—which no instructor can or should at¬ 
tempt to match. The crucial ’’knowledge” to be dealt with in class puts less 
emphasis on data and stresses more the processes of negotiations that bring 
requisite knowledge into discussions as needed through a format of co-inquiry. 
The instructor/researcher assists to provide enough background information that 
students may make appropriate decisions. 
An important stimulus to learning can be the way in which a class is con 
ducted using a business simulation and the process of co-inquiry. As stated by 
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Jones and Maloy: ”... By bringing multiple realities and ill-structured prob¬ 
lems within loosely connected organizational frameworks [classrooms], partner¬ 
ships encourage reflexive thinking that is appropriate for adult development, 
(and learning).” 1 
By creating a simulation of a complex international business negotiation, 
the author hopes to contribute to educational understandings of how to address 
ill-structured problems for advanced students. 
Learning to deal with other people in complex situations is a very impor¬ 
tant managerial skill, as stated by Robert Lawrence Kuhn in his book Frontiers 
in Creative and Innovative Management. 
. . . We should strive to find ways within the business school setting 
to help students acquire chunks that involve, not merely the situation in 
cases, but the behavior of fellow students. . . . Creating that experience in 
the classroom would be a very valuable part of managerial education.2 
Nature of the Problem 
The environment in which business operates has changed dramatically 
over the past two decades, particularly for United States business. The Ameri¬ 
can economy is increasingly becoming interdependent both domestically and in¬ 
ternationally. Imports and exports now represent twice as large a portion of 
United States gross national product (GNP) as they did two decades ago. Al¬ 
most one-fifth of United States’ industrial production is exported, and fully sev¬ 
enty percent of the goods produced in the United States compete with merchan¬ 
dise from abroad.3 In 1992, the European Community plans to eliminate all 
remaining economic boundaries between the twelve member countries. European 
companies will have a home market more populous than the United States or 
4 
Japan. New economies of scale will make them stronger in world markets for 
technically complex production.4 
Management practices and policies that sufficed in the past no longer 
provide a competitive advantage to sustain a high standard of living in the 
United States. Continued growth depends on ’’globalization” as that business 
will continue to operate in an ever interconnected world.5 Managers will have 
to shape organizations that can respond quickly to developments abroad. As 
nations move toward a global economy with industries capable of technological 
developments and large-scale output, no firm can presume its capacity to com¬ 
pete in international markets where technological skills, an industrial workforce 
and investment funds are widely available as they now are in Europe, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
New cooperative agreements (coalitions, joint ventures, partnerships, and 
so forth) take on special importance during this process of global redistribution 
of specialized capital and labor. Foreign companies and investors will become 
stronger influences in the United States in the near future. American business 
groups in Washington already worry that foreigners may be outdoing them in 
twisting congressional arms. Pat Choate, TRW’s Washington economist, points 
out that 152 Japanese companies are paying lobbyists in the Unites States a to¬ 
tal of $100 million in 1988 to press their causes.6 
In addition to economic shifts, new applied technologies have affected 
every sector of the labor force. The high technology revolution is all around us. 
Recent research and literature (Drucker, 1980; Ferguson, 1980; Kantor, Nais- 
bitt, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Toffler, 1970, 1980) have identified the 
critical issues before us and contrasted the old assumptions of our fading indus¬ 
trial society with the new assumptions of our modern, technological, informa- 
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tion-based society. Some of these issues relate to new forms of competition 
and new competitors that challenge the commercial position of United States’ 
firms at home and abroad. These new competitors (especially Japan) are throw¬ 
ing the lackluster performance of United States’ firms, particularly those that 
manufacture, into sharper relief. Companies will have to adopt fluid structures 
that can be altered as business conditions change. Other issues refer to tradi¬ 
tional country-centered economic concepts, such as comparative advantage, 
which do not assist firms as they seek achievement in world market leadership. 
These authors argue that the United States’ challenge is to catch up to the Japa¬ 
nese in a variety of technologies and to learn how to gain the benefits of coordi¬ 
nating among dispersed units. The alternative is to be trapped by myths of de¬ 
centralization and competition when new technological developments require bil¬ 
lions of investment in untried technologies. 
With so much change ahead in the 1990s, business school deans, and 
managers who hire MBAs, might well be concerned that United States’ schools 
at best have slipped off the leading edge and at worst have become irrelevant. 
Xerox vice-chairman William Glavin charged, ’’They are developing middle 
managers, but we are not hiring or promoting very many of them.”7 
At the same time, disciplined inquiry in human development and adult 
learning have provided us new insights on how teaching of adult learners can be 
improved. (Cross, 1981; Erickson, 1963; Greenberg, 1981; Kolb, 1984; Neugar- 
ten, 1968; and others). They advocate that the purposes and methods of teach¬ 
ing adults must be adapted to the needs of individuals at different stages in 
their development. From this point of view, adult education is concerned not 
with preparing people for life, but rather with helping people to live more suc¬ 
cessfully. Thus, if there is an overreaching function of the adult educational 
6 
institution, it is to assist adults to increase their competence, or negotiate transi¬ 
tions in their social roles (workers, managers, negotiators, etc.), and to assist 
them in solving their adult related problems. 
Case study methods of teaching adult graduate students have an honor¬ 
able history of involving students in the learning process, but they need modifi¬ 
cation to cover ill-structured problems created by this fast-changing environ¬ 
ment. These ill-structured problems raise issues of multiple realities, as Mitroff 
noted, ”... ill-structured problems not only vary in their definitions from 
stakeholder to stakeholder; they vary over time as well. They are dynamic. A 
solution for one time period and one set of conditions is not necessarily a solu¬ 
tion for another.” No scientific study can conclusively resolve such issues: ”. 
. . there are either too many data, or too few, never exactly the right amount or 
the right kind.”8 
The challenge of trying to meet the needs in adult learning is probably 
greater than in most professional areas. The nature of adult learning makes it 
one where continuous updating of program offerings is a common occurrence. 
In our changing times, continuous learning becomes essential for all. For those 
involved in providing learning programs, challenges will always be present due 
to constant change in our complex society. 
Since society changes so rapidly, and the implications of these changes 
are so great, the adult educator faces a continuous battle in keeping programs 
and personal qualifications up to a point where the challenges can be success¬ 
fully met and overcome. The growing need for updating curricula and media of 
instruction is actually a function of this rapidly accelerated rate of change which 
characterizes society today, and the demands that it places on educational sys¬ 
tems. What does this mean for our MBA programs? Clearly, the focus of our 
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educational programs must be on producing graduates who will be effective and 
comfortable in a global marketplace. Second, it has become clear that govern¬ 
mental, political, and social forces—all of which are what we term nonmarket 
forces are becoming major influences on business strategy and managerial ef¬ 
fectiveness. Business schools should therefore produce graduates who under¬ 
stand, influence, and harness the nonmarket forces that impact business effec¬ 
tiveness. 
Purpose of the Study 
Teachers decide what materials and methods they will use so that stu¬ 
dents have a useful learning experience. Case methods and business simula¬ 
tions are two effective tools to bring realistic decision making problems into the 
classroom.9 Most fields of professional study have an abundance of text books 
designed to introduce a body of knowledge that informs professional practices. 
Apparently case studies and simulations in graduate business education depend 
on more local knowledge and instructional strategies. Few college professors 
have formal training in developing case studies and simulations. For these rea¬ 
sons, the case simulation methodology, although used in most business schools, 
has received little or no attention in the professional literature of adult educa¬ 
tion. 10 
In most universities, where case studies research has been carried out, 
individual professors have the responsibility for developing new case study mate¬ 
rials. Some professors collect data from their own experiences, others use re¬ 
search assistants or case writers. The normal approach seems to be that ’’one 
learns by doing.” Most training occurs on the job and many instructors find it 
difficult to use a case developed by another faculty member. Productivity and 
quality expectations vary considerably. Most research assistants work on the 
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task of case writing for about a year and then turn to other activities. As a re¬ 
sult, there is a high turnover of personnel. These factors add to the problem 
that casewriting, although a major and continuing commitment in the field of 
graduate education, is a fairly disorganized activity. 11 
This study, therefore, will explore the development and use of a case 
study using simulation methodologies in graduate business education. Based on 
research in the field of adult learning, the study will document the appropriate¬ 
ness of long-term simulations for presenting ill-structured problems. 
Second, the principles developed in part one will be applied in part two 
to the development of a comprehensive simulation related to the field of Interna¬ 
tional Military Aircraft Sales (IMAS). 
Taking mastery of content for granted, the author will develop what is 
being called a process-dominant simulation. 12 The focus of this comprehensive 
simulation is primarily on the dynamics involved in an international business ne¬ 
gotiation. The simulation creates a model of a competition between firms in¬ 
volved in the sale of military aircraft to United States allies. Most salient strate¬ 
gic elements are present in the simulation, but many thousands of factual or op¬ 
erational details, which must be attended to in reality, are absent. This facili¬ 
tates a time compression so that students can participate in the entire life cycle 
of the negotiations over a relatively short period. Enough data will be included 
on the knowledge requirements of other business courses that one would hope 
the students will appreciate the academic circumstances in which the teaching 
problem has developed. 
Another critical assumption of this study is the belief that student 
growth, not instructor ego gratification, is essential for the effective use of 
simulations. In the intensity of the classroom drama, many teachers may seek 
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to play center stage, with the class as their supporting cast; but the goal is adult 
learning of complex processes and information. A summary of student evalu¬ 
ations of their learning experience will be an integral part of this study. As 
stated by Darkenwald: 
Adults who have many and varied experiences and who daily make 
decisions affecting their lives and the lives of their dependents are capable 
as well of participating in the planning and implementation of their learning. 
They are also the ones who can accurately judge the value of a learning ac¬ 
tivity and its relevance to their lives. 13 
Significance of the Study 
Many events, in the form of changes and advancements, confront and af¬ 
fect professionals in the practice of their profession. For the professional who 
wishes to stay abreast of these events, it appears imperative that new ideas be 
examined, new knowledge be gained, and new and different concepts, princi¬ 
ples, and processes be reviewed carefully so that the professional can perform 
duties at the best possible level. In other words, many forces and factors come 
to bear on educators which force them to be continuous learners; therefore, pro¬ 
fessionals must continue their educational experiences after entering a profes¬ 
sion. 
The adult graduate education profession is, of course, no exception. 
Many advancements in theory, knowledge, and practice as well as dynamic 
changes in society, curriculum structures, values, cultural orientations, and edu¬ 
cational thrusts confront teachers and administrators in their efforts to provide 
adults with the best learning experience possible. Adult educators, like other 
professionals, must define self-improvement plans to keep abreast of events that 
enter their field of endeavor. 
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To do an effective job, professionals have needs which are as varied and 
complex as the changes to which they are subjected. The treatments and reso¬ 
lution of these needs and concerns can also be a varied and complex process. 
However, to do a professional job one must continue the updating process and 
focus on the specific concerns perceived by the individual professional. Since 
treatments of professional problems and concerns will probably be varied, a set 
of alternatives may have to be offered. No set precription will affect all profes¬ 
sional educators. 
This study is devoted to a discussion and explication of alternative ways 
of teaching graduate business education. The case study and simulation delivery 
systems for learning experiences is the focus of this study. Much of this disser¬ 
tation deals with what an individual professor can do for self-improvement. 
This is essential. Adult educators are devoted to helping others grow and real¬ 
ize their potential, but not enough is done in the area of developing appropriate 
curriculum materials to assist the individual educator. 
This study should be of value to those who wish to improve their curricu¬ 
lum delivery system, and should be helpful to those entering the field. It also 
has significance for experienced instructors who would benefit from a fresh ex¬ 
amination of efforts to improve competencies to meet the needs of students. 
That is, this case study may encourage reflection over teaching methods even 
when it does not have direct applications in classrooms. 
11 
Research Design 
In order to delineate the process which we label a case study, as ”a slip¬ 
pery term,”14 it is first advisable to understand what a case study in social re¬ 
search is not: 
1. Case Study is not the name for a standard methodological package. 
2. Case studies should not be equated with observational studies, partici¬ 
pant or otherwise. 
3. Case studies are not simply pre-experimental.15 The case method is, 
according to Adelman and Associates, a study of an instance in action.16 
A case study focuses on the understanding of human behavior in its own frame 
of reference and how people ”go about the task of seeing, describing, and ex¬ 
plaining order in the world in which they live. ”17 
Defined more formally, a case method is: 
... an in-depth investigation of a given topic resulting in a complete, 
well organized picture or unit. The scope may encompass the entire life cy 
cle or only a selected segment; it may concentrate upon specific factors or 
take in the totality of elements and events.18 
The case study method has also a number of advantages, particularly as 
a teaching methodology for adult learners. These include: (a) data is ’’strong in 
reality”, but difficult to organize; (b) the process allows the subtleties and com¬ 
plexities of each case or ’’instance” to be seen and understood; 19 (c) a proc¬ 
ess that can reveal complexities and alternative modes of interpretation; (d) the 
possible provision of data is so deep and rich, so thickly descriptive that it is 
useful for subsequent reanalysis and reinterpretation; (e) rootedness in the eve¬ 
ryday ’’real world” that allows data to be fed back to stimulate and show direc- 
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tion to action; (f) because the presentation is in a publicly accessible form, it 
has the ’’capability of serving multiple audiences.”20 
This study explores the use and application of the case studies and simu¬ 
lation methodologies in graduate business education. As an exploratory study, 
its functions are those of descriptive research. Most educational research meth¬ 
ods are descriptive; that is, they set out to describe and to interpret what is. 
Descriptive research, according to Best, 
... is concerned with conditions or relationships that exist; prac¬ 
tices that prevail; beliefs, points of view, or attitudes that are held; proc¬ 
esses that are going on; effects that are being felt; or trends that are devel¬ 
oping.21 
This design is suited for, it becomes apparent that this design is required 
by the specific purpose of this study: to explore the use of, and to design a 
case study simulation for teaching graduate business education. In choosing this 
format, the researcher has moved away from the realm of social science. This 
study will, therefore, be dealing with ’’social (i.e.person-made) artifacts;” to 
the extent that these are held to be different from physics and chemistry (i.e., 
the natural sciences), it is quite legitimate to address them with different proce¬ 
dures.’^ 
Cohen and Mannion, state that descriptive research ’’helps us understand 
. . . not the products of scientific inquiry, but the process itself. ”23 Descriptive 
research also has its methodological weaknesses: (a) the methodology itself is 
eclectic:24 although there are a number of procedures and techniques that are 
commonly employed, they must be ’’customized to fit the exigencies of the situ¬ 
ation. ”25 This customizing constrains the skills of the researcher and often de¬ 
mands experience in its effective execution: (b) descriptive research is ’’particu- 
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larly vulnerable to subjective biases,”26 so ’’there is much in the technique of 
data-gathering, observing and reporting . . . that is left to the judgment of the 
evaluator.27 Similarly, ’’what an observer collects as data is dependent on what 
he/she defines as relevant. ”28 Thus, the opportunities for insight in social re¬ 
search are also opportunities for subjectivity or even prejudice.29 (c) Social 
research is severely limited in generalizability, since the focus of the research is 
depth and not breadth.30 Overall, the potential benefits of using the descriptive 
research methodology in studying the case study method of teaching seem to 
outweigh the disadvantages. 
Nonetheless, safeguards to offset the effects of the limitations of this re¬ 
search methodology have been incorporated in the design of this study. In view 
of the subject matter under consideration, descriptive and topical methods of 
presentation will be used in this study. 
In the preparation of this project, the writer made use of publicly avail¬ 
able information found in the libraries of the Hartford Graduate Center, United 
Technologies, McDonnell Douglas General Dynamics, Dassault-Breguett, and 
TRW corporations, the National Archives of the United States, and the library of 
Congress. 
Both primary and secondary sources have been consulted. Primary 
sources included interviews with company officials and managers who had been 
involved in actual negotiations. These interviews gave the author a unique in¬ 
sight into the day-to-day workings and attitudes of companies all over the 
world. These interviews were used to construct the negotiation process in part II 
of this study. Secondary sources have consisted of commentaries on actual pro¬ 
posals, found in books, periodicals and newspapers. In addition the writer has 
utilized a personal collection of related references such as student papers and 
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teaching notes. The case study methodology used as a research method in so¬ 
cial sciences may not be confused with the case method of teaching. They both 
have the same object of study in that they both describe actual situations, but 
the focus and applications are different. The case study methodology of re¬ 
search does focus on the situation as a tool for the researcher’s data collection 
and analysis. The case study method of teaching attempts to integrate theory 
and practice. Because case studies closely reflect reality, they are eminently 
suitable for preparing business managers. This methodology suits the business 
school’s mission of training men and women not only to know, but to act. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter I contains a broad introduction to some major contemporary 
business issues and the impact they create on graduate adult business education, 
together with a statement of the problem addressed in this study. Basic as¬ 
sumptions upon which the study is based and the significance of the study are 
also reviewed. 
Chapter II will examine literature on the case studies and simulation 
methodology in graduate business education. This chapter also reviews related 
literature from the disciplines of adult learning theory and teaching methodolo¬ 
gies. The advantages and disadvantages of both methods will form the basis for 
the selection of one of these methods as being more effective method for deal¬ 
ing with ill-structured problems. The conclusions will form the framework for 
the writing of the curriculum materials for the international business negotiation 
simulation in PART II. 
Chapter III describes the instructional process used in the teaching of the 
International Military Aircraft Sales (IMAS) course. Chapters IV and V describe 
the pilot course in international negotiations (MAS), the design strategy of the 
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course and the evaluation method used, as well as the author’s recommendation 
for future research related to this study. All materials for the course were de¬ 
signed by the author. The author will use student reaction evaluation in order 
to obtain data how the participants responded to the simulation as it took place. 
The actual simulation in International Military Aircraft Sales was first used in 
the fall of 1987 at the Hartford Graduate Center, a graduate business school 
where the author is employed as an Associate Professor. A summary of student 
comments of the teaching process will be included in Chapter m, not to justify 
what we are doing but to improve teaching and learning through the use of 
comprehensive business case simulations. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The Use of the Case Method in Graduate Business Education 
Over fifty years ago the Harvard Business School pioneered in adapting 
case discussions from the disciplines of law and medicine. The case method 
has long been referred to as an integral part of the school’s business administra¬ 
tion curriculum. 1 
Powell and Bennet, Philosophies of Adult Education (1960), delineated sev¬ 
eral beliefs shared by most adult educators: (1) adults are different from young 
people; (2) education is an activity that emphasizes learning rather than teach¬ 
ing; (3) there is some interplay between the intellectual and emotional elements 
in learning; (4) the primary vehicle of adult learning is the group; and (5) em¬ 
phasis is placed on applications versus theory.2 
Case studies attempt to integrate theory and practice. Because cases 
closely reflect reality, they are eminently suitable for preparing business manag¬ 
ers. This methodology suits the business school’s mission of training men and 
women not only to know, but to act. 
Today case studies are included in the management development pro¬ 
grams of hundreds of companies here and abroad. Developing skills and abili¬ 
ties in thinking logically and working in harmony with others are the essential 
aims of the case method. Business and industry have always needed executives 
and middle management personnel who can think for themselves and who can 
get work done through others. 
One of Harvard’s early professors, Arthur Stone Dewing, philosophically 
compared the theoretical method (lecture) with the case method of teaching in 
the business schools: 
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This method [lectures] has great advantages. Above all, lecturing 
is efficient, it is also economical of the time, energy, and the patience of 
instructor and student. Further, this method produces brilliant results. A 
student trained under it seems to possess a sureness, a precision, a firm¬ 
ness of grasp remarkable for the relatively short time which he is com¬ 
pelled to spend on acquiring his knowledge. 
The other method [case study] starts with an entirely different pur¬ 
pose and ends with an entirely different result. 
. . . Business people must be able to meet in action the problems 
arising out of new situations of an ever changing environment. Educa¬ 
tion, accordingly, would consist of acquiring facility to act in the presence 
of new experience. It asks not how people may be trained to know, but 
how people be trained to act.3 
In more pragmatic terms, E. Lawrence Lowell underscored the relation¬ 
ship between classroom discussion and the day-to-day work of a businessper¬ 
son. 
The case method of business training is deemed the best prepara¬ 
tion for business life, because the decision of questions by the banker, 
the manufacturer, the merchant or the transporter consists of discerning 
the essential elements in a situation and applying to the principles of or¬ 
ganization and trade. His most important work consists of solving prob¬ 
lems and for this he must have the faculty of rapid analysis and synthe¬ 
sis.4 
This emphasis on problem solving suggests the requirement that informa¬ 
tion be presented that is realistic, yet neither obvious nor ambiguous. Individu¬ 
als both listen and express their own views. Bertrand Fox further emphasized 
the individual learning opportunity in a group’s discussion process. 
The method provides an opportunity to gain confidence in one’s 
own judgment, but also a degree of humility as well. It also provides a 
most invaluable opportunity to learn how far one can go by rigorous logi¬ 
cal analysis of one or another dimension of the problem and the extent 
to which judgment comes into play when many factors which have no 
common denominator must be weighed.5 
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John Dewey defined education as the reconstruction and reorganization of 
experience, which increases one’s ability to direct the course of subsequent ex¬ 
perience. It is both active and passive. That is, education or experience is not 
just what happens to a person, but also what that person does. It is more pre¬ 
cisely, the interaction of the individual with the environment. Dewey’s theory 
supports the Dewing-Fox position, for his theory of learning supports a discus¬ 
sion-oriented teaching methodology for adults. 
As Jonas Soltes notes, Dewey believed the learner is like an explorer who 
maps an unknown territory: 
The explorer, like the learner, does not know terrain and adven¬ 
tures his journey holds in store for him. He has yet to discover moun¬ 
tains, deserts, and water holes and to suffer fever, starvation, and other 
hardships. Finally, when the explorer returns from his journey, he will 
have a hard-won knowledge of the country he has traversed. Then, and 
only then, can he produce a map of the region. The map, like a text¬ 
book, is an abstraction which omits his thirst, his courage, his despairs 
and triumphs—the experiences which made his journey personally mean¬ 
ingful. The map only records the relationships between landmarks and 
terrain, the logic of the features without the psychological revelations of 
the journey itself. To give the map to others (as a teacher might) is to 
give the results of an experience, not the experience by which the map 
was produced and became personally meaningful to the producer. . . edu¬ 
cational growth consists of combining past experience with present expe¬ 
riences in order understand future experiences. To grow, the individual 
must continually reorganize and reformulate past experiences in the light 
of new experiences in a cohesive fashion.6 
A review of literature on adult learning and the case method of teaching 
supports the position that to the extent that students can learn business practice 
in the classroom, there are limits, the case method enables them to discover and 
develop their own unique framework for approaching, understanding, and deal¬ 
ing with complex business problems.? 
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Interest in teaching methodologies for adult graduate education has in¬ 
creased dramatically during the last two decades, fueled in part by a dozen or 
more private and governmental study commission reports on the current state of 
academia.8 A major conclusion of these reports is that teaching needs to be 
improved. The Association of American Colleges sums up the point: "The fac¬ 
ulty should concern itself with the quality of college teaching on which, after all, 
the effectiveness of any curriculum depends. We must assure that future col- 
lege teachers are better prepared to teach.”9 
Claude Mathis, director of the Center for the Teaching Professions at 
Northwestern University, reminds us that the teacher is essential to any such 
revitalization process. In a recent editorial in the New York Times, Fred 
Hechinger points out that: 
Education is the teacher you remember after you’ve forgotten the 
others. . . . Changing the way schools are organized and introducing tech¬ 
nology to provide much of the instruction may increase the chances for 
serendipity to provide what is missing in schools but the ultimate reform 
must come from the teacher. 10 
These pleas for more attention to teaching have been accompanied by a 
questioning of higher education’s traditional dependence on lecturing. Both 
students and teachers are demanding greater use of active, student-involved 
teaching methods. 11 Interest in discussion teaching is clearly on the rise 
throughout the academic community. For example, a special panel convened by 
the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) urged medical schools 
to provide more active learning experiences by reducing lecture time, emphasiz¬ 
ing independent learning skills, and requiring less factual memorization. Spe¬ 
cifically the report recommended that: 
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. . . medical schools should establish programs to assist members 
of the faculty to expand their teaching capabilities. . . . Faculty members 
who guide student into independent learning must do more than merely 
transmit information. They must challenge medical students to be in¬ 
volved actively in their own education rather than being passive recipients 
of prepackaged information. To create such a learning environment, fac¬ 
ulty members will require assistance in developing the skills they need to 
be effective and stimulating guides and and mentors. 12 
This study creates a complex case to enable faculty members to guide 
student into independent learning rather than merely transmitting information. 
Most salient strategic elements are present in the simulation, but many thou¬ 
sands of factual or operational details, which must be attended to in reality, are 
absent. Enough data will be included on the knowledge requirements of other 
business courses that one would hope the students will appreciate the academic 
circumstances in which the teaching problem has developed. 
Teaching Concepts Derived from Adult Learning Theories 
Carl Rogers made one of the sharpest breaks between theorists who 
based their teaching concepts based primarily on studies of children and those 
theorists who derived their theories of learning primarily from studies of adults: 
Teaching, in my estimation, is a vastly over-rated function. Hav¬ 
ing made such a statement, I scurry to the dictionary to see if I really 
mean what I say. Teaching means ’to instruct’. Personally I am not 
much interested in instructing another in what he should know or think. 
’To impact knowledge or skill’. My reaction is, why not be more efficient, 
using a book or programmed learning? ’To make to know.’ Here my 
hackles rise. I have no wish to make anyone know something. ’To show 
guide, direct.’ As I see it, too many people have been shown, guided, 
directed. So I come to the conclusion that I do mean what I say. Teach¬ 
ing is, for me, a relatively unimportant and vastly overvalued activity. 13 
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Rogers explained that in his view teaching and the imparting of knowl¬ 
edge make sense in an unchanging environment, which is why it has been an 
unquestioned function for centuries. ’’But if there is one truth about modern 
man, it is that he lives in an environment which is continually changing,” and 
therefore the aim of education must be the facilitation of learning.14 He defines 
the role of the teacher as that of a facilitator of learning. The critical element in 
performing this role is the personal relationship between the facilitator and the 
learner, which in turn is dependent on the facilitator’s possessing three addi¬ 
tional attitudinal qualities: (1) realness and genuineness, (2) nonposssessive car¬ 
ing, prizing, trust, and respect, and (3) empathic understanding and sensitive 
and accurate listening.15 
He provides the following guideline for a facilitators of learning: 
1. Facilitators have much to do with the initial mood or climate of the 
group or class experience. 
2. Facilitators help to elicit and clarify the purposes of the individuals in 
the class as well as the more general purposes of the group. 
3. They rely upon the desire of each student to implement those purposes 
which have meaning for them as the motivational force behind significant learn¬ 
ing. 
4. They endeavor to organize and make easily available the widest possi¬ 
ble range of resources for learning. 
5. They regard themselves as flexible resources to be utilized by the 
group. 
6. In responding to expressions in the classroom group, they accept both 
intellectual content and the emotionalized attitudes, endeavoring to give each as- 
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pect the approximate degree of emphasis which it has for the individual and the 
group. 
7. As the accepted classroom climate becomes established, facilitators are 
able increasingly to become participant learners, members of the group, express¬ 
ing their views as those in one individual only. 
8. In their functioning of facilitators of learning, they endeavor to recog¬ 
nize and accept their own limitations. 16 
Although Maslow does not spell out his conception of the role of teacher, 
several followers of both Rogers and Maslow have experimented with translating 
their theories into classroom behavior. George Brown, for example, described 
the development of confluent education—the term for the integration of flowing 
together of affective and cognitive elements in individual and group learning—in 
the Ford-Esalen Project in Affective Education in California in the late 1960s. 
Elizabeth Drews described an experiment to test a new program designed to fos¬ 
ter self-initiated learning and self-actualization, in which teachers defined their 
roles as facilitators of learning. Their conclusions can best be summarized us¬ 
ing Goodwin Watson’s Guidelines for the facilitation of learning: 
1. Behavior which is rewarded, from the learner’s point of view, is more 
likely to recur. 
2. How ’’ready” we are to learn something new is contingent upon the 
confluence of diverse—and changing—factors, some of which include: 
a. adequate existing experience to permit the new to be learned; 
b. adequate significance and relevance for the learner to engage in 
learning activity; 
c. freedom from discouragement, the expectation of failure, or threats 
to physical, emotional, or intellectual well-being; 
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3. Genuine participation intensifies motivation, flexibility, and rate of 
learning. 17 
Contrasting adult learning with childhood learning also offers one means 
for exploring the unique characteristics of adult learners. Malcolm Knowles has 
proposed adoption of the term andragogy, the ’’art and science of helping adults 
learn, ”18 to be distinguished from pedagogy, the instruction of children. Andrag¬ 
ogy is grounded on four assumptions, that pinpoint some of the salient features 
of adulthood: 
1. As a person matures his or her self-concept moves from one of a 
dependent personality toward one of self-directed human being. 
2. An adult communicates a growing reservoir of experience, a rich 
resource for learning. For an adult, personal experiences establish self-identity 
and so are highly valued; 
3. The readiness for an adult to learn is closely related to the develop¬ 
mental tasks of his or her social role; and, 
4. There is a change in time perspective as individuals mature, from one 
of future application of knowledge to immediacy of application; thus an adult is 
more problem-centered than subject-centered in learning. 19 
The preceding principles drawn from the research on adult learning theo¬ 
ries are helpful as a set of guidelines for a teacher in a graduate business 
school setting and are the foundation of the case study methodology of teaching. 
These assumptions encapsulate much of the literature about adult learn¬ 
ing and development. The first two—that adults are independent beings and 
have forged their identities from unique personal experience—are drawn from 
humanistic philosophy and psychology and readily generate implications for 
teaching adults. The third and fourth assumptions, dealing with the adult’s 
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readiness and orientation to learning, provide the links to understanding adult 
learning from a psychological developmental perspective. Some knowledge of 
both the humanist and developmental orientations, when combined with princi¬ 
ples related to the learning process itself, offer adult educators an understanding 
of the complex relationship between adulthood and learning. 
27 
Relationship Between Adult Education Principles and the Case Methodology 
Fundamental principles of adult education are closely related to charac¬ 
teristics of the case method as shown in the following parallels based on Jack R. 
Gibbs’s article on Learning Theory, 20 and David Ulrich’s article: The Case 
Method. 21 
PRINCIPLES OF ADULT EDUCATION 
Learning must be problem centered. . . 
the problem must arise in the experi¬ 
ences, perplexities, doubts, and thinking 
of the learner; the problem must be a 
problem of the learner. 
Learning must be experience centered; the 
teacher must provide the optimal kind of 
experiences that will relate to the problem 
of the learner, 
The learner must be free to look at the 
experience. The learning climate 
should be permissive, supportive, ac¬ 
cepting, free, spontaneous, reality-cen¬ 
tered, or person-centered. 
Experience must be meaninful to the 
learner. A shared responsibility of the 
learner and the teacher is to create 
and environment in which the learner 
can see meaning. 
The goals must be set and the search 
organized by the learner. Active 
learning is a more effective learning 
mechanism than passive learning. 
THE CASE METHOD OF TEACHING 
Independent, constructive thinking 
on the part of the student is es¬ 
sential . . . 
Developing rapport with the class is. . 
. the deliberate creation of an envi¬ 
ronment in which the students can 
learn. 
In a democratic and permissive atmos¬ 
phere the teacher will get help from 
the students in getting away from the 
unilateral way of teaching. 
The teacher should deal with those 
aspects of the case which are 
meaningful to the learner. 
Case studies are student centered; the 
desired result of student participation 
is achieved by the opening of free 
communication between students and 
other students and between students 
and the teacher. 
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Schmidt and Svenson stated: 
The case study provides an opportunity for each individual to ar¬ 
ticulate his/her assumptions, attitudes, and theories and to compare them 
with those of others in the group. . . . Individuals in the learning group 
read the description of a real or simulated problem situation. Through 
discussion they share ideas on the key elements of the problem, princi¬ 
ples to be followed in solving it, and action which they would take if con¬ 
fronted by such a situation.22 
Kidd pointed out that: 
. . . What makes a particular case useful is its reality, its rele¬ 
vance to problems faced by others, the completeness of available data, 
and the significance of the issues and values at stake. . . . The case 
method has applications particularly to fields where there are few or no 
final answers, and where judgment is the essential quality. Many of the 
characteristics of a small discussion group must be present if there is to 
be genuine learning. Its reality and the efforts to state principles in 
terms of good practice in real situations makes it an approach of par¬ 
ticular value to many adult students.23 
Each of the following purposes for which cases are commonly used, ac¬ 
cording to Miller, impose somewhat different requirements on their construction: 
It is important to . . . specify the learning objective or we find our¬ 
selves without some crucial element in the materials a lack of which is 
not exposed until a group is engaged in discussing [the case].24 
In view of these similarities it is surprising that the case method or the 
simulation method is not dealt with in more detail and more frequently in the 
literature of adult education. Based on this close parallelism, case methods 
seem ideally suited for adults. They have more experience to draw from in ar¬ 
riving at judgments based on specific information. A simulation allows knowl¬ 
edgeable adults to share their information and to arrive at group responses to 
developing negotiations. 
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In discussing the need for ’’self-education,” or active participation by the 
learner in the process of learning, A. Lawrence Lowell wrote: ” ’Self-educa¬ 
tion’ is based on the principle that, beyond the mechanical elements, noone can 
be really educated against his will, or without his own active effort.” 25 
In short, learners share actively in the task of learning; they must create 
for themselves the ideas that the instructor seeks to communicate. The process 
of learning is not one of absorption or of fitting pieces of knowledge into one 
pattern. The process of learning is truly one of creation. Other adult educa¬ 
tional theorists describe the case method of teaching as an effort to blend cogni¬ 
tive and affective learning modes. Any attempt to capture this dynamic, the 
subtle ebb and flow of interacting ideas between teacher and student, is difficult 
at best, perhaps impossible. This may be why the phenomenon of the case 
method has seldom been analyzed or described in adult education literature.26 
A review of the fundamental principles underlying the case method of 
teaching may help explain better the relationship between adult learning and the 
case method of teaching. 
1. The primacy of situation analysis. For both teachers and students of 
business, the primary consideration is ’’the law of the situation,” to use sociolo¬ 
gist Mary Parker Follett’s pithy phrase.27 Analyzing a specific situation forces 
students to deal with the ”as is”, not the ’’might be.” They must confront the 
intractability of reality: an absence of needed information, the ever present con¬ 
flict of objectives, and the imbalance between needs and resources. The man¬ 
ager must and can act effectively under those circumstances; the intern manager 
is also expected to do so. 
This situational orientation, moreover, insistently reminds students of the 
vast gap between simplistic, global prescriptions and what can be said to a spe- 
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cific manager at a specific time on a specific issue. The goal of the case dis¬ 
cussion is to help students develop the capacity to deal with the situation in a 
specific way, not to deliver commentaries on the general. From experience gar¬ 
nered in many case discussions, students will in fact derive generalizations, but 
they are stated tentatively, tested frequently, and always with care. 
2. The imperative of relating analysis and action. 
The traditional academic accomplishment has been to know; the adult’s 
has been to act. The case method seeks to combine these two activities. The ap¬ 
plication of knowledge, always partial, to the complexities of a business prob¬ 
lem, never capable of complete solution, is the manager’s primary task. Case 
discussions are crude mirrors of reality. The class considers action in tandem 
with analysis whenever possible. The minimum end product of a case discussion 
is an understanding of what needs to be done and how it can be accomplished. 
At its best, the case discussion will include an exploration of how a plan can be 
translated into committed behavior of a group of managers. 
The importance of action influences the entire case discussion, which fo¬ 
cuses on the practical and doable, the partial but accomplishable, and the neces¬ 
sity for dealing with first-step accommodations rather than waiting for complete 
solutions. Long term cases and simulations give students an opportunity to 
build relationships which enable them to work more effectively together, gather 
specific information and develop data bases needed for the negotiation sessions. 
3. The necessity of student involvement. 
The active intellectual and emotional involvement of students is the hall¬ 
mark of case teaching. Involvement offers the most dramatic visible contrast 
with a stereotypical lecture class. In the educational process of managers, 
where knowledge and application must be related, student involvement is essen- 
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tial. One does not learn to play golf by reading a book, but by taking club in 
hand and actually hitting the golf ball - preferably under a pro’s watchful eye. 
A practice green is not a golf game, and a case is not real life. Fortunes, repu¬ 
tations and careers are not made or lost in the classroom, but case discussion 
is a useful subset of reality; it can present a micro-cosm of actual managerial 
life. It also allows students to practice the application of real-life management 
skills: observation, listening, diagnosing, deciding, and intervening in group proc¬ 
esses to achieve desired objectives. 
Case discussion demands total involvement in a variety of ways, first and 
foremost in the give-and-take of class discussion—with mind as well as vocal 
cords. It insists that students practice managerial skills both in class and in all 
other academic activities, taking responsibility for their own self-education and 
for the development of their colleagues. Managers are, after all, both teachers 
and students in their everyday work. 
4. A nontraditional instructor role. 
A teacher thoroughly experienced in traditional methodologies may well 
find case teaching difficult to understand. ”As far as I can see the instructor’s 
job is to give an intelligent grunt of approval, ask some questions, and make a 
summary statement,” said one. Another commented, ”It’s a blinking bit of in¬ 
tellectual chaos and so darned inefficient! Why let the class ’muck around’ for 
an hour to work through a point when I can explain it in a few minutes. They 
call that teaching? Just what is the instructor doing?” Guiding a process of dis¬ 
covery, an advocate of the method might reply. 
Some instructors, unfortunately, use the case method in masquerade 
form. While espousing openness and collaboration, they require students to fol¬ 
low their teaching plan point by point, with drumbeat cadence. It may seem as 
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if the student’s assignment is to come up with the missing words in an aca¬ 
demic crossword puzzle—the instructor’s teaching plan. Such pedagogical fail¬ 
ures give ammunition to the critics of the case method of teaching, for the 
badly executed case discussion can be a disaster: inefficient in use of time and 
ineffective in student motivation and learning. 
Even if teachers are masters of case method instruction, it is difficult to 
say what they are doing.28 We all appreciate the difficulty of describing what 
an artist ’’does.” What artists and instructors do or do not do, when and how, 
may be as important as what they know. The artistry of teaching may be ar¬ 
cane, but some of its mystery can be clarified, as Professor Kenneth Andrews 
thoughtfully describes the case instructor’s role: 
The instructors provide the impromptu services which any group 
discussion requires. They keep the proceedings orderly. They should be 
able to ask questions which invite advance in group thinking and at the 
same time reveal the relevance of the talk that has gone before. They 
need the ability to weave together the treads of individual contribution 
into a pattern which not only they themselves but the entire class can 
perceive. 
They need the sense of timing which tells that the discussion is 
not moving fast enough to make good use of available time or is racing 
away from the comprehension of half the class. They exercise control 
over the essentially ’’undirected” activity, but at the same time they keep 
out of the way, lest they prevent the class from making discoveries new 
also to the instructor. Since unpredictable developments always distin¬ 
guish real learning, they examine the class rather than the subject.29 
The instructor’s role in this kind of learning process differs in several as¬ 
pects from the traditional practice.30 First, the task is not so much to teach 
students as to encourage learning. This shift in mission affects a wide range of 
instructional activities, from preparing class material and planning class sessions 
to measuring what the course has accomplished. 
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Second, the teacher must be willing to forgo the role and status of the 
center-stage, intellectually superior authority figure.3l As discussion leaders 
they are simply members of the learning group, albeit with a unique position. 
Gragg wisely stated that . .Teachers Also Must Learn. ”32 in addition to pro¬ 
viding information and monitoring the quality of student analysis and presenta¬ 
tion, the instructor must facilitate a process of co-inquiry. A primary responsi¬ 
bility, therefore, is the maintenance of the quality of those paths of inquiry. 
Third, the instructor must be both teacher and practitioner. Students 
might accept that one can legitimately discuss the Battle of Waterloo without 
having the capacity to command a brigade of infantry. But instructors who try 
to develop student’s skill in observation, listening, communication, and decision 
making will be expected to practice what they are preaching and vice versa.33 
While the case method has many advantages of self-education and self¬ 
development, the method is also seen by some educators and management 
training directors to have certain limitations. It puts great responsibility on the 
participants and on the skill of the instructor. This often presents an obstacle to 
the less outgoing, who need to rely on more structured forms of instruction. 
The case method often frustrates participants who seek "the right answer" and 
who look to the teachers for firm direction. But a teacher using the case 
method is required to help each member to deal with the reality of their own 
experience. A skillful leader must gradually lead the dependent and sometimes 
doubting participants to defend his/her own ideas independently of the teacher. 
The adult educator who can achieve this movement from dependency to inde¬ 
pendent thought and action is needed today. 
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Limitations of the Case Study Methodology for Adult Learners 
The standard mode of using cases has historically been the lecture and 
discussion method,but that approach has some limitations that simulations may 
overcome, the most critical problem, is that the material is presented sequen¬ 
tially by the lecturers. They must select an appropriate place to start in describ¬ 
ing a complex topic, and then must try to work their way through to the end. 
With such a linear approach, it is frequently difficult for the learner to grasp 
the nature of the whole. As R. H. Rhyne suggested, it is like an inchworm try¬ 
ing to study the Mona Lisa by crawling over it, viewing one piece of the paint¬ 
ing at a time.34 Linear approaches do not eventually yield a good appreciation 
of ill-structured Problems. This is particularly so in instances in which one is 
trying to teach an appreciation of the simultaneity of events and actions. 
Likewise, case studies usually entail comments, questions, and answers, 
following the lecture by the teacher. Often such discussions begin with the re¬ 
marks of the most loquacious person in the group, rather than those of the one 
with the most important comments. Similarly, the time devoted to consideration 
of given topics may be more closely tied to the persistence of the speaker (and 
the hesitation of the instructor to cut him or her off), than to the relative impor¬ 
tance of the comment. In addition, discussions rarely begin with the first points 
made in the presentation and proceed through the points in the order in which 
were made; thus in many cases the questions flow in no logical order. 
A third, related shortcoming of the case method or any other use of ver¬ 
bal models, is that the form is one in which it is difficult to present system char¬ 
acteristics clearly. The multiple connections and consequences of a given ele¬ 
ment or action are difficult to convey verbally. While it is often impossible to 
understand a social system, by simply immersing oneself in it, because the com- 
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plexity is too confusing, the verbal description too often suffers from oversimpli¬ 
fication. For example, a case study on international business negotiations may 
include discussion on the functions and operations of the company, the Senate, 
the chief negotiator and the balance of power among them; then it may turn to 
processes such as lobbying and bargaining. Each of these can be looked at one 
at a time, and the listener may have a difficult time piecing the parts together. 
Fourth, without prior experience, words may not call up such imagery, or 
they may call up different imagery to different members of the class. This 
symbiotic confusion is particularly likely to arise in cross-cultural situations and 
where case studies developed in one society are employed in another. Because 
business cultures differ from society to society, home culture perceptions of the 
task environment may be inappropriate when dealing with people whose opera¬ 
tions are located abroad. This societal environment includes the wider patterns 
of social relationships and of cultural definitions of social life in a society: lan¬ 
guage, social organization, law, and politics. 
Definition of Simulations 
The best way to define a simulation is to think in terms of a large-scale 
technological system, such as a wind tunnel for testing aircraft and training pi¬ 
lots, or a televised simulation of spacecraft vehicles and their maneuvers. 
These are models of systems—in the former case, showing the wind elements 
and effects of these on aircraft, and, in the latter case, showing a technological 
system built to travel and perform operations in space. In neither of these 
simulations is the entire system represented; that is, they are not just scaled 
down versions of the larger referent systems. Rather, some aspects are simpli¬ 
fied and others are omitted. Thus the simulated spacecraft was constructed so 
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that the dimensions are scaled accurately to the original, but the weight of the 
model is likely to have been a matter of no concern to the modelers. 
As changes take place in the referent system, they likewise take place in 
the model, for a simulation is an operating model. Consider, for example, the 
difference between a diagram of the solar system, and the simulation one finds 
in a planetarium. 
Keeping these examples in mind, the author’s definition of a simulation 
reads as follows: A simulation is an operating model of central features or ele¬ 
ments of a real or proposed system, process, or environment. This definition 
stresses the critical dimension of a simulation, namely, that: a simulation is a 
form of a model; it is a dynamic, as opposed to a static (case), model; only se¬ 
lected elements of the referent system are included; referent systems can be of 
several different sorts. 
Business simulations can therefore be seen as attempts to devise an envi¬ 
ronment for students that they would not ordinarily experience—an environment 
that abstracts from reality those social, economic, or political phenomena that 
together make up a complex and sometimes confusing situation, but when re¬ 
duced by simulation, become comprehensive, revealing and educational in the 
broadest sense. Whether the referent system is a business firm, a national gov¬ 
ernment, or an international negotiation, the principle is the same: central fea¬ 
tures are identified, represented, and constructed into a model that operates in a 
manner similar to the real world system.34 
Simulations are often confused with ’’games,” and the distinction between 
simulation and games is often unclear, as the two terms are sometimes used 
synonymously. The confusion of terms is not only simply the result of sloppy 
usage. It also results from users’ concerns that both terms have problematic 
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connotations that users dislike. For some people, simulations are too complex, 
too technical, too mechanical. Hence, they prefer to use the lighter-toned term 
’’games”. Ken Jones argues that this is the main reason why teachers avoid 
simulations. His solution to the dilemma is to suggest that: ’’instead of thinking 
of a simulation like a game, it is useful to think of it as being a case study, but 
with the participants on the inside, not on the outside. ”35 
In addition, in business simulations, there is little ’’second-guessing” in 
terms of personalities of particular people or positions. Participants are not only 
given a scenario and a role profile, but also have to meet company goals. Thus 
the consequences of actions in terms of goal attainment or failure to achieve 
desired ends are built into the design.36 Managers involved in this interna¬ 
tional simulation will experience that their actions create consequences that are 
responsible for the international movement of capital, technology, and personnel. 
They are agents of change in consumer tastes, skills, ideas, and even political 
and social systems. 
Differences between Case Studies and Simulations 
How is teaching with simulations different from teaching a case study? 
First, in simulations, in contrast with cases, the class members are active learn¬ 
ers. They must make decisions, pay the consequences, articulate positions, and 
make the system work. After the simulation, the analysis focuses on what hap¬ 
pened and why, how that relates to the real-world counterpart, and the limita¬ 
tions of the simulation. Thus the learning experience builds upon the philoso¬ 
phy in the old Chinese proverb: 
I hear and I forget 
I see and I remember 
I do and I understand 
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Adult learning theories stressed the importance of the student’s active in¬ 
volvement with the materials or skills to be learned. The use of simulations 
permits discovery, experimentation, and reflection. Omar Khayam Moore and 
Alan Ross Anderson’s four heuristic principles for the design of learning envi¬ 
ronments also parallel the arguments for the effective use of simulation in 
teaching.37 They suggest that, first, the learner should be given the opportunity 
to operate from various perspectives. The learner should not just be a recipient 
of information, but should at times be an agent, a referee, and a reciprocator. 
Second, activities should contain their own goals and sources of motivation, not 
just represent means to some end (such as grades). That is, in an effective 
learning environment, activities are authentic. Third, the learners should be 
freed from a dependence on authority and allowed to reason for themselves; 
they are thus made more productive in the learning process. And fourth, the 
environment should be responsive to the learners’ activity. Not only should they 
be given feedback, but they should be helped to be reflexive, evaluating their 
own progress see Darkenwald, 1982. 
The active involvement aspect of simulations in the learning process has 
been well described in the major books in the field see Abt, 1974; Boocock and 
Schild, 1968; Duke, 1974; Goodman and Coppart, 1979; Gordon, 1970; 
Greenblat and Duke, 1975, 1981; Jones, 1980, 1982; Raser 1969; Sanoff, 1979; 
Shubik, 1975; Taylor and Walford, 1978. 
To say that students engaged with the materials does not mean that the 
experience is all pleasant or ”fun.” Linda Lederman and Lea Stewart have de¬ 
scribed the multiple dimensions and consequences of such engagement as fol¬ 
lows: 
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Finally, years of experience with interactive, instructional simula¬ 
tions have demonstrated that students in simulations have an involvement 
with learning unmatched in any traditional classroom. Engagement in the 
activity call for active learning, and action brings with it involvement. 
This is not to say, however, that involvement always carries with it a 
’’feeling good” affect. Experiences bring them challenges, challenges 
which at times bring them uncertainty (”how am I supposed to do this?”), 
ambiguity (’’what’s the right way?” ’’why doesn’t the professor tell me 
what to do?”), change (”I have never been in this position before, no one 
ever told me before that I needed to behave differently”). But, uncer¬ 
tainty, ambiguity, and change, as well as error, diversity, and even at 
times confusion are the lifeblood of learning by doing. They provide the 
raw data out of which participants, through their own methods, in their 
own ways, and in their own time, construct for themselves patterns, theo¬ 
ries, and behaviors that permit them to cope successfully with the simu¬ 
lated environment, and therefore, in the long term, the real-world envi¬ 
ronment which it models.38 
Second, rather than being lectured to and then engaging in discussion, 
students experience the topic as a whole, since many components of the system 
are presented simultaneously in the simulation. In addition, discussion and 
analysis following the simulation is often structured by roles rather than by out¬ 
spokenness or assertiveness. Indeed, the author less often experienced that pre¬ 
viously silent members of a class sometimes become the most vocal active par¬ 
ticipants in a simulation and in the ensuing discussion. 
Third, and finally, simulations are particularly useful for conveying sys¬ 
tem characteristics. It has long been recognized that systems are more clearly 
described using graphic models, such as diagrams or pictures, or using physical 
representation, then through using verbal models. Consider, for example, the 
greater clarity of a diagram as opposed to a verbal description of the human 
circulatory system. A simulation, or a model of a system in operation, such as 
an international negotiation session, can be an even more potent teaching tool 
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than a graphic model. By being actively involved, students develop orientations 
to particular concepts ("offset,” "exchange rates”) within a common context 
(negotiations in aircraft sales). These concepts and related principles can then 
be explored, using the experience shared by all members. 
Simulations thus differ from case studies in the degree of structure and 
formalization they entail and in their emphasis on interaction processes rather 
than on assuming individual roles at the end of the case. Simulations are mod¬ 
els of systems. As changes take place in the referent system, they likewise take 
place in the model, for a simulation is an operating model. Furthermore, in 
many instances of using case studies in the classroom, several students partici¬ 
pate while the remainder of the class can be passive. When simulations are 
used, all students are participants; none are passive observers.39 
Conclusion 
What happens when the environment in which business operates is chang¬ 
ing so dramatically that teachers in graduate business schools find it difficult to 
keep up with these changes and remain experts in their respective disciplines? 
Simulations might add another dimension to the case study method which will 
help in the identification of what I previously called ill-structured problems. 
While simulations will not solve all adult educational problems, it is clear that 
their utilization offers better opportunities than case studies for teaching and 
learning about ill-structured problems. Such utilization extends beyond the 
classroom context, for many international business negotiations require that de¬ 
cision makers obtain the overall perspectives and systematic understandings that 
emerge so well from simulation activities.40 
The author’s review of literature in the fields of adult learning and teach¬ 
ing methodologies perhaps best characterizes the relationship between the adult 
41 
student and teacher as a partnership. If adult education is seen as the recon¬ 
struction of experiences through interactive processes with one’s environment, 
then this view of the teacher-learner relationship is correct. The teacher’s re¬ 
sponsibility then is to organize, stimulate, instigate, and evaluate the highly com¬ 
plex process of education. The teacher provides a setting that is conducive to 
learning. In so doing, the teacher also becomes a learner, for the relationship 
between teacher and learner becomes reciprocal. Both should plan and learn 
from each other. The adult teacher is neither totally directive nor totally passive. 
Rather, in Chistensens’ words, ’’The teacher is a learner, and the learner is, 
without knowing it, a teacher, and upon the whole the less consciousness there 
is, on either side, of either giving or receiving instruction, the better. ”41 
When the literature in the field of the case method and simulation of 
teaching adult graduate business students was reviewed, it became apparent to 
the author that the case method of teaching had an honorable history of involv¬ 
ing students in the learning process and, on the other hand teaching materials 
that are illustrative examples of ill-structured Problems created by a fast chang¬ 
ing business environment are almost non-existent. By creating the MAS simu¬ 
lation, the author wanted to bridge this gap by providing students with an oppor¬ 
tunity to integrate and apply theoretical knowledge and personal experience in a 
simulated environment. Participating in a simulation such as MAS may be as 
close as it is possible to come to a real world management experience within 
the confines of a traditional course of study. Unlike case studies, where the 
situation can never react to the student’s analysis, MAS offers a variety of stra¬ 
tegic problems that result directly from the decisions and actions of all partici¬ 
pants. 
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Unlike the real world, the simulation enables total concentration upon 
strategic planning, as the implementation of those plans is carried out in the ne¬ 
gotiation sessions. Also unlike the real world, IMAS is ultimately only a learn¬ 
ing experience. No participant’s performance will affect his or her standard of 
living. On the other hand, creative strategies may be freely tested with a degree 
of freedom not available when the welfare of a real corporation and its employ¬ 
ees depend upon the outcome. 
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CHAPTER III 
TEACHING PROCESS FOR THE SIMULATION 
Introduction 
In Chapter I, the need to revitalize teaching methodologies in adult gradu¬ 
ate education was discussed. Possible improvements included a greater use of 
active, student involved teaching methods such as the use of case study simula¬ 
tions to strengthen the link between adult learning theories and teaching meth¬ 
ods. Chapter II delineated previous attempts at introducing the case method of 
teaching as an appropriate method for adult learners and suggested changes 
through the use of simulations to accommodate ill-structured Problems created 
by the rapid changes in today’s complex business environment. 
This chapter details the pedagogical elements that form the foundation 
for the teaching process used in the MAS simulation. The specific objectives 
for the development of the MAS simulation were to provide prospective manag¬ 
ers with a complex business situation which defies conventional standards for 
structuring problems, so that adult learners may bring their background and ex¬ 
perience to bear in the learning situation. 
By participating in the simulation, students will then structure the vari¬ 
ables given in the curriculum materials to fit the needs of both the individuals 
and the organization they represent. Presented in simulated form, the course 
materials the author developed are intended to encourage student involvement 
by providing data—substantive and process—essential to an analysis of a spe¬ 
cific situation, for the framing of alternative action programs, and for their im¬ 
plementation recognizing the complexity and ambiguity of the situation (see 
Chapter n, pg 15). This simulation provides students with an opportunity to 
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bring to bear an unlimited variety of knowledge and skills acquired in their pre- 
vious academic and practical experience. 
Individual students have little access either to the corridors of power in¬ 
volved in international negotiations or to much of the secret information that 
guides and influences these negotiations. Using the different backgrounds of 
their colleagues, the IMAS simulation proved an effwctive, if imperfect, instru¬ 
ment to probe these matters. 
The second objective is to provide some practical suggestions for instruc¬ 
tors who use ill-structured Problems problem materials in their curricula to im¬ 
prove their effectiveness as facilitators in the adult learning setting. Both objec¬ 
tives reaffirm the essential elements of adult learning principles explained in 
Chapter H: learning should be problem centered, action oriented and experience 
based. The DMAS simulation itself enlarges on Lawrence’s theme of the case as 
a teaching instrument crafted to create a specific discussion opportunity. 
Basic Pedagogical Elements 
Analyzing a specific situation forces students to deal with the ”as is,” not 
the ”might be.” During the semester, the students will find themselves repre¬ 
senting the United States government, a specific industry, or a third world mili¬ 
tary power. At times the decision making roles are less specific and are played 
collectively by the team. Areas of activity can range from defense to economic 
management, from diplomatic negotiations to journalistic or espionage activities 
(see Appendix C). Skills in decision-making, negotiating, proposal writing and 
planning are the order of the day. On other occasions students will be required 
to confront the intractability of reality: an absence of needed information, the 
ever-present conflict of objectives, and the imbalance between needs and re¬ 
sources (see Appendix D). As managers, they need to learn to act effectively 
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under these circumstances; the intern manager, as well as the experienced man¬ 
ager is also expected to do so. The situational orientation of the IMAS simula¬ 
tion, moreover, insistently reminds students of the vast gap between simplistic, 
global prescriptions and what can be said to a specific manager, at a specific 
time, on a specific issue. From experience garnered in many discussions, the 
adult learners can in fact gain a ’’knowledge of,” rather than a ’’knowledge 
about” international negotiations. F. J. Roethlisberger in his research on Train¬ 
ing for Human relations, puts it as follows: 
Although related, we assumed that there were two kinds of knowl¬ 
edge that needed to be different. One is the kind of knowledge that is 
associated with the scientist who is seeking to make verifiable proposi¬ 
tions about a certain class of phenomena. The other is the kind of knowl¬ 
edge that is associated with the practitioner of a skill in relation to a 
class of phenomena. 
The difference between these two kinds of knowledge can be read¬ 
ily seen by contrasting the aim of the scientists with the aim of a practi¬ 
tioner of a skill. The aim of the scientist is to discover and make vari¬ 
able propositions about a certain class of phenomena; the aim of the 
practitioner is the immediate ’’control” of the phenomena with which he/ 
she deals. Although the ’’knowledge of acquaintance” which the practitio¬ 
ner acquires from the practice of skills often remains intuitive and im¬ 
plicit, it serves his/her immediate purposes well.l 
The purpose of adult graduate business education is to combine knowl¬ 
edge and action. The application of knowledge, always partial, to the complexi¬ 
ties of a business problem, never capable of complete solution, is the manager’s 
primary task. 
The IMAS simulation tries to create a crude mirror of the international 
business reality in the sense that the salient strategic elements are present, but 
thousands of tactical or operational details, which must be attained in reality, 
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are absent. This facilitates a time compression so that students can participate 
in the entire process of the negotiations over a relatively short period. The stu¬ 
dents consider action in tandem with analysis whenever possible. The minimum 
end product of a discussion is an understanding of what needs to be done and 
how it can be accomplished. At its best, the classroom discussion will include 
an exploration of how a plan can be translated into committed behavior of a 
group of managers. The importance of action influences the entire discussion, 
which focuses on the practical and doable, the partial but accomplishable, and 
the necessity of dealing with first-step accommodations rather than waiting for 
complete solutions. 
The active intellectual and emotional involvement of students is the hall¬ 
mark of the MAS simulation. Involvement offers the most dramatic visible 
contrast with a stereotypical lecture class. In the educational process of manag¬ 
ers, where knowledge and application must be related, student involvement is 
essential. One does not learn to play golf by reading a book, but by taking club 
in hand and actually hitting the golf ball—preferably under a pro’s watchful eye. 
A practice green is not a golf game, and a case study is not real life. 
For a teacher of adults, the interplay of knowledge, and the discussion 
process is critical. Like two scissor blades, both elements must work together 
for incisive learning. Not all instructors appreciate that reality. Most adult stu¬ 
dents do. 
Instructional Strategies Used in Teaching the IMAS Course 
Preparing for the Negotiating Sessions 
When teaching adults it is easier to declare the need for the integration 
of knowledge into the discussion process than it is to provide practical, detailed 
support for instructors wishing to improve their proficiency as discussion lead- 
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ers. How does the need for a certain degree of mastery of both knowledge and 
process affect preparation for class? What are some of the consequences for a 
teacher’s leadership in a simulation dialogue? One of the author’s students in 
the pilot course stated the problem pointedly. She asked, ”How do I plan for a 
discussion session yet to be born? ” How do I ready myself for the minute-by- 
minute job of running the class—to be able to understand, organize, and guide 
the free flowing give-and-take of the simulation class? As soon as I ask the 
first question to anyone on the other side, everything is wide open. It is a 
frightening process—traditional structures just don’t seem to work for me. 
What’s the answer?” There is no simple solution. 
Based on the experience gained from teaching the MAS pilot course and 
ten years of working with adult graduate business students, the author has devel¬ 
oped his own method of preparing for a discussion class where there are no 
right or wrong solutions. These suggestions are only intended as guidelines. 
The suggested approach is just one of many possibilities. 
The first step used in the preparation for teaching the MAS case is to 
review the substantive materials (PART II) to be introduced in the session, and 
to note the critical issues that need to be raised or were raised in previous ses¬ 
sions (later on in the semester). At the same time it is important to pinpoint 
areas where further examination needs to be encouraged. What topics remain 
to be raised, and what upcoming proposals offer the best possibilities for their 
exploration? Detailed instructor summary notes, made after each session, pro¬ 
vide the data for this exercise. Postclass discussion with students is also valu¬ 
able to review strengths and weaknesses of each session. Videotaping some of 
the sessions provides useful feedback for the instructor. 
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Next, an in-depth preparation of the simulation is suggested. The objec¬ 
tive is to prepare a detailed analysis of the data needed for the upcoming nego¬ 
tiation session. Superior command of substantive information and the discipline 
of a rigorous intellectual analysis are basic to any preparation, but offer special 
benefits to a discussion leader. Command of the substantive gives the instructor 
additional opportunities to concentrate on understanding and managing the nego¬ 
tiation process, the only first hand data with which he or she has to work. 
Roethisberger clarified this point: ’’For me the important facts existed in the dis¬ 
cussion of the data and not in the written materials per se. It could be said that 
they [other instructors] were teaching the written case, whereas I was teaching 
the discussion of it.”2 Ideally a facilitator can use both data banks. 
Once this analytic exercise is complete, preparation could shift to a more 
complex task: trying to predict and prepare for the process by which students 
and instructor will handle the negotiations. Without attempting to draw up a 
formal statement, the aim is to develop an internalized appreciation and com¬ 
mand of the complexities of the MAS simulation that may influence the discus¬ 
sion dynamic during any of the negotiating sessions. First and foremost is an 
understanding of each student’s background, and a reading of the current work 
experience of the group. The instructor needs to anticipate approximately 
where in the discussion opportunities may arise to meet individual student and 
group learning needs. 
Where are the danger spots? The following five step procedure might help to 
plan for constructive guidance during the negotiations: 
1. Assess the status of the negotiations. How far and well have they 
progressed in terms of an agreement? Where have they made the most pro- 
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gress, where the least? What is the capacity of the class to work as learning 
groups? 
2. Review each student history and performance. Who might contrib¬ 
ute most? Does the simulation provide special learning opportunities for stu¬ 
dents with limited experience? 
3. Recognize and try to deal with your own mood. Do you like or 
dislike to teach this simulation? Is this a fun course for you or an academic 
chore? Where might the instructor’s personal biases or prejudices affect the 
leadership of the discussions? All those considerations as well as family and 
personal concerns, influence the instructor’s behavior in the classroom. It is 
helpful to acknowledge and examine the potential impact of these factors on 
classroom leadership. 
4. Review the MAS date (PART II - Student Materials) as a discus¬ 
sion instrument. Where are the best opportunities to practice needed negotiation 
skills? Where can students’ experience best be utilized and in what group? 
What issues of the negotiations have high potential for involvement and conflict? 
5. Work up a series of operational guidelines. How should class 
time be divided between role-playing and diagnosis? How should the sessions 
be paced? Where is there hope for high-involvement points? 
Though there is no way to predict precisely what will happen during the 
upcoming negotiating sessions, this preparation regime has been helpful to the 
author. At a minimum such planning helps instructors avoid some errors and 
capitalize on learning opportunities. At best it may help them appreciate the 
power and complexities of a teaching approach that deals with both both content 
and process while dealing with illl—structured problems problems. 
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Instructional Climate 
The first section of the pilot course (see materials in Chapter IV) offers 
an instructor the opportunity to cover usual first-day tasks, reviewing instruc¬ 
tional protocol and course administration. When the author conducted the 
course, he commented, in considerable detail, on the outline of the simulation 
(see Student materials in Part II), and provide students with some background 
on How Adults Learn, Chapter II). 
The first of two key objectives in this session is to ’’romance” the course; 
we highlight the unique learning opportunities it represents. A superior instruc¬ 
tor of adults continually relearns what it is like to be an adult student. Students 
can learn a great deal from watching experienced colleagues explore and deal 
with familiar problems in innovative ways, and from noticing how the session 
leader meets the familiar challenge of directing the discussion process. 
In addition, the instructor should begin his/her efforts to change a gather¬ 
ing of individuals into a cohesive, supportive learning group by personally wel¬ 
coming each student to the room. In the first session students need to share a 
bit of their backgrounds and future career interest in international negotiations 
with the group. It is advisable to address each student by name and make cer¬ 
tain that students do likewise. An instructional philosophy of openness and trust 
must be behaved to be believed. Professor Glover and Hower put the point 
well. 
Clearly, if the students are to take responsibility for analyzing situ¬ 
ations and discuss them with others, they need a favorable climate to do 
so. This means a permissive atmosphere in which they feel free to put 
forth their ideas and their questions without the instructor reacting in the 
form of rejection, derision, blame, or authoritarian injunctions to think 
along certain lines preferred by the instructor at the moment. This free 
atmosphere will be fostered if the instructor makes up his/her mind to 
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hear and to try to understand what students have to say, and encourage 
others to do the same.3 
Operationally, during the first class the instructor can start by raising 
small issues such as the impact of a potential military aircraft sale on the Con¬ 
necticut economy (see Student Materials). The intend is to demonstrate that ap¬ 
parently simple problems can be really complex. This allows the instructor to 
raise the key issues covered throughout the entire IMAS course. These are the 
issues that need to be covered: 
A sales agreement is only the end result of a fighter competition. The 
country holding the competition selects one of the competing aircraft and agrees 
with the winning company and country on the terms of the sale. Each sales 
agreement is a unique product of: 
1. the economic, political and military goals of the purchasing govern¬ 
ment; 
2. the economic, political and military goals of the selling government; 
3. the economic, political and military goals of the military and civilian 
hierarchies and legislative committees which compete within the governments of 
both the purchasing and selling countries to determine the goals of each; 
4. the economic and political goals of competing aerospace companies; 
and 
5. the goals of all other organizations which perceive themselves as af¬ 
fected by the competition and who were motivated by those perceptions to take 
action. The competitive process by which a sales agreement is reached is 
driven by individual decision makers possessing varying degrees of influence 
within these governmental and corporate organizations. These people must work 
within the following constraints: 
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(a) national law, 
(b) the written standard operating procedures of the organization for 
which they work, 
(c) the unwritten rules, customs and procedures of the various participat¬ 
ing organization and 
(d) their personal perceptions of relevant political and economic environ¬ 
ments. These perceptions are based on information gathered through both the 
media and personal sources. 
The summary of the first session focuses on questions raised and point 
not explored by the students, as well as suggestions on how they might want to 
work with these issues in their groups. 
Establishing the Instructor-Student Learning Contract. 
Initially the instructor should focus on the challenges of the negotiating 
sessions that appeared between class sessions when the perennial problems of 
instructor uncertainty and ’’class building” are at their peak (See details on The 
Teaching Format of the MAS Course in Chapter IV). Someone once said that 
academic communities do not commit homicide with new instructors, they sim¬ 
ply induce suicide. How does a novice instructor survive in the present, and yet 
plan for the future—the remainder of the semester?4 How does an experienced 
instructor avoid a faltering start-up, from which early errors may accumulate 
later into major problems for the class? 
The following are some highlights of preparation requirements for the 
second session: what crucial observations about section behavior need to be 
made? Are the students getting too much involved with details and are there¬ 
fore missing other important elements of the negotiations? What information 
that the instructor received between classes might be useful and how can it be 
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used? What new data from newspapers or publications can be used to get stu¬ 
dents focused on the dynamics of the process? At this time it is useful to pro¬ 
vide students with the data in the Appendix called: Government Correspondence 
and News Releases. 
Listening and Response: the Key Skill Dimension 
Central to the effectiveness of any case discussion leader is the ability to 
ask questions, listen, and respond.5 Unfortunately, relatively little research has 
been done on just what goes on in the crucial black box of professional educa¬ 
tion —the classroom.6 The pioneering investigations of Dwight Allen, formerly 
University Professor at the Darden School of Education, Old Dominion Univer¬ 
sity, and Don Oliver’s work7 have been most helpful to the author. Some very 
practical advice can be found in Margaret Morganroth Guillette’s, The Art and 
Craft of Teaching.8 
Questioning, listening, and response is an area the instructor might want 
to pay attention to throughout the entire semester. The instructors need to dem¬ 
onstrate this skill throughout the discussions and encourage students to critique 
this dimension during the semester. According to Guillette, this teaching process 
issimple in design but difficult in execution. The teaching plan to accomplish 
this feedback, she explains, takes a two-step approach. 
First, the instructor can encourage students to identify and categorize 
question-and-response patterns: to develop their own typologies. Instructors are 
typically intrigued when they realize there are six or eight basic patterns of 
questions and dozens of subset of questions available for their use—a whole ar¬ 
mament in fact. They can ask, for example questions of fact, of interpretation, 
of extension, or they can create hypothetical questions. Designing questions for 
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maximum student learning opportunities is an essential ingredient in the artistry 
of case teaching. 
Second, once the students have established their own first-cut typology, 
the instructor can make these categories operational. When, for example, would 
you use a very general, interpretive question—"What is your appraisal of this 
proposal?”—versus a very specific, factual question—"What is the current return 
of this proposal for the company?” When do you personalize a question—for 
example, ’’Janet, how did you react to that conclusion?” When do you make 
your questions more or less, abstract? In what way is the first class question 
unique? What questions are most appropriate in the early part of the negotia¬ 
tions as opposed to the later part? 
It is important that the instructor explores the complexities of the re¬ 
sponses. Should you respond verbally to a speaker or simply shift to another 
participant? If you respond to the first student, do you express personal ap¬ 
proval or disapproval of those comments? Do you restate the comment and ask 
for elaboration of one or more of its component ideas? Do you demand de¬ 
fense? Ask for clarification? Do you suggest how the current point could be 
combined with a comment made by an earlier contributor? Do you respond to 
the technical content of the comment or the latent feelings of the speaker? 
In case discussions the author suggests putting emphasis on operational 
decisions. How does one decide which student to recognize? Do you make a 
random selection? Do you call on the student whose hand has been raised long¬ 
est? (the author’s experience suggests not; thinking often stops when the hand is 
raised, and if the patient student is recognized, his or her comment usually will 
not fit into the current discussion flow.) How does one determine a student’s 
involvement level? 
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Sensitive listening is the bridge that links questioning and responding and 
is especially important during negotiation sessions that can easily turn into a 
heated discussions if attention is not paid to this process. In Teachers Also must 
Learn, Charles Gragg puts the point well: ’’Teaching is not only the art of think- 
ing and speaking. It is also the art of listening and understanding. Nor by lis¬ 
tening is meant just the act of keeping still. Keeping still is a technique, listen¬ 
ing is an art. 9 The objective is to make each class session a laboratory to ex¬ 
plore the barriers and gateways to ’’active listening”—for example to use Carl 
Roger’s phraseology. The suggested approach highlights five principles. 
First, we ask numerous ’’checking questions” during the sessions—for ex¬ 
ample, ”Is that what you said, Ms. James? Did Ms. Young hear your point?” 
When miscommunication occurs—and in negotiation sessions is is expected to 
happen—the instructor should explore the reasons for the breakdown. These in¬ 
terchanges can serve as a continuing reminder that listening to the other party’s 
point of view is hard work and that miscommunication is all too easy. 
Second, emphasis should be placed on the fundamental distinction be¬ 
tween listening for content and listening for latent feelings—the hidden agenda 
of the negotiations. During the MAS sessions, the instructor should continually 
make decisions about which level he/she should respond on. 
The third principle of effective teaching the course is closely related: ef¬ 
fective listening is most difficult unless one knows each participant as a unique 
human being. Knowing a person helps the instructor hear what the person is 
really saying, especially when the person’s latent feelings are critical to the topic 
being discussed. 
Fourth, constructive listening asks that one understand not only what the 
other person has said but also what they other person might have been expected 
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to say and did not. Instructors need to keep in mind what the specific negotia¬ 
tion session has been dealing with and what the students may be talking about 
in the next few minutes, in the next few classes. 
The author also like to include another working proposition which can be 
expressed in an old Swiss proverb: "When one shuts one eye one does not see 
everything." Observation of the entire negotiation scene—its hot and quiet spots, 
the speaker’s manner in making a point, and the reaction of the other person to 
whom the message is being sent—all contribute to one’s understanding. 
Two operational points typically arise in these discussions. First, how 
does one evaluate a classroom contribution? What is a useful comment; what is 
a poor one? Does one reward a student for excellent process contribution to the 
group’s deliberation? How does an instructor remember, for evaluation pur¬ 
poses, the thirty or fourty comments made in each class session?iO 
The crafting of questions, sensitive listening, and constructive response 
are the key skill requirements for effective discussion teaching. Second, the in¬ 
structor’s ability to stimulate classroom dialogue, to multiply individual insights 
and points of view, and to create circumstances in which individual students 
may practice their negotiation skills and gain in knowledge, maturity, depends in 
large measure on the instructor’s ability to carry out these critical tasks. 
Leading the Discussion Process 
This part of the instructional strategy examines the problem of reaching 
instructional objectives while maintaining a delicate balance between controlling 
the negotiation sessions—putting students through a series of questions usually 
based on the instructor’s analysis of the situation and following his/her bent and 
logic—and directing the negotiations—allowing students substantial leeway to 
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explore ideas of significance to them at a pace appropriate to the needs of most 
section members. 
To put the challenge directly: the discussion leader in an international ne¬ 
gotiation course such as the MAS simulation must learn to relinquish some con¬ 
trol over the content of the discussion and try to orchestrate participants’ com¬ 
ments. Throughout the semester, as the negotiations go into more technical de¬ 
tails, the author finds it easier to do so since students’ technical experience usu¬ 
ally compensates for the instructor’s lack of expertise. This is a straight for¬ 
ward task, for merely stepping aside and letting the group chat will produce 
chaos and accelerate frustration. The instructor is, in the final analysis, respon¬ 
sible for the negotiation proceedings. But he or she must endeavor to help the 
different groups succeed, and give their comments shape and direction, without 
being either directional or irritatingly manipulative—no small task. A tightly 
controlled negotiation session is an anomaly, neither efficient as a lecture nor as 
involving as an guided discussion. Most important, the role descriptions in the 
Appendix provide the students with a friendly and open forum to state their own 
objectives for peer criticism or comments. Clearly it affects the preparation of 
a teaching plan, encouraging the use of a framework of key questions with alter¬ 
native plans for dealing with anticipated student responses. From the IMAS ex¬ 
perience, the author has learned to be ready to make major changes in the 
teaching plan if students interest moves in dramatically unplanned directions. 
On the one hand, the uncertainty of not being able to anticipate what might 
happen in the classroom is probably the most difficult area for an instructor to 
deal with. On the other hand this issue is the core ingredient of dealing with 
ill-structured Problems in the classroom. 
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Conclusion 
The teaching of the MAS course places a heavy emotional burden on 
both student and teacher. From the student’s point of view, it requires an ex¬ 
traordinary degree of openness: a willingness to state and publicly defend per¬ 
sonal positions, often on controversial issues; to expose one’s own feelings and 
uncertainties to peer scrutiny; to attempt to practice publicly some very compli- 
cated techniques and skills. 
Section openness is possible only in a climate of mutual trust and sup¬ 
port. Hugh Prater put it very well in Notes to Myself: ”In order to see I have to 
be willing to be seen. i1 As a discussion leader for the IMAS course the in¬ 
structors needs to be willing to cast aside their traditional academic armor, the 
certainty of platform and podium, of knowing the right answers, to take a role 
of teacher-student, to learn from the students. 
Maintaining an open classroom atmosphere was a major challenge for the 
author himself—partially when complex educational goals are pursued using ill- 
structured Problems. Using a musical analysis, throughout his teaching of this 
pilot course, the author tried to teach students to play—not only to tune—their 
instruments. This was a complicated objective, and the author is content with 
major defeats and measured progress—constantly learning to rejoice at small 
victories. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF A PILOT COURSE IN INTERNA¬ 
TIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS (IMAS) 
Introduction 
Given technological developments and international markets, adult gradu¬ 
ate education needs to revitalize teaching methodologies. Possible improvements 
included: a greater use of active teaching methods that involve students. Case 
study simulations can strengthen links between adult learning theories and teach¬ 
ing methods. By combining simulations over an extended period of time with 
case studies, adult learners can address ill-structured problems created by the 
rapid changes in today’s business environment. 
This chapter describes an experimental graduate business course using a 
comprehensive business simulation. Specifically, this course used newly devel¬ 
oped materials in a semester-long simulation. The focus is on multinational ne¬ 
gotiations involving both profit-making firms and government agencies entering 
major investments and long-term commitments. All instructional materials for 
the course—entitled ’’International Military Aircraft Sales (MAS)—were devel¬ 
oped by the author, an associate professor, in the School of Management at the 
Hartford Graduate Center during 1985-86 and was also taught by him on an 
experimental basis during the Fall 1987 semester. Other teachers may find the 
approach and possible materials important sources when designing courses for 
teaching ill-structured subject concerns. 
Despite the unavoidable circularity that occasionally confuses the issue, 
prospective writers of business simulations should note that the purpose of writ¬ 
ing a business simulation is not to settle some vexed question forever, but sim¬ 
ply to provide fodder for a rich discussion. The researcher need not understand 
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the workings of every detail of a simulation to write well and usefully. In fact, 
most people familiar with the use of business simulation in teaching agree: 
"There are no answers.-l The writer's challenge is to coax informants into pro- 
viding vivid recollections, and then organize and present these so that readers 
may find them challenging and interesting enough to draw their own conclu- 
sions. 
Detailed in this chapter is an overview of the IMAS course including a 
description of the course participants and the instructional support system, and 
an outline of the materials selected for the course. Also included in this chap¬ 
ter is the evaluation of the pilot course, an analysis of the findings of the attitu- 
dinal instrument used in the evaluation, and finally, a summary of findings and 
personal reflections about teaching this course. 
Overview of the IMAS Course 
The IMAS course for prospective international business negotiators was 
offered with the approval of the Dean of the School of Management at the 
Hartford Graduate Center as an elective course in the MBA curriculum. The 
Hartford Graduate Center is an accredited graduate school, affiliated with 
Rensselear Polytechnic Institute (RPI) in Troy, New York. As such the Graduate 
Center has the authority to offer RPI degrees in Hartford, Connecticut. The 
MAS course was offered on an experimental basis during the Fall 1987 semes¬ 
ter. The experimental design of the course allowed for the necessary flexibility 
to try out different types of materials and teaching methods to determine work¬ 
able strategies and content. 
The course was fifteen weeks in duration, meeting eight houfs on alter¬ 
nate Saturdays for a total of forty five instructional hours. Students were also 
required to meet outside scheduled class meetings to prepare for the sessions or 
65 
to meet with individual representatives. The course was equivalent to three 
graduate credit hours and would ordinarily be taken after the student had com¬ 
pleted all MBA course requirements except for the last elective course. The to¬ 
tal required credit hours for an MBA degree is forty five. 
Participants for the IMAS course were selected from a list of students 
who were in their last semester of graduate school, majoring in International 
Business. This ensured that students had been exposed to a similar program of 
study and interests. Ar -tempt was made to include students with different 
cultural backgrounds to provide diversity of input during the negotiation ses¬ 
sions. Another requirement was that each participant should have had three 
years of experience as a manager in one or two functional areas of business. 
Twenty five students participated. They were advised that participation in 
this study was voluntary. Anonymity in the reporting of their evaluation was 
also guaranteed. Students who agreed to participate signed consent forms that 
delineated the research project and advised them of their rights. The consent 
form is included in the Appendix. 
Supporting this IMAS course was an instructional system which included 
computer equipment (hardware), and a management decision program (soft¬ 
ware). A video teleconferencing center (two-way) was available upon request at 
two of the local area companies. Students who availed themselves of these fa¬ 
cilities did not report to the campus site for the sessions, but were linked to the 
Graduate Center via two-way satellite television. 
The IMAS course was made possible through the use of the Sic-Simula- 
tor on the Sun Network computer at the Hartford Graduate Center. The Sun 
Network stations are individual computers each with their own processor and 
primary memory. The models used in the course have a 68020 microprocessor 
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and four megabytes of RAM memory. Two different models are available for 
student use, the Sun 3/50 and the Sun 3/52. The 3/50 is a diskless machine us¬ 
ing a file serving host machine to provide disk space. The 3/52 also uses the file 
server, but also has a 71 megabyte disk and cartridge tape drive. The cartridge 
tape is useful for individual backups and could be used by students at their 
place of work. 
All workstations are connected together in a network. Each workstation is 
part of a subnetwork containing several IBM AT or AT&T PC running PC-NFS. 
All students are able to dial into the network from their homes or offices via an 
electronic modem and are able to leave messages using electronic mail. Incom¬ 
ing mail is sroted in a standard file for each student, called the system mailbox 
for that student. When mail is called to read messages, the mailbox is the de¬ 
fault place to find them. As messages are read by the students, they are 
marked to be moved to a secondary file for storage and can be read by the stu¬ 
dent and teacher. 
At the Hartford Graduate Center, all students have access to most com¬ 
mercially available software. Lotus 123, DBase, and word processing software 
are available on the academic network and others can be checked out for use on 
the non-networked PCs. The specific software names are omitted in this study 
because their titles include names of software companies. 
Curriculum Materials 
The materials for instruction employed in this course consisted of a series 
of handouts reproduced for each student. All student materials are included in 
Part II of this study. The materials consist of an introduction to set the stage 
for the negotiation process, the role descriptions for each students, and back- 
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ground readings on the situation, and the specific businesses and governments 
involved. 
Each student will be involved as a participant in a recently announced 
fighter competition being conducted by Greece, (or any other country which has 
a Request For Proposal, RFP). The students need to familiarize themselves thor¬ 
oughly with the dynamics of the sales competition so they can play the roles as¬ 
signed to them during the actual negotiating sessions. The introductory materi¬ 
als are mailed to each student two weeks before the first class session. At that 
point they are not yet aware of the role they will be assigned. A central frame 
of reference of this course is the class as an organization which is similar in 
many basic ways to all organizations. In order to make the parallels clear and 
explicit as well as to achieve the course objectives, each student receives a job 
description to establish a parameter of their role during the negotiations and 
also to identify expectations. The following examples of role descriptions taken 
from Appendix C appear in a form which can be reproduced directly for distri¬ 
bution to students. They are handed out on the day that the negotiation teams 
are formed. 
Biographical Sketch: 
Christiane Carney, Secretary of State. 
You are the first woman in the history of the United States to be ap¬ 
pointed Secretary of State. Though you were originally a member of the Demo¬ 
cratic Party, your strong anti-communist views made you a perfect choice for 
the Reagan Administration. 
As a professor at Georgetown University before accepting your present 
role, you cultivated a wide circle of friends including Secretary of the Air Force, 
David Dell. Secretary of the Navy, Naomi Segal, who was a member of the 
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Georgetown faculty before accepting her present post, is also a close friend. 
Amy Cardamore, who is presently a high-ranking minister of the Italian Govern¬ 
ment, was a student of yours when you first began teaching at Georgetown in 
1963. The two of you have remained close since then. Another former student 
of yours is Congressman Alexander Kam, Democrat from Minnesota. 
Your appointment as Secretary of State was not without controversy. 
Your appointment was approved in the Senate by only 3 votes. Much of the 
controversy was generated behind the scenes by the present Secretary of De¬ 
fense, Carmen Marino. Marino, who has a number of friends in the Senate, 
coveted the role of Secretary of State for himself and worked very discreetly to 
have your nomination rejected by the Senate. Since your appointment, Marino 
has worked through his Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, An¬ 
nette Boyle, to gain the upper hand in formulating foreign policy. As of July 
1982, you have the complete confidence of the President. Your two assistants, 
Under Secretary Kositsky and Ambassador Codo are both loyal to your pro¬ 
grams and policy. 
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YOUR GOALS: 
(1) Formulate a viable United States’ Foreign Policy towards Greece. 
This policy should comprise the following sub-goals: 
(a) negotiate a new military base rights treaty with Greece 
(b) attempt to reduce tensions between Greece and Turkey 
(c) maintain/improve United States, relations with Greece 
(2) Hold on to your power to formulate United States. Foreign Policy. 
Each role description includes a list of readings to provide students with 
details on the actual role they will play during the negotiation sessions. 
Do not allow the Secretary of Defense to undermine your ability to con¬ 
trol the formulation of United States’ foreign policy vis a vis Greece. 
(3) Attempt to gain greater influence with the president in matters con¬ 
cerning national security. 
(4) Do not allow the Secretary of Defense to effectively deprive you of 
your power to determine whether major weapons sales should be approved. 
Your Under-Secretary Kositsky should be the overall coordinator in any 
review of a major sale. Take care that he maintains that role. 
DUTIES: 
You possess the authority to convene the Arm Transfer Management 
Group. This group comprises Under Secretary Kositsky, who chairs the group, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Boyle, and Chief of the Arms Control Disarma¬ 
ment Agency, Sheri Rosenfeld. You are also a member of the National Security 
Council which is convened by the President upon the advice of either you or the 
Secretary of Defense. 
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Intelligence Report on Greek Government: A recent CIA document that 
you had commissioned indicates that Foreign minister Baroutas is a tough nego¬ 
tiator who often will refuse so see opposite negotiators as a means of frustrating 
them. Apparently, he insists on doing his only negotiating at lunch. Do not ex¬ 
pect to see him more than once a week during the negotiation. Prime Minister 
Papandreous on the other hand is more readily available than the FOREIGN 
MISTER. However, Papendreous will defer to his foreign minister’s judgment in 
most cases. 
BUDGET: 
You have an expense budget of one thousand dollars for diplomatic 
luncheons with members of the Greek Government. See (NAME) at Office of 
Management and Budget for reimbursement. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
Concentrate initially on the following readings: 
1. Briefing Book on Greece, particularly the New York Times clip¬ 
pings at the back of the book. 
2. The Economic Intelligence Unit Reports on Greece. 
Biographical Sketch: 
David Kositsky, Under-Secretary for Security Assistance. 
You are the administration’s chief spokesman for its arms transfer policy. 
Before being asked to join the Reagan Administration, you were chairman of the 
Heritage Foundation’s Defense Studies Committee. While at the Heritage Foun¬ 
dation, you became good friends with another member of the committee, Har¬ 
riet Madoff, who has since gone back to her home in St. Louis where she was 
elected to Congress in 1980. 
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Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, you served for 27 years with the 
United States. Air Force. One of your tours was spent in Greece where you be¬ 
came good friends with the present Chief Genera] of the Hellenic Air Force, 
Thomas Cheneterous. You ended your Air Force career as the top Air Force 
officer in the Defense Security Assistance Agency under the Ford and Carter 
Administrations. You retired from the Air Force a major general and joined the 
Heritage Foundation in 1978. 
Your father, who is now deceased, rose to the rank of Colonel in the 
Army Air Corps. His classmate and good friend was Robert McDonald, the 
present CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft. Both your father and Mr. 
McDonald received their wings in 1924 as members of Army Air Service class 
24-6. 
GOALS: 
1. With guidance from the Secretary of State, implement the President’s 
policy on arms transfers. 
There are reports of a move afoot in Congress to require that United 
States, contractors submit their offset proposals before the Congress before ma¬ 
jor arms sales would be approved under the Arms Control Disarmament 
Agency. You must lobby Congress on behalf the administration to ensure that 
legislation which would hurt the competitiveness of United States’ Corporations 
is not passed. 
2. Maintain your authority as chief coordinator of United States, arms 
transfer policy. 
It is rumored that the Secretary of Defense covets the post of Secretary 
of State and will attempt to erode State’s authority by attempting to frame for¬ 
eign policy questions as questions of national security. To assist him, the Secre- 
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tary of Defense has an able assistant, Annette Boyle. Her job is to coordinate 
foreign arms transfers at DOD. It’s a job which is practically a mirror of yours. 
Do not allow Boyle to become defacto overseer of the process. 
DUTIES: 
1. Grant or deny permission to United States. Aircraft Corporations to 
approach the Greek government and make sales proposals. 
2. Review any literature the aircraft companies wish to use in their sales 
presentations. 
3. Review any sales proposals made by United States, aircraft companies 
to Greece. 
4. Chair the Arms Transfer Management Group whenever meetings of 
that body are called by the Secretary of State. Other members include Assistant 
Secretary of Internal Security Policy, Boyle, and Arms Control Disarmament 
Agency, Rosenfeld. 
INITIAL ACTIONS: 
As you start the game, the first question you must decide is whether 
it is in the best interest of the United States, to sell either the F-16 or F-18 to 
Greece. Keep in mind that Turkey is also requesting these aircraft. Also keep 
in mind that if you delay too long in granting United States, corporations the 
opportunity to approach the Greek government, you may put them at a competi¬ 
tive disadvantage. 
* Consult with the Secretary of State on whether the United States, 
wishes to sell these aircraft to Greece. 
* Get a sense for what DOD thinks on this matter prior to meeting with 
the Secretary. 
* Also get a sense of what Congressional attitude is towards this matter. 
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* If there aPPears to be any controversy over this matter, you might want 
to recommend that the Secretary convene a meeting of the Arms Transfer Man¬ 
agement Group. 
Note that Greece, despite its more recent behavior is a NATO ally. De¬ 
fense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports that it’s Air Force is surely in need of 
modernization if Greece is to be an effective NATO partner. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. Section V of ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft”. This is the 
original case handout. 
2. The LaFalce Letter 
3. Military Offsets 
4. Briefing Book on Greece. Concentrate on New York Times, articles 
in the back of the student materials section. 
5. Economic Intelligence Unit reports on Greece. 
6. Modern Air Combat. (Large Handout) Be sure you are familiar with 
the competing aircraft as well as the basic components of all fighter aircraft. 
During each meeting students were also be provided with News Releases 
and Interoffice Memos to update them on what was going on in industry or gov¬ 
ernment during their negotiation sessions which might impact their future strat¬ 
egy. All supporting reading materials were placed on reserve in the Hartford 
Graduate Center Library. The following are some sample memoranda (see Ap¬ 
pendix C for additional illustrations) 
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Sample Memorandum 
TO: Congressman Steven Swanson 
FROM: Your Staff 
SUBJ: F-16 & F-18 Production: District Subcontractors 
What follows is a list of those companies within the district that produce 
parts used in the final construction of either the F-16 or F-18. 
MIDDLESEX GENERAL INDUSTRIES 
Part: District revenue 
per aircraft: 
Wing Panels (F-18) 
$ 440,000 
Landing Gear Doors (F-18) 
80,000 
Fuselage Panels (F-18) 
240,000 
TOTAL $760.000 
ADAMS RUSSELL CORP. 
Part: 
Radar Wave Guides (F-18) 
HYCOR INC. 
Part: 
Electroluminescent Display (F-16 & F-18) 
COBB & DREW INC. 
Part: 
Rivets (F-16) 
District revenue per aircraft: 
$110.000 
District revenue per aircraft: 
$ 57.000 
District revenue per aircraft: 
$ 38.700 
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AVCO SYSTEMS INC. 
Part: 
Radome: (F-18) 
JAMESBURY CORP. 
Part: 
Hydraulic Actuators (F-16) 
NORTON CO. 
District revenue per aircraft: 
£ 350,000 
District revenue per aircraft: 
$ 33.500 
Part: 
Bearings (F-16 & F-18) 
TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE 
F-l-18 PER AIRCRAFT: 
$1,355,000 
District revenue per aircraft: 
F-16 
$ 78.000 
$207,200 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION: The staff econo¬ 
mist has determined that for every $1.00 the district earns in subcontractor and 
contractor revenue an additional $1.02 is generated in Massachusetts. This 
means that total income accruing to the state for the purchase of a single F-18 
is: 
2.02 * $1,355,000 = $2,737,000 
She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the state’s in¬ 
come creates 1 additional job. This means that the sale of a single F-18 cre¬ 
ates: $2,737,000/$280,000 = 9.78 new jobs 
Note that the income and job benefits accrue to the state as a whole. 
However, the lion’s share of these benefits accrue to this district. 
The following is a sample of ’’Top Secret” information Memos created by 
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the author to force students to analyze all pertinent information before deciding 
on their strategy. 
Sample Top Secret Information Memorandum 
FLASH/TOP SECRET/NOFORN 
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BT//MEMORANDUM 
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY TO: PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FROM: GENERAL DELL SACAFRE, Secretary of the Air Force 
RE: SOVIET INFILTRATION OF GREEK MILITARY 
1. In light of the proposed sale of American fighter aircraft to the Greek 
government, General Secafre is gravely concerned by the CIA discovery of So¬ 
viet agents in the highest echelons of the Greek Air Force. Ultimately, Soviet 
infiltration brings into question the secu- rity of NATO operations throughout 
the Eastern Mediterranean. 
2. the Secretary of the Air Force continues to believe sale of weapons to 
Greek government is of strategic importance both for American and NATO se¬ 
curity in Eastern Mediterranean The Greek Air Force currently operating obso¬ 
lete and poorly maintained equipment in an area of vital importance to the 
safety of southern Balkans, eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Strength of 
Greece should be maintained as a deterrent to Soviet military action as well as 
Turkish ambitions in Aegean. Sale of arms demonstrates to Greece a continu¬ 
ing American friendship, reinforces the bonds of the NATO alliance and exhib¬ 
its both to other NATO allies and to the Soviets strong American commitment 
to western defense. 
3. Secondary considerations in the economic sphere should also be 
weighed. Aircraft sales entail considerable economic benefit for further Ameri¬ 
can growth and defense preparedness. As it appears Greek AirForce has se- 
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lected the F-16, such a sale would reduce unit costs for the USAF as well, a 
matter of congressional concern. 
4. Within the context of overall NATO planning and operations, sale of 
the F-16 furthers the Secretary of the Air Force’s policy of RSI of alliance 
equipment. 
5. Should we fail to sell American aircraft it seems likely the Greek Air 
Force will purchase the MIRAGE 2000 from the French. Three drawbacks are 
apparent: United States’ loses any economic benefit to be gained; United 
States. NATO solidarity appears weakened, especially in light of traditional 
Gaullist attitudes of French-United States government has been working to 
stem similar tide in Greek government; potential for technology loss is not re¬ 
moved—French jets incorporate much American technology and design. More¬ 
over as F-16 is clearly superior, the United States leaves Greece in more vul¬ 
nerable position vis a vis Soviets due to inferior equipment. 
6. This does not however deny the Secretary of the Air Force’s genuine 
concern regarding the loss of high level American military technology due to So 
viet presence in Greek AirForce. Both American and NATO security are at 
stake, the Secretary of the Air Force however does not believe Greek AirForce 
has fallen under control of leftist factions within Greece. Security breach not 
only could be contained but used to our advantage through disinformation possi 
bilities. 
POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Let Congress stop sale entirely. 
2. Inform Greek P.M. and Chief General Cheneterous of Soviet 
presence. 
3. Sell less than state of the art technology 
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4. Make sale conditional upon United States, participation in security 
arrangements for any co-production and rework facilities. 
a) As noted in sec.5 non sale has serious ramifications of security 
b) Security interests of United States, are paramount-if need be, we 
should inform Greeks to preserve national and NATO security. Defectors wife 
and family should not represent an American concern. 
c) General Dynamics has already been told to release only data on 
F-16 A/C versions and are willing to co-operate on further technology precau¬ 
tions. 
d) Potential already exists for theft or capture of F-16 from Israel, 
Egypt or Turkey. Sale to Greeks does not increase this problem. The Secretary 
of the Air Force is more concerned with problems of secret strategic planning in 
Aegean, Balkan and East Europe regions. 
Overview of the Design Process 
The process of design can be thought of as consisting of five stages. 
Stage I: setting the objectives and parameters 
Stage II: model development 
Stage IH: decision about student representation 
Stage IV: construction and modification of the simulation 
Stage V: preparation for use of others 
Each of these stages entails a number of steps that will be briefly de¬ 
scribed further. 
At the outset it was crucial to consider carefully what I wanted to try to 
do and to what ends. This meant first delimiting as clearly as possible the sub¬ 
ject matter, purpose, intended participants, and the context of use for the pro¬ 
posed simulation. This stage was often skipped or undertaken casually, and my 
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initial enthusiasm was translated into vague formulation such as "I want to de¬ 
sign a simulation about international negotiations,” with no thought to what the 
simulation was supposed to convey, to whom, and under what conditions. The 
result was often total failure or a product that was totally inappropriate for the 
intended audience. It is critical to make these decisions before anything further 
is done, and the good designer will spend considerable time formulating such a 
statement, for it offers much needed guidance later in the process. Wise 
choices among alternatives in Stage m could be made only by referring to crite¬ 
ria that were explicit in Stage I specifications. 
In Stage ID, I had to assess the constraints of time, budget, academic re¬ 
quirements and other resources for development and utilization. This may be 
too obvious to warrant stating, but the novices are likely to find they have tre¬ 
mendously underestimated needed resources for effective completion of the pro¬ 
ject. The resources of potential users must also be assessed. Later decisions 
about levels of abstraction, time reduction, specificity, complexity, parapherna¬ 
lia, and computing methods, and so on cannot be made soundly without estima¬ 
tions of the knowledge, time, and monetary resources of the educational institu¬ 
tion. 
In working with the design of the MAS simulation, I found it helpful to 
force myself to develop a brief but cogent set of responses to these questions 
before proceeding to model development. The same demands made upon my¬ 
self have likewise forced me to develop greater clarity about what I was propos¬ 
ing to undertake. 
It may also be stressed that the answers to these questions may lead to 
abandon the project. Simulations may prove to be an inappropriate medium for 
your message, or the resources may be deemed insufficient for the task. In 
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some instances modification of the intent or inflation of the resources may be 
possible, but often this will not be feasible or desirable. Then the project 
should be scrapped and shelved for some future time. 
The second stage entails developing a conceptual model of the system to 
be simulated and deciding which elements are to be included in the simulation. 
To me, this was the most critical phase, and the point at which the simulations 
might fail to achieve its effectiveness. During this stage, I needed to spell out 
the system as I understood it from experience or other sources—that is, indicate 
the substantive content of the real-world system. Here roles, goals, activities, 
constants, consequences, and external factors were identified. 
Although psychological factors can be brought in by participants who are 
stressed in the same way their real-world counterparts are stressed, this necessi¬ 
tated that the most critical of these factors needed to be identified, and roles, 
goals, constraints, and contingencies that created them, be identified as well, so 
that the sources of the stresses could be simulated. Consultation with others at 
this point was helpful to unearth omissions or inaccuracies of conceptualization. 
When the basic model was developed and decisions about elements to be 
included were made, I was ready to proceed with translating it into an operating 
model. Here decisions had to be made that related to both style and form. At 
this point, a review of existing simulations gave a sense of their basic style. 
Second, the form of the simulation components were determined. Here deci¬ 
sions were made about how each model element that was selected for inclusion 
in the simulation was to be represented. Each element can appear in several 
ways: in the scenario, in the roles, or in the procedures and rules. 
At this stage the actual simulation put together and appropriate date were 
located into it. In stage HI, I decided which pieces needed to be included in the 
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scenario and which in roles; now scenarios and role descriptions were written. 
Other simulation elements were likewise constructed and materials acquired. 
When all parts were assembled to a protoype, the simulation was tested in class. 
1 suggest considerable trials and retrials before the simulation can generate the 
behaviors and outcome characteristics of the referent system. Each ’’bug” led 
me to reexamination of the conceptual model and the design decisions as well 
as to possible failures in the construction process, in search of a missing ele¬ 
ment or one inacurately linked to others. Here considerable creativity and forti¬ 
tude are required, for the point at which you are ’’almost there” may be more 
frustrating than the initial stages when you knew a final product was far distant. 
When I was satisfied with the design, it needed to be prepared to be used 
in the degree program. This meant all the materials had to be reproduced for a 
successful run. Students with the appropriate backgrounds were selected and 
permission to participate in the research project were solidified. These were 
often complicated problems. Consequently, many fine simulations have never 
been made available beyond the limited circle of colleagues. 
There are two additional points that must be made here. First, the 
sketch presents the process as unidirectional: The designer moves from one 
stage to the next. In fact there was much moving back and forth among these 
stages. Likewise, insights developed in the design and construction phases 
about the complexity of the simulation and the cost of high realism led to the 
redefinition of the objectives and parameters, as decision made earlier proved 
impractical. 
The second caveat is that this is an outline of how simulations should be 
created rather than a description of the process used in creating the MAS simu¬ 
lation. As described, the process entails a high degree of discipline. Having 
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taken both routes, however—stumbling along doing things in varying sequence, 
and following these guidelines—I must stress vigorously that the second ap- 
proach was much more efficient and effective. 
Teaching Format for the IMAS Course 
The IMAS simulation employs Participative Management Techniques to 
give students full authority-responsibility for carrying out all aspects of the ne¬ 
gotiation sessions, including its presentation, analysis, and student evaluation.2 
The central premise in the development of this teaching method is the observa¬ 
tion that business managers appear to graduate through a hierarchy of learning 
needs which culminate in a self-actualizing stage.3 At this level of learning, stu¬ 
dents can be given an opportunity to circumvent the sometimes stifling effects 
of the instructor/student dyad because they have accumulated enough knowledge 
and experience to enter into problem-solving activity of their own. 
The IMAS simulation employs structured procedures which guide students 
in case analysis, while giving them a free rein to round out the development of 
their problem-solving abilities, which include communication, persuasion, leader¬ 
ship, synthesis, analysis, and creativity skills. Managers who participate in the 
IMAS simulation are provided with invaluable experience in using Participative 
Management Techniques to arrive at group decisions which, according to long¬ 
standing research, provide higher quality solutions than determinations made 
through authoritarian means.4 
The use of Participative Management Techniques to give students auton¬ 
omy in carrying out the international negotiation sessions is not new or original. 
But the structured procedures employed in the IMAS simulation to channel the 
student’s effort into productive outcomes are unique, because the procedures 
have been carefully designed to encourage the students to achieve a zenith in 
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productivity (learning by doing) through synergistic group interaction.5 Addi¬ 
tionally, the IMAS simulation tries to accommodate a wide range of simulated 
real-world problems and the use of Participative Management Techniques as a 
basic for group decision making. Individuals can behave as they wish, keeping 
in mind that there are a number of managerial issues or problems that they 
might choose to address. 
The business venture team concept provides a means for organizing the 
roles of the instructor, business managers and government representatives into 
an integrated effort for the MAS simulation sessions. These individuals perform 
their roles under the assumption that their group represents their company, 
state, military, or other government interest group, which can be weakened by 
poor performance or made to operate efficiently through sound, decision-mak¬ 
ing. 
In this competitive environment, the students learn to police all aspects of 
the participation in the simulation so that everyone has a fair opportunity to 
make contributions as well as develop their problem-solving skills. Although 
each of the students must do the analysis necessary to resolve the negotiation 
issues, the managers are expected to undertake the most comprehensive prepa¬ 
ration. The simulation must be carried out in a professional environment where 
a majority vote, establishing an atmosphere of open-mindedness, settles the di¬ 
verse issues which arise.6 
The IMAS simulation incorporates the use of a problem-solving itinerary 
to guide students through the simulation. The major subject areas of this agenda 
are the: scenario (dialogue performed between the different companies and the 
government representatives); situation analysis (systematic mapping of all factors 
which focus on the problem); problem statement ( a concise, concrete, correct, 
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yet unique statement of the problem at hand); alternatives (broad courses of ac¬ 
tion which might eliminate some of the factors contributing to the problem); al¬ 
ternative strategy (course of action which offers the best cost/benefit advantage 
for the company); and program goal(s), constraints/resources, strategies and tac¬ 
tics for implementing the decided upon strategy).7 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the roles 
of the instructor, managers, other participants, and the determination of grades 
for for the course. 
Scenario 
The participants were introduced to the simulation through a short de¬ 
scription of where they are and what the problem that they will be coping with 
is. This was done by the instructor, but also can be done on a cassette, illus¬ 
trated through a slide show, or handed out to the participants to read. All par¬ 
ticipants were given a ’’stage setting,” and then introduced to their particular 
roles. This presentation to the common scenario was followed by subdivision 
into groups, each of which received a second scenario (e.g., Government em¬ 
ployees, Industry managers). This scenario also made reference to what they 
needed to do in the course of the simulation, to the objectives, and to the main 
roles represented. When they are to be in a hypothetical country or town (e.g., 
their respective meeting places). These scenarios could be very simple or quite 
complex depending on the background of the students. 
Student Roles 
Players were given roles to play, including goals to strive for, resources 
available for them to control or allocate, and an overview of the activities in 
which they will engage during the semester, (see sample role descriptions). Not 
all roles identified in the conceptual model were represented by the students. 
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Indeed only those persons who make decisions that effect the outcome should 
generally be included in the role set. Student in different roles had different 
learning experiences (see Greenblat, 1980, and Linderman, 1983, for elabora¬ 
tion) and students who were not getting involved in the negotiation sessions or 
any preliminary sessions are likely not to learn much. The decisions of roles 
that were not played were incorporated in the role of the instructor, into exter- 
nal events, or into the accounting system. 
Role of the Instructor 
The primary duties of the instructor during the IMAS simulation was to 
make updated information available during the sessions. Although the instructor 
played a passive role during the negotiating sessions, he/she can influence the 
group’s performance in three ways. First the instructor was responsible for ex¬ 
plaining the operation of the MAS simulation module. Secondly, prior to the 
negotiation sessions, the managers and other key government officials met with 
the instructor to discuss all relevant aspects of the proposal(s). Thirdly, during 
the sessions, the instructor interacted with the students by making observations, 
expressing opinions and asking pointed questions when the managers or partici¬ 
pants were clearly off track. The instructor then decided whether outside con¬ 
sultants were needed to help clarify the issue(s) at hand. The instructor served 
as the chief executive officer (CEO) and was responsible for the overall func¬ 
tioning of the different teams. In addition, each of the teams had managers 
who reported to the instructor on the activities and progress of the teams. 
However, when everything is running smoothly during the sessions, the instruc¬ 
tor is ideally reduced to a prop. Over the semester, these teams of students/ 
managers worked independently and negotiated with other teams from industry 
and government. There was a great deal of commitment involved on the part of 
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the instructor. I would suggest that he/she would not teach any other courses 
during the semester to enable him/her to deal with unavoidable circumstances 
such as illness, room reservations, meetings with the managers, etc. 
The Role of the Managers 
Individuals who serve as managers are selected by the instructor so that 
negotiating teams are of equal caliber and each student has at least one chance 
to serve in this role. Once individuals received their role assignments, the 
team managers schedule all the meetings prior and during the negotiating ses¬ 
sions. The managers also assign specific duties to each member of the team. 
These duties include, preparation of qualitative and quantitative analysis, secon¬ 
dary (library) research, visual aids, developing the theme for the negotiating ses¬ 
sion, and other tasks considered useful to the team. Throughout the semester, 
four to five meetings between the instructor and the managers are held outside 
the class to discuss the progress of the groups and develop strategies for team 
performance. To schedule a meeting, the instructor periodically checks with the 
team managers to see if a meeting would be helpful. On those occasions when 
a meeting is considered desirable, a mutually convenient time and location is 
arranged and a formal memo confirming the time and place was forwarded to 
the teams. The managerial meetings serve to familiarize the instructor with the 
teams’ operations and improve communications between the instructor and the 
teams. During these meetings, managers often ask the instructor for clarifica¬ 
tion of an assignment or inquire about methods of motivating a low performing 
member. In addition, these meetings facilitate planning, provide greater control 
at both levels of management and serve as a formal arena for decision making 
activities. Rather than viewing these meetings as time consuming, managers can 
view them to be a valuable opportunity for obtaining advise from their peers 
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and the instructor which can subsequently be applied to improve group perform¬ 
ance. Since the quality of the negotiation session can generally be no better 
than the quality of the preparation, it is important the students come into the 
sessions with facts, sound logic, and rigorous investigation. 
The MAS simulation works best when all participants strive to contribute 
to the discussion with timely, relevant, accurate comments, expert opinion drawn 
from research and quantitative analysis where it is relevant. If participants at¬ 
tempt to accumulate points with erroneous and/or reduntant contributions, peers 
have the responsibility to correct these individuals by pointing out discrepancies. 
Under these circumstances, participants earn points for expediting and raising 
the quality of the analysis. Once given their respective roles in the negotiating 
process, the members of the workteam (company) are required to cooperate 
with each other and the team manager in performing the assigned activities. 
This work group setting is designed to provide members with experience in 
working with a ’’boss” and their peers to accomplish specific goals. 
Procedure and Rules 
Having decided on the overall structure of the simulation, the instructor 
must now determine what is to happen in the full time from the briefing to the 
debriefing. Since the simulation was interactive and negotiations took place in 
cycles, the steps each participant engaged in was initially the same from one 
round to the next, but it should be pointed out that the cumulative effects of 
earlier decisions and events effected what he/she did next. 
It was sometimes possible (and often desirable) to begin with a simple 
first round and then add new elements (such as offset, impact of decisions on 
local economy). When this was done, the instructor deemed it necessary to in¬ 
form the participants that there will be additional rules or options introduced 
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later. Otherwise they are likely to turn to their managers with complaints that it 
was not fair, because they did not know what would come next when they 
planned their strategy. (In a few instances, such warnings were deliberately not 
given, as emphasis in the simulation was on some ’’unfairness” of foreign gov¬ 
ernments and the way they operate). An extremely important dimension of pro¬ 
cedures and rules involved communication between players. Communication 
may be open, restricted to written messages, or in some cases nonexistent. For 
example if participants represent foreign government officials they should be 
free to communicate only with members from other governments at particular 
point of the negotiations. To make communications realistic, letters sometimes 
went astray or were not answered for long period of time; the parties were often 
not available when called; telephone messages were sometimes not delivered or 
were ignored; and ’’wrong numbers” were often reached. 
It was also important to guard against artificial ends of interaction. 
Sometimes the end was obvious and reasonable: a period of time given to the 
culminating negotiation session, and the session ends when the decision is 
reached. In other instances, especially where there was a high degree of inter¬ 
action, the ’’end” was not so obvious. 
As mentioned earlier, not all roles have to be played and not all external 
factors have to be introduced in the scenario. As the negotiations progressed, 
other factors, natural events, or social changes (e.g., change in government due 
to elections), may affect the options available to the students. These were intro¬ 
duced according to a predetermined sequence; or they could appear by chance. 
Too often the last option was used, to the detriment of the realism and impact 
of the simulation. 
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Grading the Course 
The MAS simulation employed a closed-loop grading procedure which is 
designed to allow each student and opportunity to evaluate the performance of 
his or her peers during the simulation. This grading system requires the manag- 
ers to appraise the quality of performance by the participants and the partici¬ 
pants to evaluate the proficiency of the managers in conducting the sessions. 
The instructor awards ’’gross” performance points to the managers in a lump 
sum amount (e.g., 100 pts.) which is standard for each session. The participants 
earn gross points from the instructor, based on the quality and quantity of their 
participation during the sessions. 
At the culmination of three sessions, grading ’’chits” are passed out to 
the managers and participants. Each participant is required to evaluate the qual¬ 
ity of the manager’s performance by circling the attained level of proficiency 
associated with each of the attributes on the grading chit. Taking the average of 
the participants’ composite score times the manager’s gross points produces net 
points which are distributed by the managers to each other, according to their 
contribution to the team effort. 
In turn, the managers are also responsible for using grading chits to 
evaluate the salient aspect of the participants’ performance. By calculating the 
the average of the managers’ composite proficiency scores for the participants 
and multiplying this figure times the gross participation points awarded by the 
instructor, the net points earned by each of the participants can be determined. 
Evaluation of the IMAS Course 
As in many other professional fields, it is difficult to evaluate the overall 
effectiveness of management education.8 The test elements used in evaluating 
learning measure only partial elements of practice, perhaps the less important 
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ones. Christine Me Guire puts the point dramatically: "After thirty years of 
professional research we do not have a satisfactory methodology for evaluating 
professional habits and attitudes. Perhaps a radical new approach is required to 
achieve any progress in this area. . . Work on the development of an acceptable 
theory of unifying conception of competence is urgent. ”9 Grade designations do 
little more than sort out individuals who perform well and less well in acade¬ 
mia. As J. Sterling Livingston and others have pointed out, there is little direct 
relationship between academic and practical accomplishments. 10 
Nathaniel Cantor wondered whether most curriculum is not shaped by a 
teacher s sense of what he/she can teach well rather than by the needs of prac¬ 
tice: 
Logic and mathematics do not begin to exhaust the nature of reality. Yet 
most of us have grown up in the tradition that the solution to human problems is 
found in statements, logical propositions. Our formal education is primarily in¬ 
tellectual. We learn answers, general propositions, abstract concepts. We accu¬ 
mulate facts but continue behaving pretty much the same as the generations of 
biblical times. Knowledge does not seem to make much differencedi 
Whether or not Livingston is correct, it is undoubtedly difficult to predict 
long-term results of any educational effort. To paraphrase Amy Lowell, teach¬ 
ing is like dropping ideas into the letterbox of the human unconscious: you 
know when they are posted but never know when they will be received or in 
what form. 
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Course Evaluation Instrument 
The evaluation of the MAS course sought to determine the suitability and 
effectiveness of using the international negotiation case simulation to teach man¬ 
agers the total process of the negotiation format. A ’’Course Evaluation” ques¬ 
tionnaire administered to the course participants attempted to answer the teach¬ 
ing methodology question as well as the effectiveness of the teaching of the 
course. 
This instrument contained 34 items in four major categories: 
1. Course content 
(Items 4,6,9,10,12,13,14,18,19,20,23,27,30) 
2. Methods of teaching 
(Items 3,5,8,10,11,16,23,25,29) 
3. Organization of the course 
(Items 17,21,26,28) 
4. Usefulness of the Course 
(Items 1,2,7,15,22) 
Students were asked to respond in four categories: strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly disagree. Participants completing the questionnaire remained 
anonymous. It is hoped that anonymity produced a maximum likelihood of se¬ 
curing honest responses. 
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Course Evaluation Form 
Question SA A 
1. It was a waste of time 0 0 
2. Overall the course was good 10 15 
3. More courses should be taught this 
way 911 
4. The course held my interest 10 14 
5. I would have preferred another 
method of teaching 0 0 
6. It was very easy to remain involved 
due to participation 9 13 
7. Not much was gained by this 
course 0 1 
8. The instructor encouraged the de¬ 
velopment of new viewpoints 10 13 
9 The simulation was real world re¬ 
lated 9 12 
10. It was difficult to keep attentive 0 0 
11. There was not enough student 
participation in this course 0 0 
12. The content was excellent 12 8 
13. My attention was held throughout 5 17 
14. Uninteresting course 0 1 
15. The course was very worthwhile 8 14 
16. Some aspects of simulation were 
not well explained 0 1 
D SD 
0 25 
0 0 
2 3 
1 0 
12 13 
3 0 
8 16 
2 0 
2 2 
8 17 
16 
4 
3 
10 
2 
9 
1 
0 
14 
1 
14 10 
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17. This course results in better 
learning than lecturing 2 16 4 3 
18. The simulation was too difficult 0 0 15 10 
19. One of the worsts courses in 
MBA program 0 0 6 19 
20. Materials were easy to follow 4 16 2 3 
21. Materials were poorly organized 0 0 4 21 
22. Simulation was not applicable 0 3 10 12 
23. Simulation was very interesting 4 16 3 2 
24. I think the facilitator helped us 8 14 1 2 
25. I would prefer more lecture 0 0 18 7 
26. At time I was confused 5 16 4 0 
27. Excellent course content 6 16 3 0 
28. The simulation was too much work 14 11 0 0 
29. More time would be needed 12 8 3 2 
30. The materials were not appropriate 0 0 16 9 
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An analysis of the data showed that students thought very highly of the 
course content in terms of its appropriateness and its usefulness. All partici¬ 
pants (one hundred percent) of the IMAS course felt that they had gained from 
the course, and that the content of the course was excellent. 
Reactions to the organization and methods of teaching the IMAS course 
were more varied. The majority of the students (ninety percent) preferred the 
simulation method of teaching and all (one hundred percent) said they would 
take another course that was taught this way if it was dealing with ill-structured 
problems. Although there was agreement that the course was generally well or¬ 
ganized, eighty percent said that at times they were confused by the information 
given to them. Informal interviews with the participants revealed that part of 
this confusion was due to the accelerated pace taken in the later part of the se¬ 
mester. 
At the completion of the pilot course, students were also asked by the 
instructor, to evaluate the course by responding to the following statement: 
’’Would you please give us your perception of this course and how the 
learning applies to your job.” 
Here are some of their perceptions: 
I learned something about myself; I really uncovered a blind spot in the 
way I deal with others. 
Learning how to prepare a proposal was a real mystery until. .. explained 
it to our group. Professor never could. I may go into the consulting business now. 
I didn’t realize their were so many different ways of dealing with this ’’situ¬ 
ation,” and there are lots of ’’situations” that we had to consider. I have to get 
away from single track thinking. 
This model on negotiations taught me a lot. It isn’t just that I can under¬ 
stand variance analysis; more importantly, I could stand the pressure of not know- 
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mg - not making any progress for weeks. They were hell, but I didn’t quit. 
Funny, I’ve gotten a lesson in patience and perseverance. 
I went into the first negotiation session with one point of view; it came 
under attack! In the old days I would have dropped my idea immediately, but I 
stuck in there, gave ground where I saw it was weak, and came away having 
convinced most of my group that our plan was right. I can do it! 
I m now confident that I have a framework of understanding, how to un¬ 
derstand and get things done when working with government people. The sessions 
gave me the final know-how on ways of working in a complicated multinational 
environment. 
I sure goofed! My proposal was a good one and I had spent hours working 
it through with our V.P. of International. Yeah — but we ignored the key element: 
how was I going to convince other that doing it was in their best interest? 
These comments illustrate the rich and varied nature of student learning 
experiences in a simulation setting. They do justice to student’s substantive 
learning experiences, they emphasize the development of personal insight into 
individual strengths and weaknesses, reaffirmation of the importance of qualities 
perhaps not fully appreciated—patience and persuasion, and confidence in one’s 
own capacities to endure stress. Instructors must wonder how much of this can 
be planned or even predicted. Few instructors set out to teach students patience 
or tolerance for uncertainty. Faculty members assume, understandability and 
appropriately, the primacy of academic objectives. What and when adults learn 
is often only directly related to formal teaching plans. 
Beatrice Neugarten was correct when he said that we do not have a good 
way of understanding or evaluating how people learn. 12 But in the author’s 
brief excursion into the world of ill-structured problems, I found a good bit of 
agreement between teacher and students as to the elements of an effective busi- 
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ness simulation. Both felt the ultimate teaching objective was the student's de¬ 
velopment of a personally tested, intuitive pattern of understanding and acting in 
complex situations. 
To emphasize the importance of process is not to denigrate the value of 
knowledge. It is the relationship of knowledge to practice that is critical for any 
manager. The sophisticated analysis was as follows: management and negotia¬ 
tions are learned on the job. When the outcome of a negotiation was millions 
or hundreds of millions in bottom line results as well as maker share in techno¬ 
logical advances, few companies can gamble with inexperience—yet how does 
one learn without doing it? The answer is through simulations. The military 
does war games and simulations for the same reasons. Sir William Osier, the 
great physician, makes the point that: ”To study the phenomena of disease 
without books is to sail an uncharted sea. While to study books without pa¬ 
tients, is not to go to sea at all.”13 
For a teacher of adult management students, the interplay of knowledge 
and the discussion process is critical. Like two scissor blades, both elements 
must work together for incisive learning. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to design and use a simulation in a 
graduate course in international business negotiations in which experience was a 
must. The situation was designed in such a way that no single teacher could be 
expert or teach the subject matter. There are a number of instructional meth¬ 
ods and techniques that can be used to teach international business negotiations. 
Lectures and reading assignments tend to serve as the foundation of most 
graduate business cources. To supplement this approach cases and/or simula¬ 
tions are often added as an integral part of the course. Among the rationale 
supporting case studies and simulations as useful teaching strategies is the idea 
that simulated environments provide adult learners with a dynamic content that 
has to be experienced cognitively and affectively. The more involved and active 
students are in the simulation the more experience they gain to help solve real- 
world problems. Negotiations are inherently uncertain and long running com¬ 
plex negotiations among diverse interest groups typically proceed with many ups 
and downs. 
Experience may induce learning in two ways. The first results simply 
form the students’ exposure to certain facts not necessarily related to the out¬ 
come of the simulation. At some point after several classes, students learn 
about the complexity of the simulation and start using the experience of their 
classmates. The second way experience may induce learning is by demonstrat¬ 
ing that certain consequences (offset, win the contract, or loose it) depend on 
certain behaviors (the participation of the student). This encourages the stu¬ 
dents to discriminate between different behaviors and strategies in order to find 
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the strategy providing the most favorable consequences for all parties involved. 
The evidence presented in this study supports the hypothesis that experience-in¬ 
duced learning is an effective way to resolve ill-structured problems. The kind 
of experience-induced learning with which this study was concerned is that in 
which the consequences of certain behavior are demonstrated to the students. 
The more innovative a new technique is, the greater the difficulties of 
dissemination—and simulations certainly fall toward the ’’more” end of the in¬ 
novation continuum. The physical format alone demands significant departures 
form standard classroom arrangements. Chairs and tables get moved around, 
students move about the room freely or gather in small groups to argue over 
points of strategy. Sending information via fax machines and running meetings 
via satalite is new to most people. Simulations closely fit Dewey’s ideal of the 
’’active learner,” and classrooms are often noisy and apparently less well organ¬ 
ized than in the conventional lecture-recitation situation. 
A second and, perhaps more radical, change is the teacher-student rela¬ 
tionship. If teachers use simulations in the matter intended, they should familiar¬ 
ize themselves with the rules, but also change their perception of students. An 
important assumption underlying this teaching method is that students can be 
autonomous, self-motivating, and self-regulating with regard to their own learn¬ 
ing to a much greater extend than is normally assumed—or allowed. While this 
shift in control may lead to a more productive exchange between students and 
teachers, it also may be very threatening to those (both teachers and students) 
accustomed to more authoritarian methods of teaching. 
Third, the type of problem posed by an International Negotiation simula¬ 
tion differs from the type of problem usually presented in a case situation. 
Teachers and students alike are familiar with the textbook problems which cov- 
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ers one or a few specific points and might have one unambiguous "right an¬ 
swer." They will probably also have tried "discussions” about ill-structured 
problems. An International sumulation presents a rather complex problem, and 
there is, in contrast to the textbook problem, usually more than one winning 
strategy. At the same time unlike the "discussion," some strategies are clearly 
much superior to others. This kind of problem is often encountered by manag- 
ers in real life situations. 
Recommendations 
Most research reports conclude with a few paragraphs on gaps in the ex¬ 
isting knowledge in the field with suggestions for further research. The author 
will not follow this line in any detail because the research described in this pa¬ 
per is clearly not complete. The newness and complexities of the field of adult 
learning are such that any well-thought-out evaluative research will make a 
genuine contribution to our knowledge (and, of course, replications of much of 
the work reported here would be of great use). 
At the high tide of American economic expansion, American firms found 
a seemingly unlimited and uncontested outlet for their products in their own do¬ 
mestic market. The home market was large, unified, and familiar. Foreign 
markets were small, segmented, and protected not only by tariff barriers but 
also by impenetrable distribution systems. Above all, they were foreign: operat¬ 
ing in them required linguistic and cultural skills that Americans did not have 
and did not wish to acquire. Hence, most foreign markets and foreign competi¬ 
tors were largely ignored. 
Today the global business strategies of European and Asian firms have 
fundamentally changed the game (see Chapter I). The nation is extremely 
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linked to the rest of the advanced industrial world. However, Americans have 
not taken seriously the needs and preferences of other societies, at least in part 
because they simply have not those needs and preferences. Parochialism has 
been an economic handicap, because it cripples efforts to sell to foreign mar¬ 
kets. Many Americans pat scant attention to life beyond the nation's borders. 
Graduate schools even have reinforced this inward-looking bias and failed to 
open windows into the world. 1 
Because of the increased dispersion of technology and managerial innova¬ 
tion among countries and the need for firms to match global best practice, the 
author agrees with the recommendations of the MIT Commission on Industrial 
Productivity which states that future managers must be skilled in all of the fol¬ 
lowing: (1) operating in an international economic, political, legal, social, and 
information era; (2) operating in a number of national environments and social 
structures: (3) managing international flows of goods, people, technology, infor¬ 
mation, and financial resources and the institutions that facilitate and regulate 
these flows: and (4) learning across borders, by which we mean identifying, 
analyzing, and adapting the world’s best management practices wherever they 
happen to be found. 
To develop these skills, the commission recommends the following: 
. . . three changes are needed in educational programs. First, the interna¬ 
tional content must be deepened in the required courses taken by all management 
students. Second, linkages with regional-study programs and with universities in 
other countries should be strenghtened to foster broader exchanges of ideas, 
knowledge, students, and faculty.2 
To provide this deeper international exposure and skill to students, more 
management faculty members will need to be directly exposed to, and expert in, 
international developments, practices, and theories in their specific discipline or 
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specialty. Creation of curriculum materials such as this simulation needs to be 
encouraged. For this to happen, the reward criteria used to evaluate faculty pro¬ 
motion and tenure will need to be revised to reflect the longer lead times re- 
quired to do high-quality scholarly work of this kind. 
Finally, going beyond the question of how universities can contribute to 
to goal of internationalizing its curriculum, we believe that our own productivity 
at the Hartford Graduate Center as an educational institution is hampered by 
several of the weaknesses that led to the decline of the American industry. For 
example, we are subject to short-term pressures in setting goals and in measur¬ 
ing the success of students, faculty members, and programs; we do not have 
adequate resources in place to manage educational change effectively. In short, 
we call on our colleagues at the Graduate Center to continue the effort this 
study has started.. 
Personal Reflections 
It is always rewarding to witness the timid, unsure students, gain in self¬ 
assuredness to emerge competent and confident learners. The beauty of this 
transformation lies in the knowledge that the change process means a letting go 
of security and an embracing of momentary insecurity, while leaving the self 
open to criticism from other students. It is difficult, if not impossible, to cap¬ 
ture in writing or relay with any degree of accuracy to non-eyewitnesses these 
instances of vulnerabilities shared between learners and observers. Although the 
findings reported on the aforementioned instrument suggest positive kinds of 
changes in competencies, the statistical date only expresses static states of a 
learner’s development, while empirical techniques come closer to capture the 
instances of change. The author witnessed two basic kinds of changes: changes 
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in cognitive growth and changes in affective growth. Students in the IMAS 
course shared moments of their vulnerabilities with this author. Most of the 
students came into this experimental course expressing verbal and nonverbal 
fears about participating in a non-structured class, but in observations of these 
students throughout the semester, some of these fear were assuaged. Students 
who were frightened began to steadily develop positive feelings and attitudes 
about the non-structured sessions. 
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PART II 
CURRICULUM MATERIALS FOR CASE STUDY SIMULATION 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
F-18 Wins Spanish Fighter Competition 
July 23, 1982. Madrid — The Spanish government today announced 
that it has reached agreement with Mc-Donnell-Douglas Aircraft to purchase 
eighty four F-18A aircraft. The cost of this weapons purchase is estimated to 
be $3 billion, which makes it the largest in Spain’s history. To help Spain de¬ 
fray this cost, the United States has agreed to provide Spain low interest loans 
as part of a USA-Spain bilateral defense pact. McDonnell-Douglas will also 
assist Spain by providing counter-trade and offsets worth 100 percent of the con¬ 
tract price. Supposedly, McDonnell-Douglas will buy $100 million of Spanish 
made shoes as a part of this offset deal. 
The Spanish government’s announcement ends competition among three 
aircraft manufacturers, McDonnell-Douglas, manufacturer of the F-18A, General 
Dynamics, maker of the F-16A, and Dassault-Brequet of France, maker of the 
Mirage 2000. Final choice was between the F-16 and F-18. This is the third 
time since 1980 that General Dynamics has lost an international sales competi¬ 
tion to McDonnell-Douglas. Canada chose the F-18 for its Air Force in 1980, 
and Australia followed suit in 1981. 
The Spanish Government and McDonnell-Douglas have yet to finalize the 
details of the agreement, and whether they will be able to do so before the up¬ 
coming October elections is questionable. Spokespersons for the Spanish Social¬ 
ist Worker Party (PSOE) have previously expressed that Spain would prefer to 
purchase a European aircraft. PSOE, which is opposed to Spain’s membership 
in NATO, and which is growing in popularity, would likely either try to cancel 
or demand significant revisions in any agreement 
108 
negotiated by the present government. 
When asked to comment on the impact on this contract of the PSOE 
coming to power in October. General Garcia Conde of the Spanish Air Ministry 
argued that defense matters must be held above party politics. "The best has 
been chosen.” 
The Fighter Competition; Complex Process, High Stakes Game 
A fighter aircraft sales competition is a complex weave of business and 
politics. Because of the many dimensions involved in choosing the winning 
fighter the comparative combat capabilities of each competing aircraft, the val¬ 
ues of the offset packages offered by competing corporations and countries, the 
political and military benefits of purchasing the aircraft of one country versus 
another—choices involve a marketing calculus not easily followed by outside 
analysts. The stakes for the companies and countries involved are enormous. 
For the sellers, a fighter competition is a zero-sum game. The winning com¬ 
pany can stretch out its production and thereby reduce its costs and increase its 
profits. The winning country benefits from closer diplomatic and military rela¬ 
tions with the purchasing country, decreased defense costs, increased domestic 
employment and an inflow of foreign exchange. The losers get none of these. 1 
All risk, however, does not rest with the sellers. Should they choose the 
wrong aircraft, decision makers for the purchasing country stand to lose not 
only their peace of mind, but also their jobs. Choosing an aircraft that is ill- 
equipped for the country’s air force can result in scores of pilots being killed in 
training alone.2 On the other hand, foregoing a more generous offset package 
in order to purchase the most combat-capable aircraft can cost the economy 
thousands of jobs, new technology and needed foreign exchange. Perceived in- 
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competence and corruption on the part of these decision makers is powerful po- 
litical ammunition for parties out of power. 
As one of the chief participants in the recently announced fighter compe- 
tmon being conducted by Greece, (or any other country which has a Request for 
Proposal) you must become thoroughly familiar with the dynamics of these sales 
competitions. This compendium of potentially useful information has been writ- 
ten to assist you in that task. 
Objectives and Descriptions 
IMAS is a business negotiation simulation developed to familiarize the 
participant with most of the issues, strategies, and pressures involved in interna¬ 
tional military aircraft negotiations. It combines the political, as well as the eco¬ 
nomic, forces at work and illustrates the necessity for careful consideration to 
the ramifications of negotiated issues. It is not designed to teach ’’international 
negotiations” as such, but rather to give students a practical approach to the 
strategy and substantive information required in these negotiations. It enables 
them to experience the dynamics of international military aircraft negotiations. 
As participants in these negotiations, students will be members of either 
the U.S. government, a foreign government, or one of the businesses involved. 
The goal of their team will be to negotiate an agreement based on the demands 
which it believes to be most important. The team will continuously receive state¬ 
ments of its perspective and outlook on certain important issues. 
Opening Observations 
A sales agreement is the end result of a fighter competition. The country 
holding the competition selects one of the competing aircraft and agrees with 
the winning company and country on the terms of the sale based on: 
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1. the economic, political and military goals of the purchasing govern¬ 
ment; 
2. the economic, political and military goals of the selling government; 
3. the economic, political and military goals of the military and civilian 
hierarchies and legislative committees which compete within the governments of 
both the purchasing and selling countries to determine the goals of each; the 
economic and political goals of competing aerospace companies; 
4. the goals of all other organizations which perceive themselves as af¬ 
fected by the competition and who were motivated by those perceptions to take 
action. The competitive process by which a sales agreement is reached is 
driven by individual decision makers possessing varying degrees of influence 
within these governmental and corporate organizations. These people must work 
within the following constraints: 
a. national law 
b. the written standard operating procedures of the organization for 
which they work 
c. the unwritten rules, customs and procedures of the various participat¬ 
ing organization and 
d. their personal perceptions of relevant political and economic environ¬ 
ments. These perceptions are based on information gathered through both the 
media and personal sources. 
If one could know the evolving goals of all the individuals in all the par¬ 
ticipating organizations, then one might, with a phenomenally sophisticated com¬ 
puter model, be able to come close on the price/offset package.Or one might 
construct a table of assumptions for price/offset packages which would show 
what values would yield a tie among the competing companies. Attempting 
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such a feat, however, would be too time consuming to be practical. Neverthe¬ 
less, it is possible to overlay a framework on the process and thereby create an 
heuristic model for understanding the competition’s dynamics. 
Building the Model 
Step One: Identify the Key Players 
The first step in constructing a model is identifying the key people in the 
competition. The key people are those who have the greatest influence on what 
aircraft is finally selected by the purchasing country. Key people for the pur¬ 
chasing country might be the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the For¬ 
eign Minister, or the Chief General of the Air Force. For a selling country such 
as the United States the key people might be the Secretaries of the Navy or Air 
Force, the Secretary of State or a particular senator or congressman. Each or¬ 
ganization that is actively participating in the process has key people working 
for it. Additionally, the laws and procedures of selling and purchasing countries 
usually mandate particular individuals taking significant roles in the process. 
Step Two: Identify the Key Players’s Goals 
The second step is to determine the goals of each of these key players. 
This model assumes key players are dynamic individuals with strong egos who 
have achieved their present positions through setting goals for both themselves 
and their organizations. It further assumes they have goals they believe the out¬ 
come of the competition will effect. These goals vary depending upon the roles 
of each key player. A CEO for an aerospace company has profit goals for his 
corporation; a finance minister for a purchasing country has goals for economic 
growth. Knowing the goals of the key players in the competition is critical in 
determining the outcome. 
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Step Three: Classifying the Goals 
The third step requires classifying each key player’s goals according to 
three categories: national, subnational and transnational. These three catego- 
ries are defined as follows:3 
National: These are goals which are of overriding concern to the country 
as a whole. They include, but are not limited to: building a strong national de¬ 
fense, increasing the nation s international influence; increasing national employ¬ 
ment, and increasing economic growth. 
Subnational: These are goals which aim at benefiting political constitu¬ 
ency that is a subelement of the national policy. Subnational goals are often 
stated in such a way as to appear as contributing to the achievement of national 
goals. Consequently, they are often difficult to separate from national goals. 
Transnational: These are goals that relate to the transnational opera¬ 
tions of competing aerospace companies and transnational organizations such as 
NATO and the EEC. 
By the nature of their positions, some key players will have goals that 
predominantly fall into one category. For example, the goals of the President of 
the United States are primarily national. Other key players may have goals in 
two or three categories. For example, a national goal of the Secretary of De¬ 
fense is to strengthen the country’s national security. However, he/she desires 
adequate funds in the budget for specific defense programs. His/her goals relat¬ 
ing to specific projects might be categorized as subnational. Other examples 
are congressmen from states producing major portions of one of the competing 
aircraft. They might support the sale because they firmly believe it will 
strengthen NATO (transnational) and also strengthen U.S. national security (na- 
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tional).They most certainly support it because of the desire to increase employ- 
ment in their district (subnational). 
Why break down each key player’s goals by these categories? Going 
through this exercise forces one to think carefully about the goals and under¬ 
stand their nature. Besides to directly note how this breakdown may suggest 
how different package mix may reduce opposition or build support. For exam¬ 
ple, the aforementioned congressman might profess supporting a sale for na¬ 
tional and transnational reasons. Are these actually goals of the congressman, 
or simply arguments he is using to help him achieve his subnational goal of in¬ 
creasing employment in his district? 
Step Four: Classify Goal Sets 
The fourth step entails classifying each set of national, subnational and 
transnational goals as political, military or economic in nature. This is done be¬ 
cause most arguments either in favor or against a particular sale are framed in 
political, military and economic terms. Table 1 identifies some key players ac¬ 
cording to the goal categories in which their goals predominantly fall, and the 
predominant classifications of those goals within those categories.4 For exam¬ 
ple, the Congress (and each congressman and senator as a member of it) has 
political, military and economic goals at the national level; an individual con¬ 
gressman has political and economic goals at the subnational level. 
Step Five: Determine Cost/Benefits of Sale 
Once the goals of key players have been categorized, the next step re¬ 
quires examining all facets of each proposed sales agreement and judging the 
costs and benefits of each to each player. If the sale positively affects a player’s 
national political goals when taken together, a +1 is assigned to that goalset; if it 
negatively affects it, -1; if it has no effect on it, 0. (see Table 2). This is done 
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for all goals sets of all key players. For example, the aforementioned congress¬ 
man faces the following situation: He is a liberal Democrat representing a dis¬ 
trict which is home to a large defense contractor. This contractor is the largest 
employer in the state and needs foreign sales to maintain high levels of employ¬ 
ment. However, a large percentage of voters in the district are opposed to the 
U.S. selling any arms overseas. The congressman favors a strong national de¬ 
fense and a strong NATO alliance. The congressman’s district derives 
$3,000,000 benefit for each F-18 sold overseas 
This step is important and difficult. It requires weighing the relative im¬ 
portance of each key player in the competition. As a start, one should look at 
the position each player holds in the hierarchy of the process. In doing this, re¬ 
member that all players have certain restraints upon their ability to act. Weights 
can be assigned on any scale desired by the analyst. For example, assume that 
the aforementioned congressman is Tip O’Neill. 
On a scale of 0 to 1, O’Neill might receive a weight of .8. (see Table 3). 
As time passes, people both gain and lose influence. The changing influence of 
players is sometimes a natural part of the process. 
For example, one of the first things the government of the purchasing 
country does is evaluate competing aircraft. Usually the country’s air force per¬ 
forms this evaluation. In this role the air force has the power to eliminate any 
of the competing aircraft for military and technical reasons. Once the air force 
validates particular aircraft is meeting military requirements, it loses some of its 
power over the final choice. 
The changing influence of players can also result from events totally un¬ 
related to the competition itself. For example, if a strong labor leader who was 
close friends with the president and who was a strong supporter of the United 
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States selling the F-16 versus the F-18 to another country were suddenly indicted 
on racketeering charges, it would probably undermine his influence over a final 
decision. 
Step Six: Use Fighter Competition Matrix 
The final step requires inserting each player's weight and goal scores in a 
competition matrix similar to the one shown in Table 3. Such a matrix can be 
built easily on Lotus 1-2-3. By adding the matrix both down and across, the 
analyst can derive the following information: 
1. An estimate of the potential intensity of eachkey player’s support for, 
or opposition to, a particular proposal; 
2. Information on why each key player supports or opposes a proposal; 
3. A breakdown of the specific political, military and economic 
strengths and weaknesses of a particular proposal according to national, subna¬ 
tional and transnational categories.This information is valuable in formulating a 
strategy for steering the competition a particular way. Of course, this model is 
not a magic answering machine. One must carefully analyze the sensitivity of 
each variable before reaching an answer which can be both time consuming and 
imprecise. Nevertheless, the model provides a means of finding one’s way 
through a maze of complexity. 
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CHAPTER II 
COST BENEFITS OF A MAJOR AIRCRAFT SALES AGREEMENT 
To use the model presented in the previous section, one must be able to 
discern the costs and benefits to the key players of each possible sales agree¬ 
ment. Because every competition can involve different countries, corporations 
and personalities, it is impossible to present all of the potential costs and bene¬ 
fits which might arise in a particular competition. However, generalizations 
about potential costs and benefits are possible. What follows is a delineation 
and discussion of the political, military and economic costs and benefits that can 
arise from a major weapons sale. 
Political Costs and Benefits 
An arms transaction is just one in a stream of events that makes up the 
relationship between two nations. It can either mark the beginning of a coopera¬ 
tive relationship or contribute to its continuation. This portion of the compen¬ 
dium addresses the political costs and benefits of a major weapons sale that are 
derived by the selling country. 
Political Benefits 
The political benefits of arms transactions manifest themselves in three 
ways: 
1. As a symbolic gesture of friendship and support 
2. As a means by which the selling country furthers its influence with 
the purchasing country; 
3. As a means by which the selling country acquires leverage in deter¬ 
mining the specific political behavior of the purchaser. 1 
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Symbolism and Friendship 
Arms are an important symbol of statehood. Making them available to 
another country symbolizes a strong recognition by the selling country of the le¬ 
gitimacy of the purchasing country’s government. It tangibly evidences support 
for the independence and territorial integrity of the purchasing country. Fur¬ 
thermore, it indicates a mutually beneficial political relationship. Consequently, 
a major arms sale is one means of strengthening political relationships with an¬ 
other country. 
Influence. 
Political influence manifests itself in two forms. One is through the dif¬ 
ferent types of specific influence that arise directly from the arms transfer rela¬ 
tionship. For example, this could derive from the impact that the selling coun¬ 
try’s military training has upon the attitude and behavior of the purchasing 
country’s military establishment. The other form arises from the additional 
day-to-day access government and corporate officials of the selling country 
have to the officials of the purchasing country’s government. There may be a 
tendency, however, to exaggerate the specific influence created by arms transac¬ 
tions. In some cases the selling country may find itself compelled to make a 
sale just so it can maintain the influence it has with the purchaser. 
Leverage. 
Leverage provides the selling country with a means of extracting specific 
political behavior from the purchasing country. It is exercised in the extreme in 
two ways: (1) the selling country agrees to sell more arms to the purchasing 
country in return for specific political behavior; (2) the selling country embar¬ 
goes all arms sales to the purchasing country if it continues specific political be¬ 
havior. Whether leverage is a viable benefit of an established seller/buyer rela- 
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tionship is questionable. By establishing a close arms relationship, the seller en¬ 
ters into a political bond with the buyer in which trust becomes an important 
factor. Consequently, attempting to exercise whatever leverage exists often 
gives rise to negative consequences. Exercising the leverage disrupts political 
relationships between buyer and seller by damaging the trust and friendship fos¬ 
tered by the earlier sales. Often the buyer will turn to other countries for its 
purchases, many times to the political and economic detriment of the original 
selling country. 
Political Costs 
There are three obvious potential political costs of arms transfers:2 
1. Identification of the seller with repressive regimes. 
2. Loss of prestige due to the purchasing country’s poor performance in 
combat; 
3. Creation of a potential hostage population in the purchasing country. 
Repressive Regimes. 
Selling arms to a country run by a repressive government identifies the 
selling country with the policies of that government. For example, the recent 
United States’ arms sale to Iran led directly to a disastrous turn in the United 
States-Iranian relations after the overthrow of the Shah. 
Loss of Prestige. 
When a close arms transfer relationship exists between two countries, the 
combat success or failure of the purchasing country’s armed forces directly re¬ 
flects on the military power and prestige of the selling country. Egypt’s debacle 
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was a serious blow to Soviet prestige, as was 
South Vietnam’s final fall in 1975 a blow to American prestige. 
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Hostages. 
Selling a fleet of sophisticated fighter aircraft to a nation often requires 
the selling country sending its citizens to the purchasing country to provide 
training and technical assistance on the use and maintenance of the aircraft. 
This population of teachers and technicians becomes a potential hostage popula¬ 
tion if relations between the seller and the buyer radically change. For exam¬ 
ple, before the Shah’s overthrow, there were between 25,000 and 30,000 Ameri¬ 
cans in Iran working on arms transfer related programs.3 
Military Costs and Benefits 
Military costs and benefits are a national concern. This section will dis¬ 
cuss these national concerns as they affect the selling country. 
Military Benefits. 
There are four direct and two indirect military benefits derived from sell¬ 
ing sophisticated weapons systems to other countries:4 
Direct. 
1. strengthens allied forces; 
2. strengthens the forces of friendly nations; 
3. in some instances it might be a means by which the selling country 
can obtain military base rights from the purchaser; 
4. it is a means by which the selling country can obtain intelligence 
gathering rights. 
Indirect. 
5. may curb nuclear proliferation; 
6. may provide a means by which selling country can test its combat 
equipment. 
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Support for Allies 
Arms sales are a critical ingredient in the defense bond between allied 
countries. First, they can help create relative peace and stability in otherwise 
potentially explosive, strategically important areas. For example, United States' 
arms assistance and sales to both Europe through NATO and to South Korea 
have significantly contributed to the maintenance of peace in those regions. 
Second, in the event that war occurs, providing one’s allies with arms ensures 
they will be effective partners in combat because their arms are compatible with 
one’s own arms. This facilitates joint operations with allied armed forces. Also, 
the development process for hi—technology arms might also create an opportu¬ 
nity for coproduction with allied nations. 
Support for Friends. 
Friendly countries are those the selling country hopes would win an 
armed conflict but with which it is not obligated by alliances to fight alongside 
of. In the case of the United States, arming friends is a means of reducing the 
level of direct United States’ military commitments abroad, thereby reducing the 
monetary and manpower burden inherent in honoring international obligations. 
Nevertheless, supplying arms to friendly countries is no guarantee that those 
arms will be used for purposes intended by the selling country. For example, 
the United States did not supply both Pakistan and India with arms so they 
could use them against each other as they did in the mid 1960s. Moreover, sup¬ 
plying friendly countries can sometimes be the first step to direct intervention by 
the supplying country, as is argued was the United States’ experience in Viet¬ 
nam. 
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Base Rights. 
Bases can be used as a bargaining chip for negotiating base rights in an¬ 
other country. An excellent example of this is the base rights treaty the United 
States and Spain negotiated as a part of Spain’s purchase of the F—18. Never¬ 
theless there are other means of securing base rights, including cash payments, 
loans and other economic assistance. 
Intelligence Gathering Rights. 
In essence, this is part of the benefit derived from using arms sales to 
secure basing rights. However, because of the strategic importance of intelli¬ 
gence gathering and because of the way it potentially alters the nature of rela¬ 
tionships between a purchasing country and its neighbors, it should be viewed as 
a separate benefit. 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation. 
An argument can be made that this is an indirect benefit of arms sales. 
The logic is that if a potential nuclear power has a sufficient conventional arse¬ 
nal to ensure its security, it will have less incentive to develop nuclear weapons. 
Unfortunately, there are many other reasons to become a nuclear power, 
among which are prestige, the desire to match regional competition, and the de¬ 
sire to attain regional dominance. What might, in fact, result in creation in the 
region of both a conventional arms race and nuclear arms race. 
Test Combat Equipment. 
This is also argued to be an indirect benefit of arms sales. It too is a 
questionable benefit at best because any testing usually takes place accidentally. 
The supplier usually does not know for certain whether the arms supplied will 
be used in combat. Additionally, testing environments are often poor because 
of the different military strategies, tactics, levels of training and technical com- 
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petence of the forces of a user country. Equipment testing has never been 
openly used by the United States as a justification for arms sales. 
Military Costs 
There are at least three military costs a country potentially incurs by sell¬ 
ing arms to another country:5 
1. sales of arms by a country may hurt its military readiness; 
2. arms sold by a country may eventually be used against its own forces; 
and 
3. technology transferred as a part of the sale may fall into the hands of 
the selling country’s enemies. 
Military Readiness. 
Arms sales can hurt a country's military readiness in two ways. The first 
occurs when sales are made directly from the military stocks of the selling coun¬ 
try, thereby reducing the weapons and supplies it has to equip its own forces. 
The second occurs when manufacturers of weapons systems which are in high 
demand are not able to produce enough of them to supply the demands of the 
selling country’s armed forces.6 
Use Against Seller. 
The best example of this problem comes from the recent Falklands crisis. 
In the three years leading up to the conflict, the United Kingdom sold Argentina 
warships and electronics valued at $200 million. Ironically one-fourth of the 
Exocet missile components used by the Argentine Air Force to sink two British 
ships, were manufactured in Britain.7 
Technology Theft by Hostile Powers. 
In cases where the military and industrial security of a purchasing coun¬ 
try are not as good as they are in the selling country, opportunities exist for 
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hostile powers to steal both actual weapons and weapons manufacturing technol¬ 
ogy. This problem has become a grave concern of the United States in recent 
years. Presently, safeguarding technology is a major consideration of the De¬ 
fense Department in deciding whether to approve the export of an advanced 
weapons system 
Economic Costs and Benefits 
Economic costs and benefits permeate every sales agreement, and affect 
players on national, subnational and transnational levels. 
National Perspective 
At the national level, the economic costs and benefits are measurable in 
terms of Gross National Product (GNP), Balance of Payments (BOP), national 
unemployment, and growth within targeted sectors of the economy. These costs 
and benefits can be derived by looking at the relevant economic statistics for 
both the selling and purchasing countries. 
Selling Country: United States. 
Table 3 describes the relationship between the United States’ economy 
and the import/export of weaponry.8 The export of arms is not overwhelmingly 
important to the United States national economy. In 1983, for example, arms 
exports comprised only 5.3% of all United States’ exports.9 Nevertheless, the 
United States can hardly afford to ignore the positive economic effects accruing 
from arms sales. Making certain economic assumptions, it is possible to graph 
United States GNP both with and without arms sales overseas. 10 
Such a graphing, as shown in Figure 1, illustrates that the exclusion of 
arms exports would have significantly reduced United States’ GNP. These GNP 
differences translate into a gain of almost 26,000 jobs in the United States’ 
economy for every $1 billion arms exported. 11 It is easy to see how exporting 
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100 jet fighters worth over $3 billion provides an economic benefit that easily 
translates into a political benefit. The possible alternatives make the ’’visible” 
gain probably much less in reality. 
The second major economic benefit accruing to the United States is a 
lower cost of defense. By political necessity, the United States must maintain 
its own defense industry. In the case of fighter aircraft, only a limited number 
of United States’ corporations are capable of designing, developing and build¬ 
ing aircraft capable enough for the mission requirements of the Navy and the 
Air Force. Keeping these companies financially solvent required the United 
States’ Government’s providing them with adequate markets for their aircraft. 
However, it is not politically viable for the government to purchase more aircraft 
than are minimally required by the armed services. 
All of this presents the government with a dilemma: If the extra aircraft 
are purchased, the added expenditure will heavily increase the deficit; if the air¬ 
craft are not purchased, the companies may face bankruptcy and need federal 
assistance as Lockheed did during early 1970.12 One way out of this dilemma is 
allowing these companies to export aircraft. 
Exporting has an additional benefit in this regard it provides the United 
States with money to defray the research and development costs associated with 
developing new aircraft. In some cases, the United States makes a profit on 
collecting these ’’recoupement” fees normally paid to the United States by coun¬ 
tries purchasing United States aircraft. Overall, especially in light of the pre¬ 
sent deficit debate, the savings arising from all arms exports looms large as not 
only an economic but also as a political benefit. 
The size of the economic benefit was empirically derived by the Defense 
Department in early 1970 for all United States arms exports. For every $11 bil- 
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lion dollars in arms the United States government exports, it saves $770 mil¬ 
lion. 13 
Purchasing Country: Spain. 
The economic costs or benefits of a major arms purchase to a country 
like Spain depend largely upon the terms of the sales agreement. Two features 
of sales agreements, financing (specifically United States’ Foreign Military 
Sales financing) and the offset packaging can turn purchases which would be 
overall detriments to the national economy into overall benefits. 
Purchase Made Without Financing and Offset 
% 
Just as arms exports help the United States’ economy, arms imports hurt 
the Spanish economy. Table 3 and Figure 1 both illustrate why the Spanish 
Government cannot afford to ignore the economic costs of arms imports. 14 
Purchase Made With Financing and Offset 
Arms import agreements may turn from costs into benefits when financ¬ 
ing and offsets are included. The United States’ Foreigm Military Sales financ¬ 
ing program, the biggest of its kind in the world, provides both credit guaran¬ 
tees and direct credit to purchasing nations such as Spain. This financing signifi¬ 
cantly reduces import of arms sales on international balance of payments. Table 
5 shows that Spain has received considerable Foreigm Military Sales funding 
since 1972. Comparing the size of amounts of Foreigm Military Sales credits 
granted to the size of Spanish arms imports over these years bears witness to 
this. 15 Offsets, however, may provide even more economic benefit than financ¬ 
ing for a given purchase. ’’Offset” is a generic term commonly used to refer to 
economic benefit package both selling countries and companies offer a purchas¬ 
ing country. The package is designed to counteract or ’’offset” the detrimental 
impact of huge outflow of capital, ($ 3 billion in the case of Spains s F-18 
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purchase) would have on the economy. However, balancing international cash 
flow is not the only benefit a country’s economy derives from offset. In addi¬ 
tion, the purchasing country may acquire the right to coproduce the aircraft it 
purchases. The new technologies often acquired through these coproduction 
agreements aid the purchasing country’s efforts to further develop its economy. 
Finally, many offset packages require the contracting company’s finding new 
markets for goods produced by the purchasing country’s economy. 
All in all, once financing and offset are considered, a major arms pur¬ 
chase often results in a net benefit to the purchasing country’s economy. 
Subnational Perspective. 
This perspective is a function of the infrastructure of the countries in¬ 
volved in the competition. Consequently, to appreciate the subnational eco¬ 
nomic cost/benefit implications of a particular salesagreement, it is necessary to 
understand the infrastructure of the participating countries. Analysis should be¬ 
gin with a careful review of the political and industrial situation of the selling 
and purchasing countries. 
Selling Country: United States. 
The political substructure of the United States is made up of states and 
congressional districts. The industrial structure is primarily made up of the con¬ 
tracting and subcontracting aerospace corporations, aerospace and defense re¬ 
lated industrial associations and labor unions. The key players with the most sig¬ 
nificant subnational concerns are usually legislators and corporate executives. 
The national economic costs/benefit of a particular sales agreement are 
magnified in those states hosting major defense contractors and subcontractors 
such as Texas (General Dynamics) and Missouri (McDonnell Douglas). Table 5 
reflects the ranking of the top ten states for Fiscal Year 1981 in terms of the im- 
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portance they attach to defense spending in general and weapons exports in par- 
ticular.16 
To focus more narrowly, consider the State of Connecticut, which is 
home of United Technologies’ Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division and General 
Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division. A regional breakdown by DOD (Department 
of Defense) spending per worker reveals that DOD spends more than $1000 per 
worker annually in the state. By applying the same economic methodology ap¬ 
plied previously, one discovers that total income generated by DOD spendinc 
exceeds the entire amount of taxes collected by the state.17 
Given this economic motivation, it should come as no surprise that legis¬ 
lators from such regions are often in the forefront of debates on weapons pro¬ 
curement and sales. Nor does the political persuasion of politicians on other 
matters always decide their stance on these matters. Liberal senators like Alan 
Cranston, Howard Metzenbaum and Ted Kennedy have voted repeatedly for 
weapons procurement contracts and weapons export sales. Their votes might 
seem out of character politically, but annually serve to put billions of dollars 
into their respective states.18 
Perhaps even more motivating to some representatives is the potential 
benefit that contributions from aerospace industrial associations and Political Ac¬ 
tion Committees (PAC) can have for their campaigns. Every major weapons 
contractor and subcontractor in the United States maintains a PAC and contrib¬ 
utes both through its own PAC and those of its associations to those candidates 
who best represent the industry on issues of weapons procurement and weapons 
sales overseas.19 
Two major subnational forces are the Navy and the Air Force. The eco¬ 
nomic benefits both services derive from exporting their aircraft include reduced 
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cost for those aircraft due to learning curve efficiencies and recoupement of the 
research and development money expended designing them. The magnitude of 
these cost savings is dramatically illustrated in Figure Four, which shows that 
sales of theF-18 to Canada, Australia and Spain saved the United States Navy 
an estimated $1.8 billion. The political twist to this economic benefit arises in 
cases where the unit cost of anew aircraft is so expensive that Congress may be 
unwilling to approve funds for its purchase. If foreign friends and allies can be 
persuaded to purchase the new aircraft, its price might be reduced to where it 
becomes acceptable to Congress. Another economic benefit to the Navy and 
Air Force from export sales derives from logistical considerations. All aircraft 
must be overhauled periodically. The overhaul work is done in what are called 
rework centers which normally are located in the United States. However, if 
another country is flying the service’s airplane, the service can have its aircraft 
overhauled in that country. Many times it is shorter flying distance to these for¬ 
eign overhaul depots. Furthermore, because of lower labor costs overseas, it is 
often less expensive to have overhaul work done in a foreign depot. 
Purchasing Country: Spain. 
The Spanish military, specifically the Spanish Air Force was the most im¬ 
portant subnational actor in Spain’s fighter competition. Although the Spanish 
military is part of the government, the costs and benefits it derives from select¬ 
ing a particular fighter do not flow from macroeconomic changes such as GNP 
or level of employment. The Spanish Military works on a fixed budget, and 
must make its armaments purchases with appropriated funds. Consequently, it is 
primarily concerned with purchase financing (such as Foreigm Military Sales) 
and the final price of the aircraft. 
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The second most powerful subnational organization in Spain is a govern¬ 
ment affiliated industrial group entitled Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI), 
which is a state holding company promoting industrial growth and making its 
investments directed at developing both basic and high technology industries. 
INI has two firms which are primary contractors for the Spanish Ministry of De¬ 
fense, Empresa Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (ENCASA) and Empresa 
Nacional Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares. These two firms, supported 
by several smaller firms which act as their subcontractors, constitute the pri¬ 
mary subnational force outside the government. These associations realize that 
to grow and compete in the international marketplace, Spain’s economy must 
not only grow, but also grow in the right directions. Consequently, they strongly 
favor industrial participation and coproduction agreements that provide technol¬ 
ogy transfer not only in defense industries but commercial industries as well.20 
Transnational Perspective. 
Over the past fifteen years, aerospace corporations both in the United 
States and abroad have become more and more dependent upon transnational 
operations as a means of doing business. This is attributable to four factors: 
1. The evolution of a global economy; 
2. domestic laws mandating subcomponent production and/or processing 
within the the company’s host country; 
3. growing need for coproduction and licensing agreements as a part of 
offset packages; 
4. growing pressure on contractors to help reduce United States de¬ 
fense costs. 
The outgrowth of this combination of factors is a bundle of transnational 
economic costs and benefits to the corporation. In pulling apart this bundle, 
131 
notice how potential economic benefits to different national and subnational 
groups politically tie the package together. 
Global Economy. 
The goal of any business is to keep production costs down so as to 
maximize profit. As the world economy continues to sprout an ever increasing 
number of companies capable of building components that are usable in modern 
weapons systems, arms manufacturers are increasingly tempted to turn to for¬ 
eign sourcing as a means of reducing their costs.21 This allows the manufactur¬ 
ers to take advantage of the value-added chain in their production, and thereby 
use comparative advantage to their benefit. 
Domestic Production & Processing Requirements. 
The manufacturers are prevented from taking full advantage of the global 
economy by national laws which require that particular components which either 
are or can be produced in the manufacturer’s home country are not sourced out 
to a foreign manufacturer. 
Coproduction Requirements. 
Foreign customers of domestically produced advanced weapons systems 
are increasingly demanding some participation in the production of the weapons 
they purchase. They often demand contracts to produce components for all of 
the systems that will be sold worldwide by the manufacturer. The best example 
of this is the 40-10-15 percent offset arrangement which was the keystone to the 
huge F-16 sale in 1975 to Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands. Un¬ 
der this arrangement, 10 percent of the parts used in United States Air Force 
F-16’s are produced by the Europeans. 
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Increased Pressure To Cut Defense Costs. 
This is a factor particularly applicable to the United States in recent 
years. The federal government often sets the profit margin that defense con¬ 
tractors earn on a given contract. Many times the contract is written so that the 
contractor and DOD share cost savings. Consequently, if the contractor is able 
to reduce its costs due to learning curve efficiencies, both DOD and the contrac¬ 
tor benefit. However, if costs exceed a certain fixed ceiling, the contractor can 
find itself without a profit. Such contract terms become particularly significant 
when considered in conjunction with the coproduction demands of purchasing 
countries. These countries do not necessarily base their coproduction demands 
on what they can most efficiently produce but on what will provide them the 
greatest amount of new technology. Consequently, subcomponent assemblies 
that might be more efficiently performed in the United States are transferred to 
another country. This increases the cost of aircraft the contractor sells to the 
United States. Because the United States does not pay for these incremental 
cost increases, they cut into the contractor’s profits for aircraft sold domesti¬ 
cally. Another way a potentially beneficial contract can suddenly change into a 
costly venture is if the purchasing country suddenly undergoes a radical change 
in governmentand, as a consequence, defaults on the contract. To help guard 
against this, United States corporations commission extensive research into the 
political underpinnings of the purchasing government as well as the demographic 
factors of the society over which it governs. Factors such as the strength of an 
incumbent government, the overpopulation of urban centers, and the presence or 
absence of xenophobia, although not economic in nature, may spell the differ¬ 
ence between a lucrative sale and a catastrophic loss. Table Six shows the po¬ 
litical risk analysis used by the General Dynamics/Pratt & Whitney team during 
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their attempt to sell the F-16 to Spain. Notice both the short term and long 
term perspective addressed by the table. To put the Spanish calculation in per¬ 
spective, similar surveys have been conducted for other countries purchasing the 
F-16. The high or least risky score was 32.0 for Belgium; the lowscore was 
14.50 for Egypt.22 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SELLERS 
This part of the study examines the countries and companies which com¬ 
peted to sell their respective aircraft to Spain. It focuses primarily on the 
United States. However, France and its nationalized producer Dassault-Brequet 
as well as Great Britain, Italy and Germany which are the member countries of 
the Panavia Consortium will also be discussed. 
The United States Government 
Throughout the twentieth century, arms transfers have been a significant 
feature of United States foreign policy. Some of the most important decisions 
determining United Statesinvolvement abroad over the past 65 years have been 
directly related to the transfer of arms and munitions to foreign governments.i 
Concern for the national security of the United States has been the pri¬ 
mary rationale for government controls on arms exports as well as the primary 
justification for the United States Government’s authority to sell, give or loan 
arms to other nations.2 Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to state that United 
States policy makers, especially between 1960 - 1970, turned a blind eye to the 
potential economic benefits arising from weapons sales to foreign powers.3 
Because of the President’s constitutionally vested power to direct United 
States’ foreign policy, the executive branch has dominated the process of formu¬ 
lating United States arms transfer policy. Nevertheless, the Congress has not 
hesitated to exert its power to achieve its own goals whenever it has deemed it 
necessary to do so, even when they conflict with those of the President. Conse¬ 
quently, resulting policy has been a product of both conflict and cooperation be¬ 
tween the two branches. 
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As the ’’Arsenal of Democracy”, the United States exported almost S2.2 
billion of arms from August 1914 to March 1917 and emerged from World War 1 
as a leading participant in the international trade in arms.4 After the war, this 
country continued to be a major participant in the arms trade, accounting for 
more than 52% of global arms exports.5 As United States’ arms transfers grew, 
however, so did the controversies surrounding the arms industry. During the 
1920’s and 1930’s a growing number of people both here and abroad came to 
believe in what was called the ’’devil theory of war”. According to this theory, 
arms manufacturers in both the United States and Europe conspired to both 
start and prolong World War 1.6 This theory gave birth to the belief that the 
United States had been drawn into WW I to protect the interests of the ’’inter¬ 
national arms industry.” 
In 1934, as a growing wave of pacifism and isolationism swept across the 
United States, the Congress resolved to investigate the arms industry.7 On 
April 1, 1934, the Senate approved the motion of North Dakota Senator Gerald 
P. Nye to begin hearings. As the hearings progressed, public disgust with the 
arms industry grew.8 The Nye hearings helped inspire Congress to pass the 
Neutrality Act of 1935 which, among other items, compelled the president to em¬ 
bargo all arms shipments to belligerents in any foreign war.9 Included in the 
bill was a provision creating the Munitions Control Board to supervise American 
arms exports. This provision did not give the government power to prohibit 
arms transfers in peacetime. 10 
The White House initially welcomed the investigation, and later welcomed 
those provisions of the Neutrality Act which created the Munitions Control 
Board. 11 However, it was horrified when Nye, ”an isolationist of the deepest 
dye” was appointed to lead the investigation.12 In reaction to the hearings, Sec- 
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retary of State Cordell Hull recorded in his memoirs that ’’The majority of the 
committee in effect dug the ground out from under those of us who had the in¬ 
ternational viewpoint and who argued that, if the peace of the world was to be 
maintained, the United States had to take its share in the effort.” 13 in another 
passage Hull wrote: ”It is doubtful that any congressional committee has ever 
had a more unfortunate effect on our foreign relations. . .”14 
Congressional attitudes towards arms transfers slowly began to change 
with the outbreak of World War H. In November, 1939, United States’ neutrality 
laws were revised to allow for the sale of munitions to any belligerent nation on 
a ’’cash and carry” basis. 15 This aided the allied nations who had not pro¬ 
gressed as far as Germany had in rearming. 16 
In September of 1940, after German forces occupied France, President 
Roosevelt made an executive agreement with the British Government to swap 
fifty World War I destroyers for the right to 99-year leases on British naval and 
air bases in Newfoundland and the Caribbean. 17 Six months later, after strenu¬ 
ous debate, the Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act. Under this legislation, 
the President was authorized to ’’lease, lend or otherwise dispose of” to any 
country whose defense was vital to the United States, arms and other equipment 
and supplies to an extent of an initial appropriation of $7 billion. 18 When the 
United States finally entered World War H, Lend-Lease became the official ve¬ 
hicle by which it helped equip allied armed forces. Under Lend-Lease, the 
United States transferred arms worth tens of billions of dollars between 1941 
and 1945.19 
In the Post-War era and continuing into the Cold-War, arms transfers 
were one of the central components of the United States’ strategy of containing 
Communist expansion.20 In 1947, President Truman declared under the 
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’’Truman Doctrine” that the United States would provide assistance to countries 
threatened by the Soviet Union.21 As a direct follow-on of the Truman Doc¬ 
trine, the Congress passed Public Law 75 which provided arms transfer and 
other military assistance to the governments of Greece and Turkey.22 Following 
the formation of NATO in 1949, the Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assis¬ 
tance Act, which provided for additional military assistance, including arms 
transfers, tothe new alliance.23 Military assistance (or weapons transfers) were 
called ’’the mortar of the NATO alliance.”24 United States’ military assistance 
policy expended alongside United States containment policy to other geographic 
regions. Both the Korean War and the Soviet Union’s support of Egypt changed 
the focus of United States’ assistance, thereby motivating the United States to 
transfer increasing quantities of arms to Southeast Asia and the Middle East.26 
Of all the transfers during this period the majority were made ’’free of charge” 
under what became the Military Assistance Program (MAP).26 
During the 1960’s the form of United States’ arms exports changed from 
grants of World War II surplus equipment to sales of new equipment.27 In 
1961, military grant aid was twice as large as sales. By 1966, sales figures were 
double those for military aid, excluding South Vietnam.28 This shift in empha¬ 
sis in United States’ arms export policy was made because many more develop¬ 
ing countries were making sufficient economic progress to assume a greater 
share of the financial burden of their defense.29 Policy makers began appreci¬ 
ating the potential economic benefits of arms sales for the United States’ bal- 
ance-of-payments position and the domestic arms industry.30 Grant aid contin¬ 
ued to decline while the number of sales recipients continued to increase. In 
FY 1966, fifty-nine nations received foreign military sales (FMS) deliveries in 
1975, seventy-four did. Commercial deliveries increased from fifty-one coun- 
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tries in FY 1966 to seventy-seven.3l Policy rationale for this continuing in- 
crease in sales is best expressed in the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which shifted 
the emphasis of policy from stationing United States’ troops in friendly nations 
to providing friendly nations with the weapons and assistance necessary for 
them in order to defend themselves.32 
Also during the 1960’s the Congress was becoming more and more con¬ 
cerned with the nature and consequences of United States’ arms transfers. One 
problem was how foreign powers were using United States supplied arms. In 
the mid-1960’s, India and Pakistan fought each other with United States made 
weapons.33 In the late 60’s Congress began reflecting public disapproval of the 
authoritarian repression and corruption witnessed in such military aid recipients 
as Vietnam, Greece, Korea and the Philippines.34 
Because of the Vietnam experience, which had begun as a military assis¬ 
tance program only to be transformed into a United States war, many in Con¬ 
gress were concerned that United States military assistance to a region was the 
first step towards the eventual involvement of United States’ forces. 
In 1968, Congress passed the Foreign Military Sales Act. This legislation 
required administrations to emphasize foreign policy considerations, as opposed 
to economic considerations, when formulating their arms transfer policies.36 
Reflecting Congress’ growing concern with how foreign governments were using 
United States weapons, this act also prohibited sales togovernments that engaged 
in human rights violations orimpeded social progress.37 Partially due to Con¬ 
gressional concern, administrations of this period adopted a basic policy of de¬ 
nying sales of sophisticated weapons to countries that needed their financial re¬ 
sources for economic development and did not have serious threats to their se¬ 
curity.38 
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During the early 1970’s the rising dollar value of United States’ arms 
sale, the increasing sophistication of weapons sold and what was perceived as 
an over-casual attitude on the part of United States’ policy makers towards 
arms sales caused increasing Congressional concern.39 ’’Arms sales appeared 
to have become a tool of politics rather than a policy for security, and the arms 
traffic appeared to be out of control.”40 One example cited is President 
Nixon’s instructions in 1972 to honor all Iranian arms requests, a policy that cir¬ 
cumvented review by the State and Defense Departments of the potential conse¬ 
quences of such sales.41 Another example cited is President Ford’s selling to 
Israel in 1976 equipment previously banned from foreign sale.42 The force and 
impact of Congressional action increased alongside its concern. In 1971 Con¬ 
gress expressed its sense that the President should: Immediately institute a com¬ 
prehensive review of military assistance and sales programs; initiate arms trade 
control talks with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy; 
commence a debate in the United Nations on the arms trade; and ’’use the 
power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the United States to 
work actively with all nations to check and control the international sales and 
distribution of conventional weapons of death and destruction.”43 In 1975 Con¬ 
gress tacked the Nelson amendment to the FY 1975 foreign aid authorization. 
This required the President to report military sales of $25 million or more to the 
Congress which would then have twenty days to veto the sale of joint resolu¬ 
tion.44 Congressional action culminated in 1976 with the passage of the Interna¬ 
tional Security Assistance and Arms Control Export Act.45 
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) was designed to shift the emphasis from selling arms to controlling the 
sales of arms.46 It attempted to accomplish this by specifying Congressional 
142 
guidelines for United States arms sales policy.47 The act includes the following 
provisions: Congress has the right to veto proposed arms sales 30 days prior to 
a sale; commercial sales (sales by a United States company directly to a foreign 
government) cannot exceed $25 million if the purchasing country is not a mem¬ 
ber of NATO; 48 the President is required to submit to congress quarterly in¬ 
formation on arms transfers; and the President is encouraged to initiate negotia¬ 
tions which would result in a reduction in international arms traffic.49 The 
AECA is still the controlling legislation on United States arms sales. 
The arms transfer policies of President Carter were an affirmation of the 
congressional initiatives embodied in AECA.50 The President’s policy was that 
conventional arms transfers would be viewed as an ’’exceptional foreign policy 
implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated 
that the transfer contributes to our national security interests.”51 
President Carter established controls on transfers to all nations except 
NATO member countries and Japan, Australia and New Zealand.52 Carter’s 
basic guidelines as expressed in his policy statement included the following: 
1. An effort would be made to promote respect for human rights in re¬ 
cipient nations. . . . 
2. The economic impact of arms transfers to countries receiving United 
States economic assistance considered. 
3. The United States would not permit development or significant modi¬ 
fication of advanced weapons systems solely for export. 
4. The United States would not permit coproduction agreements for sig¬ 
nificant weapons, equipment and major components. 
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5. An attempt would be made to remove the economic incentives for 
arms sales, such as lower per unit costs for Defense Department procurement 
of similar items. 
6. United States’ government employees were forbidden to help arms 
salesmen abroad without express authorization from Washington. (What soon 
became known as the ’’leprosy letter”). 
7. An attempt would be made to reduce international arms traffic 
through multilateral negotiations.53 
The Carter administration initiated the Convention of Arms Transfer 
Talks in addition to its other policies. The administration first approached its 
allies, the major Western European suppliers, to see what might be achieved 
through negotiations on arms restraints. These suppliers said that restraint 
could pose serious problems for them and they wanted assurances of Soviet in¬ 
terest in arms sales restraint before they could consider restraint measures 
themselves.54 The administration proceeded to initiate talks with the Soviets 
which lasted through four rounds until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended 
any prospect for an agreement.55 As the talks proceeded, the major Western 
European allies continued their customary arms sales practices and were not 
brought into the negotiations.56 
The Carter administration achieved some modest reduction in the dollar 
volume of United States’ arms transfers, turning down arms requests from over 
60 countries valued at over $1 billion.57 These included denying both Greece 
and Turkey the opportunity to purchase the F—16.58 Nevertheless, the Carter 
administration made almost S40 billion of arms transfer agreements with the 
Third World, which was about the same value of arms transfers in the previous 
four years under Presidents Nixon and Ford.59 The trends for the Soviet Un- 
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ion and the major Western European suppliers are notably different. In the 
Carter period the value of their arms transfer agreements generally moved up¬ 
ward. The Soviet Union nearly doubled its transfer agreements in 1977-1980 
from their 1973-1976 totals. The French, from 1977-1980 more than tripled their 
agreement values from the 1973-1976 period. The United Kingdom, West Ger¬ 
many and Italy each doubled the values of their transfer agreements in 1977-180 
from their previous four year totals.60 
In 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president and United States’ arms 
transfer goals and policy entered a new era. 
Present Goals and Policy of the United States 
The arms transfer policy of the Reagan Administration is an about-face 
from the Carter policy.- In his first official statement on the matter on July 8, 
1981, President Reagan underlined the need for flexibility in arms sales and fo¬ 
cused on the use of arms sales to counter the Soviet global challenge.61 The 
United States, he said, would be ’’guided by principle as well as practical neces¬ 
sity. We will deal with the world as it is rather than as we would like it to 
be.”62 
A presidential directive issued soon after the July 8 statement stated the 
United States must ’’not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be pre¬ 
pared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs through the transfer of 
conventional arms and other forms of security assistance.”63 Conventional arms 
transfers would be ”an essential element of [the administration’s] global defense 
posture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy. 64 
The stated goals of the Reagan policy are: 
1. to help deter aggression by enhancing preparedness of friends and 
allies; 
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2. to increase military effectiveness by improving America’s ability in 
conjunction with allies and friends, ”to project power in response to threats 
posed by mutual adversaries.” 
3. to strengthen and revitalize United States’ mutual security relation¬ 
ships through support of efforts to foster the capability of our forces to deploy 
and operate with those of our friends and allies; 
4. demonstrate the enduring interest the United States has in the security 
of its partners and friends and that ”it will not allow them to be at a military 
disadvantage.” 
5. to ’’foster regional and internal stability, thus encouraging peaceful 
resolution of disputes and evolutionary change.” 
6. to ’’help to enhance United States’ defense production capabilities and 
efficiency.”65 
The Reagan policy directive emphasizes that the United States will 
’’evaluate requests primarily in terms of their net contribution to enhanced deter¬ 
rence and defense.” Arms transfer decisions will be made after giving due con¬ 
sideration to a broad range of factors including: 
1. the degree to which the transfer is an appropriate response to the 
’’military threats confronting the recipient.” whether the transfer will enhance 
the ability of the recipient to participate with the United States in collective se¬ 
curity effort; 
2. whether the transfer will promote mutual interests through countering 
externally supported aggression; 
3. whether the transfer is consistent with United States’ interests ”in 
maintaining stability within regions where friends of the United States may have 
differing objectives.” 
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4. whether items transferred "can be absorbed by the recipient nation 
without overburdening its military support system or financial resources." 
whether the "positive contributions" to United States' "interests and objectives” 
more than counterbalance ’’any detrimental effects of the transfer.”66 
In a direct turnaround from the Carter policy, the Reagan policy stipu¬ 
lates that coproduction will be allowed, but requests for such would ’’receive 
special scrutiny” taking into consideration the following factors: 
1. ’’economic and industrial factors” for both the United States and the 
participating nations; 
2. ’’the importance of arms cooperation with NATO and other close 
friends and allies; 
3. ’’potential third party transfer. . 
4. ’’the protection of sensitive technology and military capabilities.” 
Finally, the Reagan policy revokes Carter’s so called ’’Leprosy Letter”. 
United States’ representatives overseas are now required ”to provide the same 
courtesies and assistance to firms that. . . [market arms] as they would to those 
marketing other American products.”67 
United States Corporations and Their Products 
Profits v. Patriotism. 
”1 build airplanes for the United States Government! I’m not selling air¬ 
planes to foreigners unless the United States’ Government tells me to!”68 So 
said James ”Mr. McDonnell Jr., founder and, until his death, Chairman of 
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft. As for General Dynamics, it was ’’reluctantly 
dragged into the fray” of the 1974-1975 European Fighter competition, being to¬ 
tally content to let ’’Uncle Sam do the lobbying.”69 The statement by Mr. 
McDonnell and the behavior of General Dynamics are indicative of the attitudes 
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that characterized the management of both companies concerning overseas sales 
prior to their becoming involved in the fighter competitions of the past ten 
years. To some extent, these same attitudes are still prevalent today.70 One 
very important reason for this attitude is marketplace reality. Both companies 
know that their primary customer is the United States’ Government. Conse¬ 
quently both are very conscious of their need to comply with the desires of their 
chief customer. 
In all fairness to both companies, however, a considerable amount of 
their motivation derives from patriotism. The workers and management of both 
companies take a great deal of pride in designing and building what they feel to 
be the best fighter aircraft in the world. This pride carries over into an even 
greater pride in the United States. A major factor adding to this patriotism is 
that many of the employees of both companies are former military officers. In 
marketing these aircraft overseas the representatives of each company are ”con- 
stantly aware that [they] are selling instruments of foreign policy and [they] 
often find it a little intimidating.”71 
The implication of this patriotism is that both companies are at the beck 
and call of the United States Government. Their attitudes towards international 
sales implies that though they will compete fiercely against both each other and 
foreign competition they will probably not violate the rules for overseas market¬ 
ing set down by the policymakers within the United States State and Defense 
Departments. They feel doing so would not only be bad business but also 
un-American. 
General Dynamics and the F-16. 
General Dynamics is the largest defense contractor in the United States. 
Along with aircraft, it produces Trident Class submarines at its Electric Boat Di¬ 
vision in Connecticut and the Army’s Ml main battle tank in its Land Systems 
Division located in Ohio. Nonetheless, it is the FA16 that is the big money 
maker for G.D., accounting for 41.5 percent of its total sales in 198172 
A quick glance at Table 7 explains why. By 1982, General Dynamics 
had sold 1,786 F-16s to ten different countries. Operating income from F-16s 
was $224 million for 1981. Prospects for additional sales were excellent, be¬ 
cause the government had given General Dynamics permission to approach 24 
additional countries concerning future sales. Past success does not guarantee fu¬ 
ture success, however, as General Dynamics had learned in competitions re¬ 
cently conducted in Australia and Canada where it lost to McDonald Douglas in 
competition against the F-18. As in all previous competitions, General Dynam¬ 
ics teamed with the F-16 engine maker, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of 
United Technologies, in making both its aircraft and offset proposals to Spain. 
The F-16 Falcon is a ’’brilliantly capable multi-role fighter which, in the 
eyes of most observers is number one in the western world.”73 When it first 
came out, it was hailed as the ’’fighter pilot’s fighter”. One test pilot described 
flying it this way: ’’You feel like you’re riding on top of the airplane... you feel 
it might run out from under you...it’s like driving the world’s fastest drag 
racer.”74 The F-16A, which was the original aircraft sold to the Europeans in 
1975, is capable of speeds exceeding ’mach 2’ or twice the speed of sound. It is 
armed with both a twenty millimeter cannon capable of shooting 6000 rounds 
per minute and with Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles. Additionally, it is capa¬ 
ble of carrying 25 500 lb. bombs. An accurate bomber, the F-16 was used by 
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Israeli pilots to attack and destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. If the F-16 
had one weakness going into the Spanish competition, it was its lack of a radar 
missile capability. The F-16A could not shoot down long range targets. To 
deal with this problem, General Dynamics developed a follow-on to the F-16A, 
the F-16C (figure 6). This aircraft has both the radar and the missiles neces¬ 
sary to attack threat aircraft at ranges exceeding 20 miles. The F-16C was the 
aircraft General Dynamics offered to Spain. 
McDonnell Douglas and the F-L8 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation is one of the major forces in military 
aviation. Formed in St. Louis in 1939 as McDonnell Aircraft, it has designed 
and produced a wide variety of aircraft and aerospace products, including the 
Mercury space capsule that carried John Glenn into orbit around the earth. In 
1967, McDonnell Aircraft merged with Douglas Aircraft, a major producer of 
commercial aircraft, to form the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. 
McDonnell Douglas has an outstanding reputation for building fighters. 
Its most famous fighter, the F-4 Phantomll, was a work horse for the Marine 
Corps, Navy and Air Force in Vietnam, and was eventually purchased by nine 
other nations.75 More recently McDonnell Douglas has developed the F—15 for 
the Air Force and worked with British Aerospace to develop the AV-BB Harrier 
for both the Marine Corps and the British Royal Air Force. Military aircraft 
sales were $3.7 billion in 1981, or 49 percent of the corporation’s revenue. This 
figure included not only F—18 sales, but also F-15sales, AV-88 sales and pay¬ 
ments on a multi-year 2.8 billion dollar contract for 44 KC-10 tanker cargo air¬ 
craft (a derivative of the DC-10) for the United States Air Force. As it had in 
the Canadian and Australian competitions, McDonnell Douglas teamed with the 
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F 18 engine maker, General Electric, in making both its aircraft and offset pro¬ 
posals to Spain. 
The F—18 Hornet is ”a double answer to United States and free world de¬ 
fense needs —a durable, dependable strike fighter that is superior for both 
fighter and attack missions.”76 Some say that it won both the Canadian and 
Australian competitions almost entirely because of its ability to kill hostile air¬ 
craft at long range.77 Unlike the original F-16A, the F-18 was capable of car¬ 
rying the Sparrow Missile, which makes it able to shoot down aircraft at a ranee 
beyond twenty miles. In addition to Sparrow, the F-18 fires a 20 millimeter 
cannon and carries the Sidewinder heat-seeking missile. An extremely accurate 
bomber, the F-18 is capable of carrying a payload of bombs exceeding 9 tons. 
As 1982 began, the F-18 entered full scale production and had begun opera¬ 
tional flying with both Navy and Marine ‘Corps squadrons. Fifty-four of the 
1,377 F-18s contracted for by the United States Navy had been delivered, with 
McDonnell Douglas producing them at a rate of four per month. McDonnell 
Douglas had already delivered the first 3 of 138 Hornets to the Canadian Air 
Force, and would begin delivering 75 Hornets to Australia in 1986. (Figure 7) 
The European Competition 
The Countries: U.K.; F.R.G.; ITALY & FRANCE 
In June 1976 the [British] ministry of defense mounted an exhibition at 
Aldershot of military equipment. . . to help push up arms sales to a new target 
of 1750 million a year. It was a cozy occasion with marquees and plenty of re¬ 
freshments like a sports day or a horticultural show. After some modest pro¬ 
tests from the Campaign Against the Arms Trade it went ahead peacefully. 
Chieftain tanks were lined up along the lawn while wives and children of sol¬ 
diers clambered over them and popped up in the turret. Mortars and guns were 
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laid out on neat gravel or clipped grass, like sports goods in a shop. A painful 
new kind of barbed wire called a 'Barbed Tape Concertina' was stretched 
across a lawn, shining brightly in the sun like gay bunting. Nowhere could I 
notice the word ’kill’. Stalls were decorated with artists’ impressions of banles, 
in the style of boys’ comics... The eagerness for foreign clients was visible eve- 
rywhere.”78 
Arms are an important business in Europe. In France, 67,500 jobs de¬ 
pend on arms exports.79 During the oil crises of the 1970’s arms were one of 
Britain’s few growing exports.80 Consequently, there is a much closer relation¬ 
ship in Europe between the arms industries and governments. ’’Foreign compa¬ 
nies dealing in [arms] can usually deliver their governments, and their govern¬ 
ments can usually deliver their industries. The opposite is true with the United 
States.”81 Why is there such close cooperation between European governments 
and their armaments industries? The answer is military, economic and political 
necessity. To design and build modern weapons systems requires enormous ex¬ 
penditures on research and development. The individual domestic markets of 
France, U.K., F.R.G. and Italy are not large enough to make domestic produc¬ 
tion of new fighter aircraft feasible. The alternative, of course, is to purchase 
all aircraft from the United States. This, however, is neither economically nor 
politically feasible. Notwithstanding either coproduction or licensed production, 
purchasing aircraft from the United States would, in effect, cede to the United 
States all of the employment presently accounted for by military aviation. 
Moreover, in ceding all research and development activities to the United States, 
these countries undermine their technological base. 
A strong political factor arises from the pride each of these nation’s re¬ 
tains in its past Old World glory. It is a blow to that pride to announce that 
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one’s country is no longer economically capable of producing the arms it needs 
to defend itself. The two countries exemplifying the close relationship between 
the government and the arms industry are the United Kingdom and France. In 
Britain this relationship is both intimate and private. Though arms sales may be 
carefully scrutinized by diplomats and defense officials in private, the British 
Parliament is not allowed to share in the decisions or to know how the sales are 
apportioned.82 British weapons are designed with the export market specifi¬ 
cally in mind. 
The Defense Sales Office has formal representation on both the Opera¬ 
tional Requirements Committee and the Weapons Development Committee.83 
Each volume of Britain’s Defense Equipment Catalogue has emblazoned on its 
cover the crests of Britain’s three services; each contains photographs of and 
specifications for everything from hand guns to fighters to warships.84 The 
French are the most aggressive and successful exporters of arms in Europe. 
French arms sales are directed from the Direction des Affaires Internationales 
(DIA) which is a special export department of the Delegation Ministerielle pour 
1’Armament (DMA). American companies have been obsessed by the belief in 
French cunning and bribery, and have used it to justify their being allowed to 
do the same.85 The French government sees its arms industry as an instru¬ 
ment of diplomacy, a means of developing engineering skills and a means of 
developing new technology.86 More importantly, through exporting the French 
are able to maintain a more self-equipped and therefore independent defense 
force than most other European countries. Both Italy and West Germany were 
forbidden to rearm in the years following World War n. However, with the for¬ 
mation of NATO, their rearmament became a necessity. The Italians have be¬ 
come aggressive sellers in the export market, some would say to the point of 
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being unscrupulous.87 German governments have attempted to restrict arms 
exports. In 1969, then Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt insisted that he would 
"m no way act as an aide to the sales manager of German industry".88 Never¬ 
theless, German governments of the late 1970’s came under increased pressure 
from trade unionists to support export sales.89 
The Countries and their Aircraft 
DASSAULT-BREGUET & THE MIRAGE 2000. 
Dassault-Breguet is very much the creation of one man —Marcel Das¬ 
sault. Dassault first entered the aircraft industry during the First World War, 
starting his own company, which began mass producing aircraft just as the war 
ended. His first company collapsed with the post-war collapse of France’s avia¬ 
tion industry. Dassault started another company in the early ’30s which built 
aircraft both for the French post office and, eventually, the French Air Ministry. 
However, with the crushing defeat of France in 1940, Dassault was once again 
out of business. Taken prisoner, he became a national hero by refusing to de¬ 
sign aircraft for the Nazis in return for being set free. After the war, largely 
due to his heroic exploits, he became a close friend and supporter of Charles de 
Gaulle; until his death, he enjoyed the closest of ties with the French govern¬ 
ment.90 With the end of World War D, Dassault built what is presently Das¬ 
sault-Breguet. The company developed several fighters in the 1950’s, the most 
famous of which was the Mach 2 Mirage ID. (figure 8) This aircraft was fol¬ 
lowed in the 1960’s by the even more capable Mirage FI, which competed 
against the F-16 in the 1974-75 European Fighter Competition. Both the Mirage 
ID and Mirage FI have been very successfully exported. Between the two, they 
have flown more than two million hours with the air forces of twenty five coun¬ 
tries. 91 
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The Mirage 2000 is the follow-on to these two aircraft. "It incorporates 
the best of recent aerodynamics, electronic and propulsion technology to achieve 
impressive gains in performance, maneuverability and overall handling quali¬ 
ties”, and ’’compares favorably with other new Western fighters” like the F-16 
and F-18.92 Dassault claims the Mirage 2000 is "the pre-eminent multi-role 
fighter of the latest generation” noting that it is ’’the only single engine Mach 
2.3 fighter capable of both long and short range interception.”93 The 2000 is 
armed with two 30 millimeter cannons and can carry up to four heat-seeking 
and radar missiles. Though it was initially developed as an interceptor and air 
superiority fighter, it is also capable of performing bombing missions. The Mi- 
rage 2000 is the primary combat aircraft of the French Air Force.94 
PANAVIA & THE TORNADO. 
The Panavia consortium was developed as a response to the aforemen¬ 
tioned problem of individual domestic markets being too small for individual 
European countries to develop their own fighters. Unlike France, which fi¬ 
nanced the Mirage 2000 through export sales, Britain, West Germany and Italy 
combined their markets to support development of the Tornado. On March 26, 
1969, these three countries formed a joint organization known as NAMMO, the 
NATO Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Management and Production Organization. 
From NAMMO sprung the conglomerate corporation Panavia, a consor¬ 
tium of the three nationally cosponsored aircraft companies British Aerospace, 
Aeritalia, and MBB. 
Panavia has faced a number of disadvantages in entering these competi¬ 
tions, first and foremost of which is that as a conglomerate, each component 
company has tended to look more to its own advantage. The respective levels 
of control of the three companies were as follows: British Aerospace, 42.5%; 
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MBB, 42.5%; Aeritalia, 15.0%. Panavia is not the only consortium in which Brit¬ 
ish Aerospace is involved. It also builds a light attack aircraft, the Jaguar, in 
conjunction with Dassault. Perhaps a second disadvantage that Panavia faces in 
these competitions is the Tornado itself. The aircraft designers faced the chal¬ 
lenge of building a plane to meet the needs of three air forces. In the end, they 
designed two models of the Tornado, the IDS and ADV, to meet all of the con¬ 
sortium’s needs. The IDS is designed to fly at very low level at very high speed 
to a heavily defended target, make a single bomb run, and return home, (figure 
9) The ADV was designed to intercept and destroy Soviet bombers at long 
range. Dogfighting capability, which would have downgraded the ADV’s per¬ 
formance as a bomber destroyer, was not a consideration in its design.95 Con¬ 
sequently, in mock dogfights against aircraft such as the F-16, Mirage 2000 and 
F-18, the Tornado usually loses. The IDS and ADV do what they are designed 
to do very well. At low altitudes (200 feet) both can reach aspeed of greater 
than 920 mph. The IDS has a bomb payload of nine tons and carries two 27 
millimeter cannon internally. The ADV has excellent ”on station time” (time an 
aircraft can patrol at slow speed while searching with its radar for hostile air¬ 
craft). It is armed with one 27 millimeter cannon, and can carry four long 
range radar missiles and two short range heat-seeking missiles. At the time of 
the Spanish competition, only the three consortium countries had ordered the 
Tornado. The Royal Air Force ordered 385, the German Luftwaffe 212 and the 
Italian Air Force 100. Although Spain did not seriously consider purchasing the 
Tornado, Greece is very interested in it. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SALES PROCESS 
This section discusses the pattern of events in a typical competition, the 
United States’ laws and regulations governingforeign sales by United States’ cor¬ 
porations, and the process by which the United States Government reviews 
fighter aircraft sales requests. The laws and regulations of France, U.K., F.R.G. 
and Italy will not be discussed , since we only deal with United States Military 
sales. 1 
Overview of a Fighter Sales Competition.2 
A fighter competition, such as the one just conducted in Spain or the one 
which is about to be conducted in Greece, should be viewed in the wider con¬ 
text of the foreign policy relationships of the competing selling countries vis a 
vis the purchasing country. However, notwithstanding the consequent political, 
military and economic dimensions involved, each competition is characterized 
by a typical pattern of events. These events can be viewed as occurring in two 
phases: The Pre-Announcement Phase and the Post-Announcement Phase. The 
announcement is the formal announcement by the purchasing country it will be 
buying fighter aircraft and will be requesting different countries and companies 
to submit bids for the sale. 
Pre-Announcement Phase. 
The pre-announcement phase occurs during that undefined period before 
the formal competition is announced.3 The duration of this period is difficult to 
predict. It is largely dependent on the age and degree of obsolescence of the 
purchasing country’s air force. During this phase the goal of the aircraft com¬ 
pany is to prepare the potential military and civilian judges of a competition, to 
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be particularly receptive to its presentations once the formal competition be¬ 
gins.4 
The companies hire agents in potential purchasing countries. These 
agents, who are often natives of the country, make it their business to familiar¬ 
ize potential military and civilian decision makers with their company’s prod¬ 
ucts, as well as build a rapport with these same people. In addition to in-coun- 
try representatives, the companies have international sales representatives who 
travel to potential purchasers and provide them with more detailed information 
on specific weapons systems. The amount of information these representatives 
can present is, in the case of the United States, highly regulated by the State 
Department. 
The governments of the companies also play an important role in this 
phase. Government influence during this phase is often exercised at the em¬ 
bassy level through its resident military advisors. For example, the United 
States, has Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) in those countries re¬ 
ceiving United States’ aid. These military advisors build friendships with mili¬ 
tary officers in the purchasing country. Advisors are inclined to prefer those 
arms built in their own countries, and communicate this preference both for¬ 
mally through defense briefings they provide on behalf of their governments and 
informally through friendly conversations. Both planned and unplanned events 
also can effect the predispositions of a purchaser. An example of a planned 
event is the Paris Air Show. Perhaps the largest and most famous of its kind, it 
is an international aerospace fair where manufacturers from all over the world 
display their products. Many of the highlights of recent Paris Air Shows have 
been demonstration flights of the newer fighter aircraft such as the F—16, and 
Mirage 2000. Thrilling performances of these aircraft can create lasting impres- 
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sions with government officials who will later decide competitions. An example 
of an unplanned event which has a direct impact on sales, is the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon. During the Bekaa Valley Air Battle, Israeli pilots flying McDonnell 
Douglas F-15s and General Dynamics F-16s shot down Syrian flown Soviet built 
aircraft at a ratio of 50:1. Such scores make even more lasting impressions. 
Post-Announcement Phase. 
At some point in time, the purchaser announces it will purchase new 
fighter aircraft for its armed forces. As a part of this announcement, it will 
usually announce which aircraft it is considering buying. With this announce¬ 
ment, the formal fighter competition begins. 
The purchasing country must now evaluate the competing aircraft. Its 
four main criteria for selecting an aircraft are combat capability, price, financ¬ 
ing and offset. 
Combat Capability. 
The primary goal of a country in buying new fighters is strengthening its 
air force. It wants aircraft that will perform those missions the country thinks 
are vital to its national defense. Aircraft are compared in terms of their speed, 
maneuverability and weapons systems. Two other important considerations are 
reliability and maintainability. Countries want aircraft that need few repairs be¬ 
tween flights and are easy to maintain.5 
Price. 
Price varies depending on the airplane, the manufacturer and the selling 
country. In the United States, price is based primarily on cost. Three cost fig¬ 
ures are relevant: Procurement cost, program cost and life cycle cost. Procure¬ 
ment cost is essentially the cost of producing the aircraft plus the cost of the 
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spare parts, training and equipment needed to operate them. Program cost is 
procurement cost plus a percentage portion of the aircraft’s research and devel¬ 
opment cost. Life cycle cost is the program cost plus the costs associated with 
maintenance and aircrew labor, fuel, and munitions for training. The manufac¬ 
turer’s profit is usually negotiated as a percentage of cost. Figure Ten illus¬ 
trates these United States cost breakdowns. 
Financing. 
Financing is a key element in these negotiations. The United States pro¬ 
vides funding assistance through a variety of programs, the most often used be¬ 
ing the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Other countries, such as France, 
finance these sales through their export-importbanks. 
Offset: 
Primarily, offset entails transactions which counterbalance the large out¬ 
flow of foreign exchange that normally results with such a large purchase. Off¬ 
set packages may take several forms.6 
Coproduction: 
Overseas production based upon government to government agreements 
which permit a foreign government or producer to acquire the technical informa¬ 
tion and know-how to manufacture all or part of an item of United States 
equipment. It includes government to government licensed production but ex¬ 
cludes production based upon direct commercial arrangements by United States- 
manufacturers. (See Figure 11) 
Licensed Production: 
Overseas production of all or part of an item of United States equipment 
based upon transfer of technical information under direct commercial arrange- 
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ment between a United States manufacturer and a foreign government or pro¬ 
ducer. 
Subcontractor Productions: 
Overseas production of a part or an item of United Statesequipment. 
The subcontract does not involve license of technical information and is usually 
a direct commercial arrangement. (Figure 10) 
Overseas Investment: 
Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the form of capital 
invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign coun¬ 
try. 
Technology Transfer: 
(Other than license production and coproduction) Transfer for technology 
occurring as a result of an offset agreement that may take the form of: 
1. Research and development conducted abroad; 
2. Technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint venture of 
overseas investment; 
3. Other activities under direct commercial arrangement between the 
United States manufacturer and a foreign entity. 
Country Trade: 
Purchase of goods and services from the buyer country as a condition of 
the offset agreement, excluding purchases under coproduction or licensed or 
subcontractor production.7 Once the proposals of the various competitors have 
been submitted, the government of the purchasing country must perform the 
monumental task of choosing an aircraft. Some countries, such as Spain, estab¬ 
lish a formal judging procedure before the competition commences. Others pro¬ 
ceed less formally. In a typical plan, the purchasing country devises a judging 
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formula which accounts for the relative importance the government places on 
aircraft capability and offset. When the government announces its decision it 
will often claim its decision was based solely on the relative merits of each 
competing aircraft. This is largely done for political reasons. Governments 
take great pains to ensure no appearance of impropriety surrounds the selection. 
Doing otherwise, would invite a storm of public criticism. However, the actual 
criteria for a final decision are significantly influenced by the whole range of 
political relationships between the purchasing government and the governments 
of competing countries. 
Once selection is made, the purchasing country makes a down payment 
to the winning aircraft corporation to secure the agreement. This down payment 
is normally equal to the cost the company must immediately incur in preparing 
for production of the country’s aircraft. Payment is annually, apportioned over 
the full term of the contract. Delivery of the aircraft and completion of the off¬ 
set agreements can take up to ten years.8 
U.S. Government Impact on the Competition 
Because of the desirability of United States aircraft, the United States- 
Government (USG) plays an important part in many fighter competitions. The 
impact of the USG depends on four factors: 
(1) existing United States law at the time of the competition; 
(2) desired manner by which, in the context of United States law, the 
purchasing country wishes to make the purchase - as an FMS Sale or a Com¬ 
mercial Sale; 
(3) the actions of all concerned elements of the executive branch in re¬ 
viewing a potential sale; 
(4) the denial or approval of the sale by Congress. 
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United States Law 
The state of United States law at the time of a competition provides the 
framework within which all actors except for foreign sellers must pursue their 
goals. United States law changes depending on the political, military and eco¬ 
nomic exigencies of the time. Notwithstanding this process of historical evolu¬ 
tion, however, United States law as it presently stands provides the ultimate 
rules of the game. United States law provides for and regulates the two means 
by which United States aerospace corporations may sell their aircraft: Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) and Comercial Sales. An FMS sale is one that is made 
directly between the USG and the foreign buyer. The USG buys aircraft from 
the United States corporation and then sells them to the purchasing country. A 
commercial sale is one made directly between the United States corporation 
and the foreign buyer. Before this sale can be completed, it must beapproved 
by the USG. Officials within the executive branch are the primary actors in 
processing and reviewing the proposed sale whether it follows the FMS or Com¬ 
mercial process. Nevertheless, United States law, specifically the Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976 (AECA), places the following restrictions on the executive 
branch:9 
1. the President cannot allow a sale to a country unless he feels it will 
strengthen the security and promote world peace; 
2. arms sales can be made only to enhance the internal security and 
self-defense capability of the buying country and to promote regional collective 
defense arrangements; 
3. countries purchasing United States arms must agree not to transfer 
arms to another country without permission of the USG. Congress must be kept 
abreast of any such granting of permission; 
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4. the consequences for arms control must be considered when evaluat¬ 
ing all arms sales; 
5. Congress must be advised before coproduction or licensed production 
agreements financed under the FMS program are completed. Information on 
the probable impact of such agreements on United States employment and pro¬ 
duction must be provided to Congress. 
6. All major defense related sales (ie. all fighter aircraft sales) must be 
reported to Congress. For NATO allies, Congress has 15 days in which to block 
the sale by joint resolution. 
Preference of Purchaser 
Purchasing countries have the choice of following either the FMS or 
Commercial process. A majority of buyers, Spain was one, choose FMS. One 
reason for this preference is the assistance the buyer gets from the United 
States Department of Defense(DOD) in determining what its defense needs are 
and how it can meet these needs with United States equipment. Another reason 
is the FMS process provides the purchasing country with the same legal and 
contractual safeguards against the contractor that are afforded the United States 
government. Nevertheless, some countries prefer to purchase equipment com¬ 
mercially because they feel it is less expensive. 10 
FMS Sale - Process and Review 
There are generally five steps in an FMS sale (See Figure 12). These 
are: 
1. Foreign government requests information on a particular United States 
aircraft; 
2. The executive (primarily state & defense) reviews the request and de¬ 
cides whether to release the information; 
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3. Foreign government evaluates the aircraft. If satisfied, it submits a 
formal purchase request to USG; 
4. Executive review of the request and decision whether to offer the air¬ 
craft for sale; 
5. Congress reviews the executive’s offer of sale; 
Request for Information 
The country’s government first requests PLANNING AND REVIEW DATA 
(P&R DATA). It can make this request through theUnited States Embassy or 
the Military Assistance and Advisory Group; a third way is for the country’s em¬ 
bassy in Washington D.C. to contact DOD’s Defense Security Assistance 
Agency. P&R data is preliminary information on the model aircraft (ie. F-16A 
or F-16C) which the United States might make available for purchase as well 
and on the estimated price of the aircraft. (Figure 12). 
Review of Information Request 
When data is released by the United States, it is usually perceived by the 
purchasing country as an indication that the United States will sell the aircraft. 
Consequently, the executive carefully considers these requests before releasing 
the data. Moreover, if and when it issues the data, the executive makes it clear 
to the potential purchaser that the United States reserves the right to not sell the 
aircraft. 
Review of Aircraft & Request to Purchase 
The potential buyer evaluates the P&R data and decide whether it wishes 
to buy the aircraft. If so, it makes aformal request to the USG for a Letter of 
Offer and Acceptance (LOA). This LOA is processed through the same chan¬ 
nels as the requests for P&R data. 
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Executive Review of LOA Request 
The executive branch reviews the request for an LOA in the same man¬ 
ner it reviews the requests for information. No LOA can be issued without 
State Department approval, n Executive approval of the LOA request is tanta¬ 
mount to executive approval of the sale. 
Congressional Review 
Under the AECA, fighter aircraft are major defense equipment and, 
therefore, can only be sold with Congressional approval. If the president has 
decided to issue the requesting country an LOA, he must inform the Congress 
of his intention to do so. By law the Congress has 15 days for NATO countries 
after receiving formal notification to block the sale by joint resolution. If it 
does not do so, the executive may issue the LOA to the purchasing country. 12 
(figure 12) 
Commercial Sale Progress 
The pattern of events in a commercial sale is illustrated in Figure 13. It 
is similar to the FMS process in the following ways: 
1. the executive must first approve the release of any information which 
is not public information, ie., information found in magazines and newspapers. 
2. the executive must give final approval for the sale of any fighter air¬ 
craft; the congress has final review over the sale. 
For commercial sales, the executive reviews the sale through the State 
Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC). This office, after thorough 
review by other offices of the executive, issues licenses to the contractor for the 
release of information. Should the potential buyer wish to purchase the aircraft, 
the aircraft corporation requests amunitions license from OMC. Upon request 
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of the contractor and after approval by both the executive and the congress, 
OMC issues the export license for the sale and export of the aircraft. 
Review by the Executive Branch. 
In the previous section, it was mentioned how individuals within the ex¬ 
ecutive branch review both the release of information and the sale. This section 
takes a more detailed look at who is involved in the review process. Figure 14 
shows the key individuals and offices that are party to this process. What fol¬ 
lows is a description of the executive review process for both types of sales. 
FMS Review 
Requests for information and requests for LOAs are directed to the Bu¬ 
reau of Politico-Military Affairs (BPM). The director of BPM solicits the views 
of those interested offices within the State and Defense Departments. For 
non-controversial sales, these are usually the State Department regional bureau 
in which the country is located, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) and the Defense Department’s Defense Security Assistance Agency 
(DSAA). DSAA consults the concerned service (the Air Force for the sale of 
F-16s, the Navy for F-18s) for their comments. Figure 15 shows a possible 
flow of information for the review of a noncontroversial information request and 
sale. 
Should there be any objection to the sale or information request by any 
of the offices consulted, the request is sent to the next higher level for review. 
For the State Department this would be the Under Secretary for Security Assis¬ 
tance, Science technology (USSA) and for Defense Department, the Assistant 
Secretary for International Security Policy (ASIP).13 If both approve the sale/re¬ 
quest, then the issue is resolved. If not resolved at this level, then the Secretar- 
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ies of State and Defense may become involved. In the most controversial cases, 
the President will participate. 
As a case becomes more and more controversial, it may be reviewed by 
two interdepartmental committees. The Arms Transfer Management Group 
(ATMG) is the first such committee. It is chaired by USSA and includes repre¬ 
sentatives of the State, Defense and Treasury departments; the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; ACDA; the National Security Council (NEC); the Agency for International 
Development; CIA; and the Office of Management and Budget. Even more 
controversial sales may be reviewed by the NSC’s Senior Interdepartmental 
Group (SIG). The chairman of SIG is the Deputy Secretary of State and its 
other members include the Deputy Secretary of Defense, thePresident’s National 
Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of 
the CIA. Cases are rarely controversial enough to warrant a meeting of SIG. 
Commercial Review 
The State Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC) has primary 
responsibility for overseeing commercial sales. OMC consults PM, DSAA and 
ACDA on information release requests. All of the offices mentioned in the 
FMS review can become involved on requests for munitions licenses. 
Except for the involvement of OMC, this review process is very similar to 
FMS review. 14 
Congressional Review 
The Congress is notified of major arms sales through the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Upon notifica¬ 
tion, it has 15 days forsales to NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand and 
30 days for all other countries to pass a concurrent resolution blocking the sale. 
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The Congress has never passed such a resolution. 15 Figure 16 shows the 
United States process overlaid upon the complete sales process. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SPANISH CASE 
Introduction 
In November of 1979, the Spanish Government solicited proposals for the 
sale of 144 fighter aircraft. Three companies, General Dynamics, McDonnell 
Douglas and Dassault-Breguet responded. On July 23, 1982, the Spanish se¬ 
lected the F—18 over the two other aircraft. How and why did Spain pick the 
F—18? 
As is the case with most countries, Spain was buying new aircraft in or¬ 
der to modernize its air force. The new aircraft would replace Spain’s old F-4 
Phantom’s. Politically it was an opportune time for this modernization. The 
United States strongly desired that Spain join the NATO alliance. As a NATO 
member, Spain would play a vital role in defending the Western Mediterranean 
and part of the Atlantic extending to the Canary Islands. Furthermore, the 
United States needed access to vital air and naval bases in Spain. It saw a ma¬ 
jor weapons sale such as this as another means of establishing a long term rela¬ 
tionship with the Spanish Government.! The United States would more likely 
than not provide Spain with generous security assistance for the purchase of 
new aircraft. Though Spain’s primary motivation was to strengthen its military, 
its criteria for judging the competition indicates that strengthening its economy 
was a strong secondary consideration. Offset was considered as equally impor¬ 
tant as aircraft capability in the formal judging procedure. In its solicitation for 
proposals, the Spanish specified they desired offsets in four categories: 
1. coproduction of the aircraft eventually purchased, 
2. production of other defense related items, 
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3. technology transfers to help Spain build its fledgling defense electron¬ 
ics industry; 
4. commercial offsets, including technology transfer and tourism and ex¬ 
port promotion.2 
The Spanish planned to have its air force judge the aircraft and the Di¬ 
rector General of Armament Material (DGAM) judge the offset proposals. Both 
of these offices came under the Minister of Defense. FACA, Spain’s national¬ 
ized aircraft company, as well as INI, the government affiliated industrial hold¬ 
ing group, had a significant say in judging the overall quality of competing off¬ 
set packages. All information from these groups was to be submitted to an in- 
terministerial commission, which would make the final aircraft selection. (Figure 
17 shows a flow chart of the Spanish procurement system.)3 
General Dynamics entered this contest confident they had the better air¬ 
plane. Though the F-18 was itself an impressive airplane, it could not match 
the F-16 in pure dogfightting ability. Furthermore, the F-16 was not a ”paper 
airplane” like the F-18.4 Hard data from over three years of operational use 
with five air forces supported General Dynamics’ claims that its F-16 was a 
highly capable and easily maintainable fighter. Some criticized the F-16s inabil¬ 
ity to attack targets at a long range because the original F-16A lacked a radar 
missile capability. G.D. rectified this by offering Spain the new F-16C which 
could fire either the ’’Sparrow” or ’’AMRAAM” long range radar missiles. 
If General Dynamics had a concern entering this competition, it was its 
ability to compete with McDonnell Douglas in the area of offset. General Dy¬ 
namics did not have the excellent reputation McDonnell Douglas had for its off 
set programs, despite the comprehensive program of coproduction G.D. had de- 
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signed for the original foreign buyers of the F-16, Belgium, Denmark, Norway 
and the Netherlands.5 
As the Spanish competition progressed, G.D. lost competitions to McDon¬ 
nell Douglas in Canada and Australia, losses some attributed to the quality of 
G.D.s offset packages.6 G.D. did not intend to lose Spain due to offset. 
Working with its teammate, the engine maker of the F-16, United Technologies, 
G.D. assembled an impressive offset package that provided Spain a positive bal¬ 
ance of payments for this particular purchase as well as increased employment. 
The package included the following: Final assembly of 136 of the 144 aircraft 
Spain would buy, construction of major structural components requiring a trans¬ 
fer of composite technology and manufacture of electronics systems for the 
F-16s fire control computer; Westinghouse, producer of the F-16 radar, planned 
to form a major electronic repair center in Spain; Pratt & Whitney Aircraft and 
TRW planned to build a turbine compressor and airfoil repair center that would 
give the Spanish access to several new technologies; Inmont Corporation, a sub¬ 
sidiary of United Technologies took the initiative to buy a graphics ink manufac¬ 
turer in Spain and planned to introduce new technologies through that purchase; 
General Dynamics and United Technologies would offer Spanish vacation pack¬ 
ages to their combined total of over 500,000 employees; rounding out the pack¬ 
age were commercial purchases of Spanish made parts for auto carburetors, 
sewing machines and refrigerators.7 By March of 1981, over a year before 
Spain made its final decision, General Dynamics had secured firm commitments 
from 96% of the Spanish companies it needed for carrying out its offset pro¬ 
posal. 
In selling its offset package, General Dynamics made presentations to 
everyone it could talk to in INI, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of 
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Industry. By these presentations, G.D. hoped to create a groundswell of support 
for the General Dynamics program.8 
McDonnell Douglas had equal confidence in its product, the F-18. This 
confidence was bolstered as M.D. proceeded towin the Canadian and Australian 
competitions from General Dynamics. Though it could not turn as well as the 
F-16, theF-18 was originally designed with radar missile capability. To those 
who claimed that the F-18 was a ’’paper airplane”, M.D.s response was so was 
the F-16C. Furthermore, the F-18 boasted a bigger radar, two engines (versus 
one in the F-16) and more advanced avionics.9 
The Situation 
McDonnell Douglas was equally confident in its ability to beat General 
Dynamics’ offset package. McDonnell Douglas was reputed to be one of the 
best in the offset game, and some would say proved this in the Canadian and 
Australian competitions. 
In selling its airplane, McDonnell Douglas had better contacts with key 
people in the Spanish Government than General Dynamics. The most famous 
of these contacts was with the King of Spain, Juan Carlos, which was made 
through Ricky Fuster, who McDonnell Douglas had employed as a salaried em¬ 
ployee for several years. Fuster was good friends with the King for several 
years prior to the competition and played golf with him often. 10 The King him¬ 
self is a pilot, and his favorite service is the Spanish Air Force. In assembling 
its offset proposal, however, some observers felt that McDonnell Douglas was 
not keeping pace with General Dynamics.n Dassault-Breguet with the full 
backing of the French Government, made a credible presentation of its Mirage 
2000. The Mirage, however, was outshone by both the Falcon and the Hornet. 
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Because of the Spanish Air Force’s desire for an American airplane, the Mi¬ 
rage was not competitive. The French, nevertheless, did affect the final deci¬ 
sion. They programmed a computer model the Spanish Air Force used to com¬ 
pare the competing aircraft. 12 
In July of 1981, the competitors expected a decision from the Spanish 
government. Instead, Spain announced that due to budgetary constraints, it 
would cut the number of airplanes it bought from 144 to 96. Then in March of 
1982, a Deputy Minister of Defense was appointed to supervise the entire com¬ 
petition. According to General Dynamics, he proceeded to redefine the offset 
competition. Despite these redefinitions, G.D. was able to continue presenting 
very competitive offset packages. 13 In the meantime, G.D.representatives 
marketing the F-16 itself were beginning to sense that the Spanish Air Force 
was not interested in their airplane.14 On July 23, 1982, the Spanish Govern¬ 
ment announced it would purchase the F—18. 
Was McDonnell Douglas, with its ’’direct line” to the King able to ”rig 
the match?” To suppose such would be unfair to McDonnell Douglas, especially 
before the role of one particular player, heretofore unmentioned, is described. 
That player was Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. 
Both General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas report that the United 
States government, both DOD and DOS, were wholly neutral during the course 
of the contest. Both companies expected the service secretaries, Lehman for the 
Navy and Mr.Vern Orr for the Air Force to support their respective service’s 
airplanes. In light of the Navy’s past history as an international marketer, how¬ 
ever, Lehman’s salesmanship was extraordinary. 15 He is rumored to have vis¬ 
ited the King himself in an effort to sell the F—18 to Spain. 16 Why was Secre- 
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tary Lehman such a staunch supporter of the F-18? Because the F-18 program 
was facing possible termination in the House of Representatives. 
With a life cycle cost of nearly $30 million a copy in 1981, the F-18 was 
considered an expensive airplane. Some members of Congress felt the Navy 
was not getting its money’s worth. One such representative, Representative 
Bruce Vento, 4th District Minnesota, vigorously campaigned against the F-18. 
In June of 1981, Vento managed to attach a rider to a defense appropriations 
bill which would have forbidden the Navy to use any of its aviation funding to 
purchase F-18s. Vento argued that the F-18 was not cost effective. However, 
supporters of the F-18 argued that it would be improper to cancel the F-18 pro¬ 
gram after the United States had agreed to allow Canada to buy the airplane. 
Vento’s proposal failed to carry and the Navy became an even more vigorous 
international marketer of its F-18.17 
One more interesting point about the services needs to be mentioned. 
The Air Force was not the positive international marketing force that it had tra¬ 
ditionally been. In previous sales, the Air Force was eager for foreign allies 
and friends to buy the F—16. In the Spanish competition, the Air Force gave the 
impression that involving itself with Spain would be an ’’administrative head¬ 
ache.” 18 As one of the decision makers in the fighter competition Greece is 
conducting, you are particularly interested in why the Spanish competition went 
as it did. Greece is interested in purchasing the following aircraft: The F-16, 
F-18, Mirage2000 and Tornado. Offset will be a decisive factor. 
As you sit in your office, you ask yourself how the decision in Spain was 
made? Who were the key decision makers, and why did they act as they did? 
What weight was given to aircraft capability? What weight to offset? Why was 
a Deputy Minister of Defense appointed at the end of the competition? Further 
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more, how might the Spanish case affect the competition in Greece? Good luck! 
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TABLE 1 
IDENTIFICATION OF KEY PLAYERS BY CATEGORY 
CATEGORY KEY PLAYERS GOALS 
NATIONAL 
President Political 
Economic 
Military 
Secretary of State Military ! 
Political 
Congress Political j 
Military j 
Economic 
SUBNATIONAL 
Secretary of Defense Political . 
U.S. Representative Political j 
Economic I 
Secretary of the Navy Political | 
Military 1 
Secretary of the Air Force Military ; 
Economic ; 
Aerospace Corporation Economic j 
Political j 
TRANSNATIONAJ 
Labor Union Economic 
Ll Aerospace Corporation Economic 
Secretary of Defense Political 
Military \ 
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TABLE 2 
A CONGRESSMAN’S SCORING FOR AN F-18 SALES AGREEMENT 
LEVEL GOALS RATING 
NATIONAL 
Political -1 Stated goal is to reduce 
U.S. arms sales abroad 
Military +1 Stated goal is to omprove 
national defense. Sale j 
will do this. i 
Economic 0 No direct effect on any of j 
of the congressman’s j 
goals. 
SUBNATIONAL 
Political -1 Sale is opposed by large 
percentage of his/her 
constituents. | 
Military 0 No direct effect on any of j 
of the congressman’s 
goals. | 
Economic +1 Sale helps keep the voters 
employed. 
Political 
Military 
Economic 
+ 1 Sale strenghtens relations 
between U.S. and NATO. 
+ 1 Sale strenghtens NATO’s 
military capability. 
0 No direct effect on any of 
of the congressman’s 
goals. 
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TABLE 3 
FIGHTER COMPETITION MATRIX 
KEY PLAYER NATIONAL TRANSNAT’L 
WEIGHT SUBNAT’L TOTAL 
P M E p M E p 1 M E 
| PRESIDENT 1 | 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 
SEC/STATE 0.8 j 1 1 1 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0 1.6 1 
I T T Q Q A Q T 0.5 | 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
AMBSSDR/ 
SPAIN 0.4 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 
SEC.DEFENSE 0.7 1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -0.7 
| A.S.I.S.P. 0.6 -1 1 I 0 -1 0 1 1 1 0 1.2 
SEC/AIR FORCE 
0.3 0 0 0 1 0 i 0 0 0 0 < 0 0 
1 SEC/NAVY 
0.3 0 0 o 0 ! o 0 0 1 0 ! o 0 
I A.C.D.A. 0.2 0 0 0 ! 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
ItIP O’NEILL 0.8 -i 1 0 0 -1 ; o j i ! i 1 1 j 0 1.6 
CONGRESS 
CONGRESS 
CONGRESS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTALS 1-3 0 5 4 3 12.7 
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TABLE 4 
IMPACT ON UNITED STATES ECONOMY OF MILITARY 
AIRCRAFT SALES 
1 YEAR ARMS IMPORTS ARMS EXPORTS NET ARMS EXPORTS 1 
S 1972 $ 160 $ 4000 $ j 
3840 
1973 
170 4900 
4730 
1974 
120 4600 
4480 ! 
j 1975 140 4800 
4660 ! 
j 1976 110 5900 
5790 j 
1977 120 6800 
6680 ! 
j 1978 120 6400 6280 | 
1979 130 6300 6170 j 
j 1980 140 6500 6360 j 
1981 210 8300 8090 1 
j 1982 430 9500 9070 | 
GNP W/EXPORTS GNP W/0 EXPORTS JOBS FROM EXPORTS | 
I 1972 $ 228202 $ 220445 976804 } 
1973 260331 250776 1116192 | 
1974 279997 270947 1068934 
1975 300956 201543 1128140 
1976 329486 317790 1353211 | 
j 1977 322286 339332 1540893 
| 1978 322272 379586 1399404 | 
1980 434217 421754 1437103 J 
1981 465482 452635 
1413800 | 
1 1982 531606 513285 2046169 | 
\ DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
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TABLE 5 
IMPACT OF MILITARY AIRPLANE IMPORTS 
ON SPANISH ECONOMY 
YEAR ARMS IMPORTS ARMS EXPORTS NET IMPORTS j 
1972 $ 80 $ 10 $ 70 
1973 110 10 100 
1974 100 20 80 | 
1975 160 80 80 
1976 220 90 130 1 
1977 300 30 
270 
1978 160 70 90 
1979 200 60 140 
1980 250 80 170 i 
1981 390 100 290 i 
1982 470 550 -80 ; 
YEAR GNP W/IMPORTS GNP W/O IMPORTS JOBS LOST W/IMPORTS 
1972 $ 74078 $ 73811 63667 
1973 74567 74186 84912 i 
1974 97484 97179 64823 j 
1975 107162 106857 64950 ! 
1976 116388 115893 103705 ! 
1977 127132 126103 211711 I 
1978 139007 138664 70081 ; 
1979 151659 151126 109552 ! 
1980 167445 166797 132346 ; 
1981 183691 182286 227394 i; 
1982 197175 197480 -62280 j 
DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
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TABLE 6 
SPANISH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS 
1972 S 357,564,000 
1973 $ 57,679,000 
1974 $ 150,599,000 
1975 $ 53,793,000 
1976 $ 123,488,000 
1977 $ 88,004,000 
1978 $ 192,560,000 
1979 $ 99,353,000 
1980 $ 441,741,000 
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TABLE 7 
PRIMARY MILITARY AIRCRAFT CONTRACTORS 
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TABLE 8 
GENERAL DYNAMICS POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS 
Factor Weighted Value Condition Rating 
1981 1986 
1 .4 Inflation j 1.0 2.0 
2 .4 Balance of Payments \ 
3 .4 Economic Growth j 4.25 4.5 
4 
4 
Infrastructure j 3.0 4.0 
5 .4 Natural Resources | 1.75 1.75 
6 A Population Pressure 4.0 4.75 
7 1.0 Internal Market 3.5 4.25 
8 .4 Agricultural Effi¬ 
ciency 
4.75 4.75 
9 .6 Regulatory Environ- 
| ment 
1.5 1.75 
10 1.0 \ Government Stability 3.0 4.25 
1 11 .8 j Attitude Towards Pri¬ vate Enterprise 
4.5 4.5 
12 
.8 j Attitude Toaward 
| Foreign Owned Bus. 
3.5 3.5 
13 
.6 External Securiry 
} Threats 
4.5 4.5 
14 
1.0 Level of Confidence 
in Survey Results 
90% 
| Summation: Total Weighted Value 24.60 28.45 
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TABLE 9 
GENERAL DYNAMICS SALES OF F - 16 
COUNTRY DELIVERED PREVIOUS TOTAL CURRENT 
1982 DELIVERIES CONTRACTED PLANNED 
UNITED 
STATES 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
HOLLAND 
NORWAY 
ISRAEL 
EGYPT 
PAKISTAN 
VENEZUELA 
KOREA 
169 
21 
15 
22 
16 
0 
22 
6 
0 
0 
520 
71 
48 
73 
46 
75 
22 
6 
0 
0 
1,085 
160 
58 
156 
72 
75 
80 
40 
24 
36 
2,165 
160 
58 
213 
72 
150 
80 
40 
24 
36 
TOTALS 
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BILLIONS OF $ 
FIGURE 1 
UNITES STATES INCOME FROM MILITARY AIRCRAFT SALES 
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U.S. JOB YEARS IN MILLIONS 
YEAR 
FIGURE 2 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT JOB - YEARS GAINED BY U.S. 
ECONOMY FROM MILITARY AIRCRAFT SALES 
1972 - 1982 
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INCOME LOST TO SPANISH ECONOMY FROM AIRPLANE 
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FIGURE 4 
JOB - YEARS LOST TO SPANISH ECONOMY DUE TO NET 
AIRPLANE SALES AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES 
2.0 
1,8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 
ASSUMED 
USN 
QUANTITY 
ASSUMED 
FOREIGN 
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TOTAL 
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18 24 41 79 78 76 46 
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FIGURE 5 
COST REDUCTION TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FOREIGN SALES 
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FIGURE 6 
GENERAL DYNAMICS F-16 FIGHTING FALCON 
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MCD 0/fcWOL£- 
Survivability has been built into 
every cranny of the Hornet, 
from its tough twin engines, 
advanced avionics and self- 
defense missiles to its extra¬ 
strength airframe. 
As both a fighter and an 
attack plane-land based or 
carrier-based-the Hornet can 
use speed, maneuverability and 
air-to air firepower to fight 
through enemy fire fire to its tar¬ 
get. 
Survivability is an investment 
in defense that is never lost. Be¬ 
cause an airplane saved is a pilot 
saved, and both can fight again. 
F/A-18 Hornet 
BUILT TO FLY IN HARM’S WAY. 
DAY AFTER DAY 
FIGURE 7 
F/A-18 HORNET 
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air-to-air : long-armed — air-to-ground : iron-handed 
The MIRAGE 2000 is the pre-eminent multi¬ 
role fighter of the latest generation. For air-to- 
air missions, the SUPER 530 D missile, in 
conjunction with the aircraft’s weapon 
system, intercepts and destroys any existing 
adversary, whatever its speed and altitude. 
TtsSNECM A M53 engineand 
its advanced aerodynamics 
make it the only single- 
engined aircraft of its genera- ^ 
non capjble of Hying at Mach *• 
2 2 In air combat, its tlv-bv-wirc 
control s>>tem and its Magic 2 
missiles give it a decisive advantage. 
For air-to-ground missions, its array of high- 
technology armament is 
offered by no other aircraft: 
laser-guided bombs and 
missiles, anti-radar mis¬ 
siles, air-to-surface missiles, 
specialized anti-runway 
and area weapons, etc... 
The MIN \CL 2000 : multirole capability 
through advanced technology. 
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FIGURE 8 
MIRAGE 2000 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT 
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PAN AVI A TORNADO F.2 
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FIGURE 10 
LIFE CYCLE COST BREAKDOWN 
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FIGURE 11 
COMPONENTS FOR SPANISH INDUSTRY: F/A - 18 
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U. S. SALES PROCESS 
MILITARY AIRCRAFT SALE TO A NATO COUNTRY 
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KEY PLAYERS IN EXECUTIVE REVIEW PROCESS 
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FIGURE 15 
FLOW OF REVIEW FOR UNCONTROVERSIAL SALE 
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FIGURE 16 
THE COMPETTITIVE PROCESS 
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SPAIN’S PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 
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The F-16 Offset Prog run has bate structurod to 
maximize Spain's axport potantial and to roduca 
imports of aorospaca products and palrolaum. 
Progress toward these objectives io illustrated by: 
• INCREASED SPANISH IMPORTS - Salts abroad will 
off sot 110 parcont of lha F-16 air vehicle cost. 
Those sales comprise high-technology, labor- 
intensive aerospace products and services, as 
well as products From a broad sector of Spanish 
industry. 
REDUCED F-16 TOTAL PROGRAM AND FUEL 
COST - The increased total program cost of 
competing aircraft and their )S percent 
higher fuel uaeaga would produce ao 
additional import cost to Spain equivalent 
to 100 percent of the F-16 air vehicle cost 
This analysis is based on the very conserv¬ 
ative assumption that future fuel prices 
will not increase in constant year dollars. 
An equivalent ratio of offset value to total 
program and fuel useage cost for these 
aircraft could only be achieved with an 
offset program 70 percent greeter than 
the f-16 offset commitment. If the same 
net balance of payment value is desired, 
an t6 percent greater offset prog! 
would be necessary. 
Reduced 
Fuel _ . 
Coat Import 
Cost 
ArwidsMcm 
FIGURE 18 
SPAIN S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
FOR F-16 OFFSET PROGRAM 
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The strong and positive economic stimulus provided 
by the F-16 Offset Program will have an impact on 
more than Just the import-export sector of Span’s 
economy 
- Increase in Direct and Indirect Employment. 
Nearly 16,000 direct man-years of employment in 
manufacturing and an additional 14,000 man- 
years in indirect and administrative jobs will be 
created. 
- Creation of Secondary Employment - The F-16 
offset economic stimulus will also affect other ba¬ 
sic elements of the Spanish economy such as agri¬ 
culture, consumer durables, and construction. An 
additional 20,000 man-years of emplotment would 
be created in these areas if an estimate based on 
data from the United States’ economy is used to 
represent an approximation of the Spanish impact. 
- Incresed Tax Revenues - The taxes generated by 
the F-16 offset economic activities couls return as 
much as 25 percent of the F-16 air vehicle cost to 
the Spanish government. 
F-16 Offset Program Job Creation. . . 
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FIGURE 19 
SPAIN’S ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
PROVIDED BY F-16 OFFSET PROGRAM 
APPENDIX C 
ROLE DESCRIPTIONS 
U.S. GOVERNMENT CORRESPONDENCE 
NEWS RELEASES 
Note: Change in print and style represents actual inter-governmental office correspon 
dence 
SAMPLE ROLE DESCRIPTIONS 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Christiane Carney, Secretary of State.You are the first woman in 
the history of the United States to be appointed Secretary of State. 
Though you were originally a member of the Democratic Party, your strong 
anti- communistic views made you a perfect choice for the Reagan 
Administra- tion. 
As a professor at Georgetown University before accepting your 
present role, you cultivared a wide circle of friends including Secretary of 
the Air Force, David Dell. Secretary of the Navy, Naomi Segal, who was a 
member of the Georgetown faculty before accepting her present post, is also 
a close friend. Amy Cardamore, who is presently a high-ranking minsiter of 
the Italian Government, was a student of yours when you first began teach¬ 
ing at Georgetown in 1963. The two'of you have remained close since then. 
Another former student of yours is Congressman Alexander Kam, Democrat 
from Minnesota. 
Your appointment as Secretary of State was not without 
controversy. Your appointment was approved in the Senate by only 3 votes. 
Much of the controversy was generated behind the scenes by the present 
Secretary of Defense, Carmen Marino. Marino, who has a number of 
friends in the Senate, coveted the role of Secretary of State for himself and 
worked very discreetly to have your nomination rejected by the Senate. 
Since your appointment, Marino has worked through his Assistant Secretary 
for International Security Policy, Annette Boyle, to gain the upper hand in 
formulating foreign policy. 
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As of July 1982, you have the complete confidence of the 
President. Your two assistants, Under Secretary Kositsky and Ambassador 
Codo are both loyal to your programs and policy. 
YOUR GOALS: 
(1) FORMULATE A VIABLE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GREECE. 
This policy should comprise the following sub-goals: 
(a) negotiate a new military base rights treaty with Greece 
(b) attempt to reduce tensions between Greece and Turkey 
(c) maintain/improve U.S. relations with Greece 
(2) HOLD ON TO YOUR POWER TO FORMULATE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. 
Do not allow the Secretary of Defense to undermine your ability to control 
the formulation of U.S. foreign of U.S. foreign policy vis a vis Greece. 
(3) ATTEMPT TO GAIN GREATER INFLUENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT IN 
MATTERS CONCERNING NATIONAL SECURITY. 
(4) DO NOT ALLOW THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO EFFECTIVELY 
DEPRIVE YOU OF YOUR POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER MAJOR 
WEAPONS SALES SHOULD BE APPROVED. 
Your Under Secretary Kositsky should be the overall coordinator 
in any review of a major sale. Take care that he maintains that role. 
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DUTIES: 
You possess the authority to convene the Arm Transfer 
Management Group. This group comprises Under Secretary Kositsky, who 
chairs the group, Assistant Secretary of Defense Boyle, and Chief of the 
ACDA Sheri Rosenfeld. You are also a member of the National Security 
Council which is convened by the President upon the advice of either you or 
the Secretary of Defense. 
INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON GREEK GOVERNMENT: 
A recent CIA document that you had commissioned indicates that 
FOREIGN MINISTER BAROUTAS is a tough negotiator who OFTEN WILL 
REFUSE TO SEE OPPOSITE NEGOTIATORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING 
THEM. Apparently, he insists on only doing his negotiating at lunch. Do 
not expect to see him more than once a week during the negotiation. 
PRIME MINISTER PAPENDREOUS on the other hand is MORE READILY 
AVAILABLE than the FOREIGN MISTER. However, Papendreous will defer 
to his foreign minister’s judgement in most cases. 
BUDGET: 
You have an expense budget of $10.00 for diplomatic luncheons 
with members of the Greek Government. See (NAME) at OMB for 
reimbursement. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
Concentrate initially on the following readings: 
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1. Briefing Book on Greece, particularly the N.Y.T. clippings at the 
back of the book. 
2. The Economic Intelligence Unit Reports on Greece 
3. Execut 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
David Kositsky, Under Secretary for Security Assistance. 
You are the administration’s chief spokesman for its arms transfer 
policy. Before being asked to join the Reagan Administration, you were 
chairman of the Heritage Foundation’s Defense Studies Committee. While 
at the Heritage Foundation, you became good friends with another member 
of the committee, Harriet Madoff who has since gone back to her home in 
St. Louis where she was elected to Congress in 1980. 
Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, you served for 27 years 
with the U.S. Air Force. One of your tours was spent in Greece where you 
became good friends with the present Chief General of the Hellenic Air 
Force, Thomas Cheneterous. You ended your Air Force career as the top 
Air Force Officer in the Defense Security Assistance Agency under the Ford 
and Carter Administrations. You retired from the Air Force a major general 
and joined the Heritage Foundation in 1978. 
Your father, who is now deceased, rose to the rank of Colonel in 
the Army Air Corps. His classmate and good friend was Robert McDonald, 
the present CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft. Both your father and Mr. 
McDonald received their wings in 1924 as members of Army Air Service 
class 24-6. 
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GOALS: 
1. WITH GUIDANCE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IMPLEMENT THE 
PRESIDENT’S PLOICY ON ARMS TRANSFERS. 
There are reports of a move afoot in Congress to require that 
U.S. contractors submit their offset proposals before the Congress before 
major arms sales would be approved under the AECA. You must lobby 
Congress on behalf the administration to ensure that legislation which would 
hurt the competitiveness of U.S. Corporations is not passed. 
2. MAINTAIN YOUR AUTHORITY AS CHIEF COORDINATOR OF U.S. ARMS 
TRANSFER POLICY. 
It is rumored that the Secretary of Defense covets the post of 
Secretary of State and will attempt to erode State’s authority by attempting 
to frame foreign policy questions as questions of national security. To 
assist him, SecDef has an able assistant, Annette Boyle. Her job is to 
coordinate foreign arms transfers at DOD. It’s a job which is practically a 
mirror of yours. 
DO NOT ALLOW BOYLE TO BECOME THE DE FACT OVERSEER OF 
THE PROCESS. 
DUTIES: 
1. Grant or deny permission to U.S. Aircraft Corporations to approach 
the Greek government and make sales proposals. 
2. Review any literature the aircraft companies wish to use in their sales 
presentations. 
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3. Review any sales proposals made by U.S. aircraft companies to 
Greece. 
4. Chair the Arms Transfer Management Group whenever meetings of 
that body are called by the Secretary of State. Other members include 
ASDISP Boyle and ACDA Rosenfeld. 
INITIAL ACTIONS: 
As you start the game, the first question you must decide is 
whether it is in the best interest of the U.S. to sell either the F-16 or F-18 
to Greece. Keep in mind that Turkey is also requesting these aircraft. Also 
keep in mind that if you delay too long in granting U.S. corporations the 
opportunity to approach the Greek Government, you may put 
them at a competitive disadvantage. 
■"Consult with the Secretary of State on whether the U.S. wishes to sell 
these aircraft to Greece. 
*Get a sense for what DOD thinks on this matter prior to meeting with 
the Secretary. 
■"Also get a sense of what Congressional attitude is towards this matter. 
*If there appears to be any controversy over this matter, you might 
want to recommend that the Secretary convene a meeting of the Arms 
Transfer Management Group. 
NOTE THAT GREECE, DESPITE ITS MORE RECENT BEHAVIOR IS A NATO 
ALLY. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) REPORTS STATE THAT 
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ITS AIR F0RCE JS SORELY IN NEED OF MODERNIZATION IF GREECE IS 
TO BE AN EFFECTIVE NATO PARTNER. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. Section V of ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft”. This is 
the original case handout. 
2. The LaFalce Letter 
3. Military Offsets 
4. Briefing Book on Greece. Concentrate on N.Y.T. articles at the 
back of the book. 
5. Economic Intelligence Unit reports on Greece. 
6. Modern Air Combat. (Large Handout) Be sure you are familiar 
with the competing aircraft as well as the basic components of all fighter 
aircraft. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Christina Codo, Ambassador to Greece. You have been 
Ambassador to Greece for the past five years. During that time you have 
become good friends with Dr. Ralph Johnstonoutus, who presently directs 
Hellenic Aviation Industries. Though you were well acquainted with the 
cabinet ministers of the Rallis government, you have not developed a 
rapport with the ministers of Mr. Papendreou’s government. 
You began your diplomatic career in 1961 in Paris. It was here 
that you became good friends with Kevin Scott, a minister of the French 
government. After a stint in Paris, you were assigned in 1968 to the U.S. 
Embassy in South Viet Nam where you served until 1972. While in Saigon, 
you became good drinking buddies with Captain Steven Swanson, U.S. 
Navy, who was supervising the secret Women in Combat project. Swanson, 
as you know, was forced to leave the Navy in 1977 when knowledge of this 
program became public. He immediatelygained fame as, of all things, a 
feminist, and was elected to Congress from Massachusetts in 1978. 
In 1972, you left State to pursue doctoral studies at Yale. While 
there, you met Shari Rosenfeld, who has since become the director of the 
Arms Control Disarmament Agency. The two of you remain close friends 
to this day. 
Because you were appointed by President Carter, you are 
particularly aware of the vulnerability of your position, especially in light of 
rumors that Secretary of Defense Marino is urging the President to replace 
Secretary of State Carney. You feel that the President is keeping you on in 
Greece because of your experience as a negotiator. The administration is 
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very anxious over negotiation of a new base rights treaty. Your relations 
with Secretary Carney are excellent. 
GOALS: 
YOUR PRIMARY GOAL IS TO NEGOTIATE A NEW MILITARY BASE RIGHTS 
TREATY WITH GREECE. 
DUTIES: ALONG WITH NEGOTIATING THE BASE RIGHTS TREATY, YOU 
HAVE THE FOLLOWING 
DUTIES: 
'Providing assistance to U.S. aircraft companies competing for the 
HAF sale. 
YOU MUST BE SURE NOT TO ALLOW YOUR ASSISTANCE TO APPEAR AS 
FAVORING ONE U.S. CONTRACTOR OVER ANOTHER. 
•Delivering any protests the U.S. government might lodge with the 
Greek government during the course of this period. 
•Take any actions you see as necessary to carry forward the policies 
formulated by the administration. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
Your first priority should be to meet with either Foreign Minister 
Baroutas or Prime Minister Papendreou. The CIA reports that Mr. Baroutas 
will be extremely difficult to contact as he ’’stone walls” diplomats from 
other countries as a bargaining strategy. See Secretary of State Carney for 
more details. Mr. Papendreou is likely to be more available. 
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BUDGET: 
The State Department has a one thousand dollars budget for 
diplomatic luncheons. See Secretary Carney. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. Briefing Book on Greece. Focus on N.Y.T. new articlesat the 
back of the book. 
2. Economic Intelligence Unit Reports on Greece 
3. Readings on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
4. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
You have been a staunch supporter of Ronald Reagan for the last 
5 years. You thought you would be Reagan’s Secretary of State. However, 
in a compromise on the eve of the 1980 Republican Convention, the Reagan 
camp agreed to appoint a Bush supporter to that post in return for Mr. 
Bush’s joining Mr. Reagan on the Republican ticket. Eventually, Mr. Bush’s 
international affairs advisor Christiane Carney was nominated for State. This 
was especially galling to you because she was of all things a Democrat. 
Nevertheless, with her strong anti-communist views, and the growing clamor 
among women’s groups for a say in government, she proved the most 
politically viable choice. You ostensibly went along with the selection. 
However, behind the scenes you tried your best to subvert the nomination. 
Carney’s nomination passed in the Senate by only three votes. Since then, 
rumors spread of your attempts to subvert the nomination. Presently, you 
and Secretary Carney are not on best of terms. 
You are a graduate of the Yale Class of 1941 and entered the 
Army at the outbreak of WWII. During the war you served on General 
Eisenhower’s staff where you became close friends with Secretary of the Air 
Force David Dell, who was then a first lieutenant in the Army Air Corps. 
Upon leaving the service in 1945, you attended Harvard Business School. 
In 1947 you were hired by the Bechtol Corporation where you worked until 
1970 when you were invited by the Nixon administration to serve as 
Secretary of HEW. After serving both the Nixon and Ford Administrations, 
you left Washington in 1977 and taught at Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government. While teaching at Harvard, you met Annette Boyle, a former 
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Senate aid who was doing doctoral work at the Kennedy School. Impresssed 
by Ms. Boyle’s astuteness as a political tactician, you included her on your 
staff when you accepted the post of Secretary of Defense. 
GOALS 
1. ENSURE THAT WHATEVER ACTIONS TAKEN ON THE MATTER OF 
A SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO GREECE ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY. Greece’s role in NATO should be of particular 
concern to you. 
2. FRAME POLICY QUESTIONS CONCERNING GREECE IN TERMS 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY. By so doing this, you will be drawing power 
away from the Secretary of State. 
3. WORK TO HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ANY DECISION ON 
ARMS TRANSFERS REST WITH YOUR OFFICE. Arguments you make to the 
President may have an impact on how he decides to implement any changes 
to the present arms transfer review process. WORK WITH ASDISP BOYLE 
TO FORMULATE STRATEGIES WHICH WILL GIVE YOU DE FACTO 
CONTROL OF THE PROCESS WITHIN THE PRESENT BUREAUCRATIC 
STRUCTURE. 
* 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
Thoroughly review Chapters 3-5 of the red casebook, ’’Foreign 
Military Aircraft Sales”. Meet with the President as soon as possible and 
recommend changes to the process. Be sure to frame your arguments in 
such a way that your changes can be viewed as helping the administration 
to better achieve its stated goals. 
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ADDITIONAL DUTIES: 
You sit on the National Security Council along with the President 
and the Secretary of State. The President convenes meetings of the council 
on the advice of either you or the Secretary of State. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. Section V of ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft” 
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
3. Paper on Greece’s role in NATO 
4. Executive-Legislative Consultation on Arms Transfers 
5. Buckley Speech - Williamsburg - May, 1981. 
6. Briefing Book on Greece. Focus on N.Y.T. articles at back of the 
book. 
232 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Annette Boyle, Ass’t. Sec., Int’l. Security Policy. 
In December of 1980 you were sitting in your Cambridge apart¬ 
ment when you received a call from your former professor at the Kennedy 
School of Government, Carmen Marino. Marino, who had just been selected 
by President Elect Ronald Reagan to be Secretary of Defense wanted you to 
serve as his Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy. You 
accepted the position, and have been serving in that capacity since. Since 
starting at DOD your influence has grown to the point where you are the 
most powerful person in DOD after the secretary himself. Your opponents 
both at DOD and State refer to you as the ’’Princess of Darkness”. 
Your career in Washington began in 1968 when you accepted a 
position directly out of Smith College as a Senate aide for Senator Barry 
Goldwater. While working for Mr. Goldwater you became good friends with 
two other aides, Yoshi Shigenari and Alex Kam. Both have since gone on 
to be Congressmen. Because of your close friendship with former Smith 
classmate turned Washington Post reporter, Karen Baler, you became an 
important ’’informed source” to the Washington press during your stint as a 
senate aide. 
In 1977, you left Washington to attend Harvard’s Kennedy School 
of Government. While there, you took several courses under the former 
Secretary of HEW, Carmen Marino, who was impressed with your 
comprehension of the intricacies of operating within the federal bureaucracy. 
Marino told you he thought you would make an excellent assistant should he 
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ever return to Washington. Until you received his invitation to join DOD, 
you had only half believed him. 
You are committed to helping Secretary Marino achieve his goals 
of taking de facto control over the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and of 
pressuring Secretary Carney to leave her position as Secretary of State. 
GOAL: 
BY THE END OF THE GAME, HAVE TOTAL DE FACTO CONTROL OVER 
THE U.S. ARMS TRANSFER PROCESS. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
You have surmised that the Secretary of Defense will be 
recommending to the President improvements to the Administration’s 
present internal review process for arms transfers. An excellent first move 
would be to prepare some recommendations which Secretary Marino can use 
when he sees the President. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS BECOMING A 
MAJOR CONCERN OF THE SERVICES, PARTICULARLY THE NAVY. THIS 
MAY BE THE ANGLE FROM WHICH YOU CAN BEST APPROACH THIS 
MATTER. 
DUTIES: 
You are now responsible for coordinating DOD review of requests 
for arms transfers. As a courtesy to the Air Force and Navy, you have 
been requesting their advice on the transfer of their particular weapons 
systems. You are also a member of the Arms Transfer Management Group. 
This group is chaired by Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance 
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Kositsky. Shari Rosenfeld, the Director of ACDA is also a member of this 
group. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. Section V, ’’The International Sale of Fighter Aircraft” (The original 
red casebook) 
2. Briefing book on Greece. Concentrate on N.Y.T. articles at the 
back of the book. 
3. MODERN AIR COMBAT. Pay particular attention sections on 
propulsion and weapons technologies. 
4. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
5. ’’Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short”. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
David Dell, Secretary of the Air Force. 
Upon retiring as an Air Force General in 1978, you were hired by 
BDM, a major Washington defense consultant, to head its Air Strategy 
Department. When President Reagan was elected in 1980, you were 
recommended for your present post by an old WWII drinking buddy of 
yours, Carmen Marino. Marino had been selected by the President to be 
his Secretary of Defense. Both you and Marino had served on General 
Eisenhower’s staff. Marino had left the military to pursue a career in 
business while you had made the military a career. 
Your last years in the Air Force were spent in the Pentagon as a 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You became a regular on the 
Washington party circuit during this period, and through these social 
engagements developed a wide circle of friends, including former 
Georgetown professor turned Secretary of State Christiane Carney. Other 
friends include Kevin Scott, a minister of France and Amy Cardamore, a 
minister of Italy, both of whom were previously stationed in Washington. 
With the upcoming Greek fighter competition, it will soon be time 
to strike up another old friendship, that with HAF General John 
Schecteropous. You and John became close friends in 1947 when you were 
part of the military advisory team sent by President Truman to help Greece 
put down its communist insurgency. Since last seeing John in 1950, your 
families have exchanged Christmas cards on a yearly basis. 
GOALS: 
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Both you and Secretary of the Navy Segal have a budgetary stake 
in which aircraft, the F-16 or F-18, the Hellenic Air Force selects. YOUR 
GOAL IS TO PERSUADE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO PURCHASE THE 
F-16. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
As a first move you might want to make an appointment to see 
your old friend John Schecteropous. You might want to mention to him 
that the Air Force needs an F-16 rework facility in the Med., and there is 
an excellent chance that if Greece bought the F-16, it could get the Lion’s 
share of this work for its fledgling aircraft industry. 
General Dynamics must obtain permission from the State 
Department before it can make a sales pitch to Greece on the F-16. 
BECAUSE OF YOUR CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS WITH SECRETARY MARINO AND 
SECRETARY CARNEY, YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO FINESSE THIS 
APPROVAL THROUGH THE BUREAUCRACY MORE QUICKLY THAN IT 
WOULD OTHERWISE GO THROUGH. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. MODERN AIR COMBAT. Become as familiar with this book as 
you can. General Schecteropous is an avid flyer. Your ability to sell him 
on the F-16 will depend on your familiarity with its capabilities. 
2. Briefing Book on Greece. Concentrate on the N.Y.T. articles near 
the end of the book. 
3. Military Offsets handout. 
4. White House Statement on Conventional Arms Transfers. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Naomi Segal, Secretary of the Navy. 
You were the U.S. Navy’s first woman admiral, and are 
considered one of the foremost experts in naval strategy in the United 
States today. You retired from your post as Chief of Navy Personnel in 
1977 and were invited to join the faculty of Georgetown University as a 
professor of strategic studies. While on the Georgetown staff, you became 
close friends with fellow professor Christiane Carney. Soon after Ms. 
Carney was invited to serve as Secretary of State, you were invited to serve 
as Secretary of the Navy. 
Throughout your career you have been a strong and vocal 
advocate for a stronger navy. You feel the key to a strong navy is air 
power. Consequently, you have lobbied for an increase in the number of 
aircraft carriers and have been a strong supporter of the F-18. In working 
since 1981 to keep the F-18 program alive, you have become good friends 
with Bob McDonald, the CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft. 
The Spanish sale was important to saving the F-18. You made 
several trips to Spain in the course of the competition, and crossed paths 
several times with Diane Dickason, a French sales representative for 
Dassault. In several casual conversations with Dickason, the first European 
woman to fly faster than the speed of sound, you found you shared much in 
common. A friendship between the two of you developed. 
Another famous friend of yours is Chris Manos, who has just 
been appointed by Greece’s primary minister Andreous Papandreou as 
Greece’s new minister of National Economy. Manos was a classmate of 
yours at Harvard. 
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GOAL: 
YOU ARE AMBIVALENT AS TO WHETHER YOU WANT THE U.S. TO SELL 
THE F-18 TO GREECE. Although additional foreign sales will save the 
Navy budget dollars, you feel that Greece is fast becoming a security risk. 
THE SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE NAVY HAS AN 
IMPORTANT BASE LOCATED IN GREECE. Sale of the F-18 may become 
one of the bargaining chips in that negotiation. You would much rather sell 
the F-18 to Greece than lose the base. 
AS YOU SEE IT, YOUR GOAL IS TO SUBTLY PERSUADE BOTH THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT AND THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THAT F-16 IS A BETTER 
AIRPLANE FOR GREECE. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
First you might want to talk with Bob McDonald of McDonnell 
Douglas and express to him your concerns about the national security 
problems that might arise in selling the F-18 to Greece. You might point 
out that your old classmate Chris Manos has definite leftist leanings. TELL 
MCDONALD THAT YOU CANNOT WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT SALE OF 
THE F-18 TO SPAIN. FURTHERMORE TELL HIM YOU WILL LOBBY ALL 
THE HARDER FOR AN F-18 SALE TO TURKEY IF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 
LETS GENERAL DYNAMICS WIN IN GREECE. The Turkish contract is for 
291 aircraft. Greece only wants to buy 100 aircraft and is rumored to be 
planning on splitting its purchase between two manufacturers. 
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Your next move might be to see ASDISP Annette Boyle and 
USSA David Kositsky to express your concern over Greece being sold the 
F-18. These two players have a large say in when McDonnell Douglas will 
get the opportunity to make its sales pitch to the Greek Air Force. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. MODERN AIR COMBAT. You will want to be thoroughly familiar with 
the F-18. The more familiar you are with the aircraft, the easier it will be 
for you to convince both Boyle and Kositsky that they should block 
McDonnell from selling the F-18. 
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. 
3. Military Offsets. 
4. Countertrade: A Serious Consideration. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Shari Rosenfeld, Director of Arms Control Disarmament Agency. 
President Reagan appointed you to your present position in 1981. 
Prior to this time you were a defense analyst for the Hudson Institute, 
where you were considered one of the foremost experts in the U.S. on 
conventional arms proliferation. 
Your career in Washington began in 1968, when you served as a 
legislative aid to Senator Jacob Javitts of New York. As a senate aid, you 
became friends with aids Alexander Kam and Yoshi Shigenari, both of 
whom went on to become Congressmen. In 1971, you left Washington to 
pursue doctoral studies at Yale. As a student in operations research, you 
met Christina Codo, a student in the School of International Relations. The 
two of you remain close friends. Upon receiving your PhD in 1974, you 
joined the Hudson Institute. 
Since taking your present position with the Reagan Administration, 
you have attended two conferences on world arms reduction where you have 
established close acquaintances with both Kevin Scott, a minister of the 
French Government and Dorothy Heisenberg, a minister of the British 
Government. 
GOALS: 
The Reagan Administration is committed to strengthening its 
friends and allies through arms transfers. This makes your job especially 
difficult, because in advocating a reduction in all conventional arms t 
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transfers you may be working against what the administration feels are its 
best interests. 
Nevertheless, you are appalled at the huge amounts of resources 
committed worldwide to armaments. You told the president when he 
appointed you that you would not disappear into the background or serve as 
a smokescreen for an administration policy which would turn the U.S. into 
’’the world’s biggest discount gun store”. You were surprised when the 
president went ahead with appointing you. 
Since taking your new post, the importance of your position has 
appeared to shrink. Moreover, the Democrats are attempting to take 
advantage of the arms proliferation issue. Some Democrats are arguing the 
administration’s proposed plans to sell our modern aircraft (F-16 or F-18) 
to both Greece and Turkey will only serve to exacerbate the tensions already 
existing in that region and may lead to an arms race between the two. 
YOUR GOALS ARE TO: 
(1) STUBBORNLY ENSURE THAT PROPER CONSIDERATION IS 
GIVEN TO THE NEGATIVE IMPACT A SALE OF THESE AIRCRAFT COULD 
HAVE ON REGIONAL STABILITY. 
(2) BLUNT ANY INITIATIVES BY THE DEMOCRATS TO MAKE AN 
ISSUE OF IRRESPONSIBLE TRANSFER POLICIES BY THE 
ADMINISTRATION. 
(3) EXPAND YOUR INFLUENCE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION SO 
YOUR PERSONAL CONCERNS ABOUT ARMS PROLIFERATION CAN BE 
TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE ACTION. 
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IMPORTANT READINGS: 
1. Democratic Policy Committee: ’’Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling 
Ourselves Short” 
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
3. Mr. Buckley’s Williamsburg Speech of May, 1981. 
4. ’’Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World” 
5. Briefing Book on Greece. Concentrate on N.Y.T. clippings at back of 
book. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
StevenSwanson, Liberal Democratic Congressman from 
Massachusetts. 
As you look back, it is hard for you to believe how you, a once 
self-avowed conservative right wing supporter of Barry Goldwater came to 
become the leading advocate of the woman’s movement and the Democratic 
congressman of the most liberal district in Massachusetts. 
It all began in 1970, in Washington D.C., where as a Captain in 
the U.S. Navy you were assigned to supervise the secret Women in Combat 
project. The Navy had forseen the women’s movement, and wanted to see 
whether women could effectively fight in combat before the U.S. law 
prohibiting such activity by women was challenged in congress. The Navy 
was specifically interested in whether women could become combat pilots. 
From among 1000 candidates you selected Carmen Chuidian to be 
the Navy’s first female combat pilot. It was a good choice, as Chuidian 
successfully flew over 90 combat missions in 1972. In May of that year, on 
her 53rd mission, she shot down a Mig 21 over Haiphong Harbor. You had 
monitored the activities of your female fighter pilot from the U.S. Embassy 
in Saigon. While there, you became good friends with Christina Codo, who 
was with the State Department on assignment in Saigon. 
For your work on the Women in Combat project, you were 
promoted to admiral. In 1977, just as you thought you would get command 
of a carrier task force, the New York Times broke a story about Carmen s 
exploits in Viet Nam. The Navy, in an attempt to limit the damage of its 
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having specifically violated U.S.law, forced you to resign. Maggie Baneser 
the New York Times reporter who had written the original expose, followed 
your case and through her stories made you the new martyr of the woman’s 
movement. When you left the Navy and returned to your home in 
Massachusetts, you were asked by the Democrats to run for congress. 
Feeling betrayed by the Navy as well as the entire conservative camp, you 
decided to accept the nomination, and won your district in the 1978 mid¬ 
term election by a landslide. 
GOAL: 
GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER ’82 ELECTION. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
Your reelection will largely depend upon your ability to get press 
coverage. Therefore, look through your package for issues which might get 
you media attention. REMEMBER, ITS 1982 AND THE COUNTRY IS IN THE 
MIDST OF THE WORST RECESSION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION. 
HOW DO YOU THINK VOTERS THINK ABOUT HUGE OFFSET PACKAGES 
THAT EXPORT JOBS OVERSEAS? 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POTENTIAL SALES TO GREECE ON 
YOUR DISTRICT: This information will be provided to you through the mail 
over the break. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short 
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy 
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3. LaFalce Letter 
4. Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy 
5. Executive - Legislative Consultation 
TO: Congressman Steven Swanson 
FROM: Your Staff 
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SUBJ: F-16 & F-18 Production: District Subcontractors 
What follows is a list of those companies within the district that produce 
parts used in the final construction of either the F-16 or F-18. 
MIDDLESEX GENERAL INDUSTRIES 
Part: District 
revenue per aircraft: 
Wing Panels (F-18) 
$ 440,000 
Landing Gear Doors (F-18) 
80,000 
Fuselage Panels (F-18) 
240,000 
TOTAL 
$ 760.000 
ADAMS RUSSELL CORP. 
part- District 
revenue per aircraft: 
Radar Wave Guides (F-18) 
$ 110,000 
HYCOR INC. 
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Part: 
revenue per aircraft: 
Electroluminescent Display (F-16 & F-18) 
$57.000 
COBB & DREW INC. 
Part: 
revenue per aircraft: 
Rivets (F-16) 
$ 38.700 
AVCO SYSTEMS INC. 
Part: 
revenue per aircraft: 
Radome: (F-18) 
$ 350.000 
JAMESBURY CORP. 
Part: 
revenue per aircraft: 
Hydraulic Actuators (F-16) 
$ 33.500 
District 
District 
District 
District 
NORTON CO. 
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Part: 
revenue per aircraft: 
Bearings (F-16 & F-18) 
$ 78.000 
TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE F-16 
F-18 
PER AIRCRAFT: $207,200 
$1,355,000 
District 
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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION: The staff economist 
has determined that for every $1.00 the district earns in subcontractor and 
contractor revenue an additional $1.02 is generated in Massachusetts. This 
means that total income accruing to the state for the purchase of a single 
F-18 is: 
2.02 * $1,355,000 = $2,737,000 
She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the 
state’s income creates 1 additional job. This means that the sale of a single 
F-18 creates: 
$2,737,000/$280,000 = 9.78 new jobs 
Note that the income and job benefits accrue to the state as a 
whole. However, the lion’s share of these benefits accrue to this district. 
251 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Alexander Kam, Liberal Democrat Congressman from Minnesota. 
You are now serving your second term as a Congressman from 
Minnesota, having first been elected to that position in 1978. Your career 
in politics began while you were a student at the University of Minnesota. 
In 1967 and 1968 you were an active campus organizer for Senator Eugene 
McCarthy, who made an unsuccessful bid for the Democratic presidential 
nomination in 1968. When you graduated, McCarthy asked you to join his 
staff. 
While working in the Congress, you made friends with three 
people who eventually rose to prominence within Washington. 
One was Annette Boyle. You met her when she was serving as an aide to 
Senator Barry Goldwater. Though the two of you disagreed on just about 
everything, a strong friendship developed. Boyle is presently the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Another friend is 
Shari Rosenfeld, who was an aide for Jacob Javitts. She has since gone on 
to become the head of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency. A third 
friend from your days as an aide is Yoshi Shigenari, who went on to be 
elected to Congress from Fort Worth, Texas. 
Perhaps your most influential acquaintance is Secretary of State 
Christiane Carney, who was a professor of yours at Georgetown where you 
did graduate work in 1970. 
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GOALS: 
GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER ’82 ELECTION 
GET OFFSET LEGISLATION PASSED. 
When McDonnell Douglas negotiated its F-18 offset agreement 
with Canada, businesses in your district lost work well over $1.4 million. 
Consequently, it is important to your reelection that you push for legislation 
that would bring some control by the federal government over the offset 
packages offered purchasing nations by U.S. aircraft companies. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
Your reelection will largely depend upon your ability to get press 
coverage. Therefore, look through your package for issues which might get 
you media attention. REMEMBER, IT’S 1982 AND THE COUNTRY IS IN THE 
MIDST OF THE WORST RECESSION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION. 
HOW DO YOU THINK VOTERS THINK ABOUT HUGE OFFSET PACKAGES 
THAT SEND JOBS ABROAD? 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POTENTIAL SALES TO GREECE ON YOUR 
DISTRICT: 
This information will be provided to you through the mail over 
the break. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. LaFalce Letter: This letter is a report by OMB on offset 
written at your insistence. 
2. Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short 
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3. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy 
4. Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy 
5. Executive - Legislative Consultation 
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July 23, 1982 
TO: Congressman Alex Kam 
FROM: Your Staff 
SUBJ: F-16 & F-18 Production: District Subcontractors 
1. What follows is a list of those companies within the district that produce 
parts used in the final construction of either the F-16 or F-18. 
FIBERITE CORPORATION 
Part: District 
revenue per aircraft 
Speed Brake (F-18) 
$ 170,000 
Dorsal Panels (F-18) 
300,000 
Horizontal Stabilizers (F-18 
322,000 
Rudder Panels (F-18) 
260,000 
TOTAL: 
$ 1.052.000 
SIFCO CUSTOM MACHINING CO. 
Part: 
revenue per aircraft 
District 
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Airconditioning Turbine (F-16 
$ 183,000 
HONEYWELL INC. AEROSPACE & DEFENSE 
Part- District 
revenue per aircraft 
Radar Wave Guides (F-16) 
$ 110,000 
Inertial Navigation System (F-16 or F-18)... 
826,000 
PARKER HANNIFLIN CORP. 
Part: 
revenue per aircraft: 
Metal Hose (F-18) 
$ 17,000 
TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE 
F-18 
PER AIRCRAFT SOLD: 
$1,895,000 
District 
F-16 
$1,119,000 
2. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION: 
The staff economist has determined that for every $1.00 the 
district earns in subcontractor and contractor revenue an additional $1.02 is 
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generated in Minnesota. This means that the total income accruing to the 
state for the purchase of a single F-18 is : 
2.02 * $1,895,000 = $3,827,900 
She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the 
state’s income creates 1 additional job. This means that the sale of a single 
F-18 creates: 
$3,827,900/ $280,000 = 13.67 new jobs 
Note that the income and job benefits accrue to the state as a 
whole. However, the lion’s share of these benefits accrue to this district. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Yoshi Shigenari, Conservative Democratic Congressman from Fort 
Worth Texas. 
From the time you were 10 years old, you had wanted to be a 
Congressman. In 1976, with the help of funding from General Dynamics’ 
political action committee, THE COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE AWARENESS, 
you were elected to congress from Texas’ Fort Worth/Dallas area. Over the 
past six years, you have become very close friends with General Dynamics 
CEO Stephen Daniel. G.D.’s PAC has contributed a total of $135,000 to 
your three campaigns. Unbeknownst to Daniel, you failed to report $5,000 
from the 1980 election. Your accountant discovered this discrepancy just 
recently, and you are presently trying to decide how to handle the oversight. 
Your path to the Congress started at the University of Texas 
where you were a scholar/athlete and president of your class. In your final 
year, you were awarded a Rhodes Scholarship. While in England, you met 
Dorothee Heisenberg, a doctoral student at the University of London. 
Heisenberg has since become a minister in the British Government. 
Upon finishing your studies abroad in 1968, you returned to the 
United States to become a congressional aide. While working in Congress, 
you became friends with Shari Rosenfeld and Annette Boyle who also were 
aides. Rosenfeld has since become the Director of the Arms Control 
Disarmament Agency. Boyle is now the Assistant Secretary for International 
Security Policy. 
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After serving as an aide for eight years, you successfully ran for 
Congress in 1976. You were reelected in ’78 and ’80 by large majorities, 
and expect to easily win your district in the upcoming November elections. 
GOALS: 
GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER 1982 ELECTION 
STOP CONGRESS FROM PASSING ANY LEGISLATION REQUIRING 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF OFFSET PACKAGES. 
Congressman Alexander Kam, Democrat from Minnesota, has 
proposed legislation which would require General Dynamics and McDonnell 
Douglas to submit their offset proposals in foreign fighter competitions to 
the Congress for approval. Such a requirement would make it impossible 
for either company to compete. SHOULD YOU FAIL TO STOP THIS 
LEGISLATION, MANY OF YOUR CONSTITUENTS STAND TO LOSE THEIR 
JOBS. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
Presently before the House is legislation that would require U.S. 
aircraft manufacturers to submit any foreign sales offset packages for 
review by the congress. You recognize that such legislation would make it 
extremely difficult for U.S. companies to compete with Dassault and 
Panavia. Once the packages of U.S. companies were made public, they 
could be easily matched by the foreign competition. THE LEGISLATION 
WOULD ENCOURAGE FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO PURCHASE FIGHTER 
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AIRCRAFT FROM NATIONS OTHER THAN THE U.S. Be ready with 
arguments to support defeat of this legislation. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. LaFalce Letter 
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy 
3. Buckley Speech - Williamsburg - May, 1981 
4. Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short 
July 23, 1982 
TO: Congressman Yoshi Shigenari 
FROM: Your Staff 
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SUBJ: F-18 & F-16 Production: District Revenue 
What follows is a list of those companies within the district that help to 
produce the F-16 or F-18. Of course, the major employer in any area, 
General Dynamics Fort Worth Division, is the prime contractor for the 
F-16. 
GENERAL DYNAMICS, FORT WORTH DIVISION 
District revenue per aircraft Final Assembly, F-16. 
$11,127,001 
VOUGHT AEROPRODUCTS 
Part: District 
revenue per aircraft 
Rivets(F-18) 
$ 43,000 
Wing Panels (F-16) 
374,000 
Landing Gear Doors (F-16) 
68,000 
Fuselage Panels (F-16) 
204,000 
TOTAL 
S 689.000 
AVIALL INC. 
Part: 
revenue per aircraft 
Circuit Breaker Panels (F-16 & F-18. 
$ 43,000 
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District 
HONEYWELL OPTOELECTRONICS 
Part: 
aircraft 
District revenue per 
LED Display (F-16 & F-18) 
$38,000 
TOTAL DISTRICT REVENUE F-16 
F-18 
PER AIRCRAFT: $11,854,001 
$124,000 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISTRICT PRODUCTION: The staff economist 
has determined that for every $1.00 the district earns in subcontractor and 
contractor revenue an additional 
$1.02 is generated in Texas. This means that the total income accruing to 
the state for the purchase of a single F-16 is: 
2.02 * $11,854,001 = $23,945,082 
She has further determined that each $280,000 increase in the state’s 
income creates 1 additional job. This means that the sale of a single F-16 
creates: 
$23,945,082/$280,000 = 85.51 new jobs 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Harriet Madoff, Republican Congresswoman from St. Louis 
When you look back at your past, you find it amazing how much 
your thinking has changed. When you were a student at Columbia in the 
late 60’s, you and your good friend Maggie Bangser (now a famous reporter 
with the New York Times) would talk of bringing the ’’system” to its knees 
by working on the inside. Today, you are a Republican congresswoman 
from a district that derives most of its income from federal defense 
spending. 
Your conservative philosophy began to take shape when, directly 
out of Columbia, you accepted a position with the CIA. Your intent was to 
change the system from within. What you learned while working there 
changed you. Your desk received information from the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow. This gave you first hand information on the massive Soviet arms 
buildup that began in 1965 and continues to this day. 
Your contact in Moscow was Matthew Czepliewicz, who was the 
CIA’s top person in Moscow. The two of you became ’’pen pals”, a 
friendship that continues to this day on the floor of the House. Czepliewicz 
was elected to Congress from Arizona the same year you were. 
In 1978 you left the CIA to accept a position with the Heritage 
Foundation. You took this job because you felt the need to convince the 
nation of the Soviet threat it faced. While on the foundation staff, you 
became good friends with David Kositsky, who you worked with on the 
Defense Studies Committee. Kositsky has since become the Reagan 
Administration’s Under Secretary for Security Assistance. 
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In 1979, after a year at Heritage, you decided that the best way to 
pursue your goal of a stronger national defense was to run for Congress. 
You returned to your home in St. Louis, where, after winning the 
Republican nomination in a hotly contested primary contest, you beat the 
Democratic incumbent in the general selection. Your strong views on 
defense during the campaign won you the support of Robert McDonald, the 
Chairman and CEO of McDonnell Douglas Aircraft. McDonnell Douglas’ 
PAC, VOICES* FOR A STRONGER AMERICA, contributed $10,000 to your 
1980 campaign. You became close friends with McDonald in 1981 when 
you fought hard to save the F-18 program in Congress. 
GOALS: 
GET REELECTED. 1982 is an election year. YOU MUST ATTRACT 
PRESS ATTENTION TO YOUR CAMPAIGN. 
SUPPORT THE INTERESTS OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS. 
This is the biggest employer in the area. Total district revenues 
from the production of a single F-18 (value added because of final 
assembly) is $12,106,000. Your staff economist has determined that every 
$1.00 of this 12 million, an additional $1.02 in income is created in 
Missouri. This means that production of one F-18 creates income of 
$24,454,120. Your economist has further determined that each $280,000 
increase in the state’s income creates 1 additional job. This means that the 
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sale of a single F-18 creates $24,454,120/5280,000 = 87.34 new jobs in the 
state. The majority of these new jobs would be created in your district. 
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INITIAL TACTICS: 
Presently before the House is legislation that would require U.S. 
aircraft manufacturers to submit any foreign sales offset packages for 
review by the congress. You recognize that such legislation would make it 
extremely difficult for U.S. companies to compete with Dassault and 
Panavia. Once the packages of U.S. companies were made public, they 
could be easily matched by the foreign competition. 
THE LEGISLATION WOULD ENCOURAGE FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO 
PURCHASE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FROM NATIONS OTHER THAN THE U.S. 
Be ready with arguments to support defeat of this legislation. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. LaFalce Letter 
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy 
3. Buckley Speech - Williamsburg - May, 1981 
4. Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: 
Ralph Gill, Democratic Congressman from Rhode Island. 
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You are relatively new to Washington, having just been elected to 
Congress in 1980. Your victory surprised most political pundits, because 
1980 was supposed to be the year for conservative candidates. However, 
your popularity as a state representative helped the voters to overlook your 
party affiliation. You campaigned as the Candidate of Common Sense. 
In the past you have been an extremely successful manipulator of 
the press. In an effort to continue this practice, you became good friends 
with Maggie Bangser, New York Times and Karen Baler, Washington Post. 
You have become an important ’’undisclosed source” for both of them. 
The other day you happened to run across an old Brown 
classmate of yours, Hoshiar Gosal. Gosal, who is now a sales 
representative for Panavia, was an exchange student from the U.K. when 
you were a senior at Brown. 
GOAL: 
GET REELECTED IN THE NOVEMBER 1982 ELECTION. 
INITIAL TACTICS: 
Your reelection will largely depend upon your ability to get press 
coverage. Therefore, look through your package for issues which might get 
you media attention. REMEMBER, IT’S 1982 AND THE COUNTRY IS IN THE 
MIDST OF THE WORST RECESSION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION. 
HOW DO YOU THINK VOTERS THINK ABOUT HUGE OFFSET PACKAGES 
THAT SEND JOBS OVERSEAS? 
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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POTENTIAL SALES TO GREECE ON YOUR 
DISTRICT: This information will be provided to you through the mail over 
the break. 
RECOMMENDED READINGS: 
1. Unconventional Arms Policy - Selling Ourselves Short 
2. White House Statement of Conventional Arms Policy 
3. LaFalce Latter 
4. Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy 
5. Executive - Legislative Consultation 
U. S. GOVERNMENT CORRESPONDENCE 
Note: The printing format represents the format used by the respective United 
States Government Agencies 
GTOP SECRET/CLASS 1 NOFORN 
FROM: CIA, LANGLEY VA. 
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TO: AMBASSADOR CHRISTINE CODO 
INFO: SECDEF MARINO TO SEC STATE CARNEY 
SUBJ: GREEK GOVERNMENT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PENETRATION 
THEREOF 
1. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION GATHERED FROM OUR AGENTS IN 
ATHENS INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A FOREIGN, POSSIBLY 
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS PENETRATED HIGHER 
LEVELS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. 
2. AT THIS TIME IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
THIS IS KGB CONNECTED ACTIVITY. 
3. NEED NOT TELL YOU THAT THIS IS INFORMATION OF THE 
HIGHEST SENSITIVITY, AND SHOULD BE GUARDED CLOSELY. 
RECOMMEND THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT NOT BE INFORMED OF 
THIS INFORMATION AS THIS MAY ENDANGER OUR SOURCES. 
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CIA 
TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFOR BT 
10 OCT 83 1143Z 
TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFORN 
FROM: CLA, LANGLEY VA. 
TO: AMBASSADOR CHRISTINE CODO 
INFO: SEC. STATE CARNEY SECDEF MARINO 
SUBJ: ANARCHIST UNIT WITHIN GREEK ARMED FORCES 
1. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION GATHERED BY OUR 
AGENTS IN ATHENS INDICATES THAT THE ANARCHIST GROUP 
WITHIN THE GREEK MILITARY IS RECEIVING FUNDING FROM 
MOSCOW VIA BULGARIA. 
2. THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT THE LEADERSHIP FOR THIS 
GROUP IS MADE UP OF HIGHER RANKING OFFICERS WITHIN THE 
GREEK ARMED FORCES. 
3. AS OF YET THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION WHETHER THIS 
PROBLEM HAD PENETRATED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GREEK 
MILITARY. 
4. IF DECISION IS MADE TO REVEAL THIS INFORMATION TO GREEK 
GOVERNMENT PLEASE GIVE THIS AGENCY AMPLE NOTICE SO OUR 
SOURCES CAN BE FORWARDED, AND IF NECESSARY, PULLED 
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BACK. INDISCREET BEHAVIOR COULD COST US DEARLY IN THIS 
MATTER. 
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CIA 
TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFORN 
29 SEP 84 0318Z 
FLASH/TOP SECRET/CLASS 1/NOFORN 
FROM: CIA, LANGLEY VA. 
TO: AMBASSADOR CHRISTINE CODO 
INFO: SECSTATE CARNEY 
SECDEF MARINO 
ASDISP BOYLE 
USSA KOSITSKY 
SUBJ: PENETRATION OF AIR FORCE SELECTION BOARD BY SOVIET 
INTELLIGENCE. 
1. SERGEI BOKHAN, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SOVIET 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE WHO DEFECTED THIS PAST MAY, HAS 
REVEALED THAT GENERAL JOHN SCHECTEROPOUS, HAF, IS AN 
AGENT FOR THE KGB. 
2. BOKHAN HAS FURTHER REVEALED THAT THE CONSULTING 
FIRM OPERATED BY MR. JEFFREY SCHWARTZ IS A KGB OPERATION. 
THE BUSINESS WAS STARTED FROM SEED MONEY FUNNELED 
THROUGH BULGARIA IN 1975. 
3. ACCORDING TO BOKHAN, SCHECTEROPOUS HAS BEEN WORKING 
WITH KGB SINCE THE GREEK REVOLUTION OF 1947. 
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SCHECTEROPOUS LOST A FIRST WIFE IN THE FIGHTING, AND 
BLAMES HER DEATH ON MONARCHIST ELEMENTS WITHIN THE 
GREEK ARMY. 
4. SCHECTEROPOUS IS CONNECTED WITH OTHER HIGH RANKING 
MEMBERS OF THE GREEK MILITARY WHO ARE DIRECTING 
ANARCHIST UNITS WITHIN THE GREEK ARMY. BOKHAN HAS 
REFUSED TO REVEAL WHO THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE UNTIL THE 
U.S. PRESSURES THE SOVIET UNION TO RELEASE HIS WIFE AND 
7-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER. BOTH WERE TURNED OVER TO THE 
SOVIETS BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. 
5. BECAUSE SCHECTEROPOUS MIGHT LEAD US TO OTHER 
MEMBERS OF THE ANARCHIST LEADERSHIP, RECOMMEND NO 
MENTION BE MADE OF THIS DISCOVERY TO THE GREEK GOVERN¬ 
MENT. 
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CIA 
FLASH/TOP SECRET/NOFORN 
BT// 
MEMORANDUM T0P SECRET EYES ONLY 
TO: PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FROM: GEN. DELL, SECAF 
RE: SOVIET INFILTRATION OF GREEK MILITARY 
1. In light of the proposed sale of American fighter aircraft to the Greek 
gov’t., SECAF is gravely concerned by the CIA discovery of Soviet agents in 
the highest echelons of the HAF. Ultimately, Soviet infiltration brings into 
question the security of NATO operations throughout East Med. 
2. SECAF continues to believe sale of weapons to Greek government is of 
strategic importance both for American and Nato security in East Med. 
HAF currently operating obsolete and poorly maintained equipment in an 
area of vital importance to the safety of southern Balkans, eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East. Strength of Greece should be maintained 
as a deterrent to Soviet military action as well as Turkish ambitions in 
Aegean. Sale of arms demonstrates to Greece a continuing American 
friendship, reinforces the bonds of the NATO alliance and exhibits both to 
other NATO allies and to the Soviets strong American commitment to 
western defense. 
3. Secondary considerations in the economic sphere should also be 
weighed. Aircraft sales entail considerable economic benefit for further 
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American growth and defense preparedness. As it appears HAF has selected 
the F-16, such a sale would reduce unit costs for the USAF as well, a 
matter of congressional concern. 
4. Within the context of overall NATO planning and operations, sale of the 
F-16 furthers SECAF’s policy of RSI of alliance equipment. 
5. Should we fail to sell American aircraft it seems likely the HAF will 
purchase the MURAJ 2000 from the French. Three drawbacks are 
apparent: U.S. loses any economic benefit to be gained; U.S. NATO 
solidarity appears weakened, especially in light of traditional Gaullist 
attitudes of French - U.S. government has been working to stem similar tide 
in Greek gov’t.; potential for technology loss is not removed - French jets 
incorporate much American technology and design. Moreover as F-16 is 
clearly superior U.S. leaves Greece in more vulnerable position vis a vis 
Soviets due to inferior equipment. 
6. This does not however deny SECAF’s genuine concern regarding the loss 
of high level American military technology due to Soviet presence in HAF. 
Both American and NATO security are at stake. SECAF however does not 
believe HAF has fallen under control of leftist factions within Greece. 
Security breach not only could be contained but used to our advantage 
through disinformation possibilities. 
POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Let Congress stop sale entirely. 
2. Inform Greek P.M. and Chief General Cheneterous of Soviet 
presence. 
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3. Sell less than state of the art technology 
4. Make sale conditional upon U.S. participation in security 
arrangements for any co-production and rework facilities. 
a) As noted in sec.5 non sale has serious ramifications fo security 
b) Security interests of U.S. are paramount - if need be, we should inform 
Greeks to preserve national and NATO security. Defectors wife and family 
should not represent an American concern. 
c) General Dynamics has already been told to release only data on F-16 
A/C versions and are willing to co-operate on further technology 
precautions. 
d) Potential already exists for theft or capture of F-16 from Israel, 
Egypt or Turkey. Sale to Greeks does not increase this problem. SECAF is 
more concerned with problems of secret strategic planning in Aegean, 
Balkan and East Europe regions. 
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April 8, 1986 
ARMS TRANSFER GROUP 
Annette Boyle, Under Sec’y Defense 
David Kositsky, Under Sec’y State 
Shari Rosenfeld, ACDA 
Policy Statement 
We fully support the arms transfer policy of July 9, 1981. 
In today’s world, the U.S. must not only strengthen its own 
military capabilities, but must be prepared to help its friends and allies to 
strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms and other terms 
of security. 
These principles applied judiciously to arms transfers can: 
-help deter aggression by enhancing the status of preparedness. 
-increase our forces’ effectiveness in concert with our friends to project 
power in response to threats by mutual adversaries. 
-demonstrate that the U.S. has an enduring interest in the security of 
its friends and partners. 
-foster regional and internal stability. 
To attain these objectives, the U.S. will continue to require 
effective control over all arms transfers. In making such decisions, the U.S. 
will give consideration to a broad range of factors, including: 
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the degree to which the transfer responds appropriately to military threats 
confronting the recipient. 
-whether the transfer will promote mutual interests in countering 
externally supported aggression. 
-whether the transfer is consistent with U.S. interests in maintaining 
stability within regions where friends of the U.S. may have differing 
objectives. 
In the situation with Greece, internal and regional stability will be 
paramount in evaluating arms transactions. 
The Arms Transfer Group reserves the right to evaluate and 
approve all arms transfer agreements. 
NEWS RELEASES 
March 27,1986 
Karen Baler 
Staff Reporter 
WASHINGTON POST 
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NAVY AND AIR FORCE DEFEND THEIR RECENT ” COMMERCIAL 
PROMOTION” OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO TURKEY 
Secretary of the Navy Naomi Segal stated that Turkey should be 
supplied with the strongest possible aircraft, believed to be the F-18, due to 
Turkey’s Soviet border. She supports the F-16 for sale to Greece, citing 
uneasiness about arming Greece with something as strong as the F-18 
because of leftist tendencies there. Annette Boyle, Ass’t. Sec. Def. Int’l. 
Security Policy, responded that it is unfair to downgrade the F-16 which is 
certainly a worthy aircraft. She expressed uncertainty over the validity of 
the Secretary of the Navy’s arguments for the Turkish sale of F-18s. 
Secretary of the Air Force Dell also disagreed with Segal that 
Turkey’s Soviet border gives it higher priority, stating that ’’all NATO 
partners should receive fair treatment”. 
It was confirmed that the Turkish sale involves as much as 3 
times as many aircraft as the Greek deal pending. It is widely known that 
the Navy and Air Force favor the F-18 and F-16 respectively. Other 
government officials admit that there is some consideration to keeping both 
defense contractors (McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics) in business 
by supporting them for different contracts thereby keeping the defense 
business as a whole strong. 
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Matthew Czepliewicz, Republican Congressman from Arizona, 
issued a statement of support for the Administration’s assurance to the 
Turkish government of undisrupted arms supplies though he considers the 
Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to ’’have exercised questionable 
judgment in their promotion of the F-18 and F-16”. 
March 27, 1986 
Karen Baler 
Staff Reporter 
WASHINGTON POST 
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DEFENSE CONTRACTORS HEAVILY SUPPORT CONGRESSIONAL 
CAMPAIGNS 
Yoshi Shigenari, Conservative Democratic Congressman from Fort 
Worth, Texas, denied allegations of a $5000 unreported contribution to his 
1980 campaign from General Dynamics, supposedly uncovered by his 
accountant recently. Shigenari confirmed his friendship with General 
Dynamic’s CEO Daniels and his good relationship with the firm, including 
receipt of $135,000 in campaign contributions from their political action 
committee (PAC) to his three campaigns. He denied any impropriety, 
stating that a thorough search of his records for money inadvertantly 
overlooked has turned up nothing and he is confident that all contributions 
have been properly disclosed. 
In a related story, McDonnell Douglas CEO Robert McDonald 
confirmed that his PAC contributed to the campaign of Congresswoman 
Madoff (R, St. Louis), stating that all money has been properly disclosed 
and that MD has a ceiling of $10,000 contribution per candidate. Madoff 
publicly supports increased export of military aid to Western Allies, citing 
the additional benefit of domestic employment. Much of that employment 
would be in her district should MD win the contract. 
March 27, 1986 
Karen Baler 
Staff Reporter 
WASHINGTON POST 
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GREEKS HIRE CONSULTANTS TO HELP AWARD DEFENSE 
CONTRACT 
Chief General of the Hellenic Air Force Thomas Cheneterous 
confirmed yesterday that the Greek military has hired two independent 
consultants to tabulate data and aid in the decision making process of 
Greek’s purchase of military aircraft from one of a number of defense 
contractors bidding, including General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas. 
Cheneterous cited time concerns and other military duties of his own staff 
as a principal reason for the move, and has no concern about the 
impartiality of the consultants hired, named as Mr. William Zack and Mr. 
Jeffrey Schwartz. 
McDonnell Douglas CEO Robert McDonald was not surprised by 
this development, stating that it is Standard Operating Procedure for 
governments to solicit technical and statistical support in weighing the 
proposals. He has heard of Mr. Zack but is not familiar with his 
credentials, and did not know anything about Mr. Schwartz. Neither of the 
consultants could be reached for comment as of yet. 
NEWS FLASH!!!! 
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GENERAL IN HELLENIC AIR FORCE SEEN RECEIVING BRIBE 
Maggie Bangser, New York Times Robert Deweydopolis, General 
in the Hellenic Air Force was seen receiving a bribe recently in the form of 
a bottle of champagne. When witnessed, Deweydopolis clutched the bottle 
close to his chest and stated (with a smile): ”1 can’t believe I’m being 
bribed!” One source high in the Greek government, who prefers to remain 
anonymous, has speculated that the bribe reaches far beyond on bottle. 
Deweydopolis refused to disclose the source of the bubbly, but the unnamed 
Greek official indicated that the best champagne is undoubtedly found in the 
hills of France. 
Office of the Secretary 
United States Air Force 
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WASHINGTON POST PRESS RELEASE 
Karen Baler, Staff Reporter 
General Dell issues the following statement: 
In order to avoid any misrepresentation and confusion concerning 
my remarks before the Congressional committee chaired by Rep. Swanson I 
would like to clarify my response to questions posed on the security of arms 
sales. Rep. Gill and Rep. Madoff asked for my assessments on the security 
of aircraft sales with regard to the potential for technology theft or 
acquisition by eastern block nations or supporters. Their question indicated 
to me a particular concern for the stability and security of the Greek 
government and its desire to purchase a new combat fighter. 
My answer was phrased in what were purely geostrategic terms: 
arms sales of this type place American made weapons in close geographic 
proximity to potentially hostile and agressive eastern block adversaries. My 
comments concerning Egypt merely reflect a general strategic concern with 
overall stability of the Middle East region and the threat of Soviet incursion; 
it was not an assessment of the domestic stability of the Egyptian 
government. 
Arms sales to any nation are based on the need ”to strengthen 
and revitalize mutual security relationships” and ”to help deter agression” 
of geographically proximate adversaries. Under no circumstances could the 
Secretary of the Air Force support the transfer of American weapons and 
technology when potentially detrimental effects of such a transfer counter 
balanced any positive contributions to United States interests and objectives. 
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Furthermore, all proposed arms sales are subject to review by the State and 
Defense Departments. 
Assessments as to the political stability of any nation are properly 
the place of the State Department and beyond my authority. It will continue 
to be Air Force policy to offer technical assistance and support to friends 
and allies who purchase American equipment in order to safeguard 
American technology and our national security. 
BUREAUCRATIC KNOT THREATENS U.S. SALE OF ARMS TO GREECE 
Maggie Bangser, New York Times 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Carmen Marino and Chief General of 
the Hellenic Air Force Thomas Cheneterous finally have something about 
which they can agree. Neither government official can understand why U.S. 
aircraft manufacturers McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics have not 
submitted technical data or proposals for their respective aircrafts, the F-18 
and F-16. 
Marino, citing U.S. law which requires manufacturers to submit 
data and proposals to the State and Defense Departments, indicated today 
that neither he nor Secretary Carney have received any information. 
Cheneterous, in a separate interview expressed ’’shock” and said he is 
’’deeply surprised” that no American proposals have reached his desk. 
Proposals from Panavia and Dassault have been submitted, however. 
The source of the problem seems to be a letter written by U.S. 
Secretary of the Air Force David Dell to Cheneterous which states clearly 
that no arms sale proposal could be submitted to Greece until the U.S. is 
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notified ’’whether your government wishes to pursue a Foreign Military Sale 
(in which the government acts as middleperson between manufacturer and 
foreign government) or a Commercial Sales Agreement (sale handled by 
manufacturer and foreign government, without involvement of American 
government)”. 
A baffled Cheneterous responded by saying that, in fact, no such decision 
could be made until all the technical data is received from manufacturers. 
The confusion begs the proverbial question: ’’does the right hand know what 
the left hand is doing?” While the U.S. government remains oblivious to its 
own bureaucratic faux pas, we continue to lose ground quickly to European 
aircraft manufacturers. 
THE NEW YORK TIMES 
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GENERAL DYNAMICS UNDER SEIG 
Maggie Bangser, New York Times 
The likes of this could only happen in a crazy place like New 
York City, in some crazy time in the future... 
A major European aircraft manufacturer has disclosed that the 
General Dynamics Corporation is being investigated for overcharging the 
United States government in sales contracts for its F-16 fighterplane, and 
that a major shakeup in the top ranks of G.D. is underway. The European 
corporation has stated that the information was uncovered by its in-house 
intelligence staff. 
Neither Stephen Daniel, CEO of General Dynamics, nor Frank 
O’Keefe, Sales Representative could be reached for comment. 
DID YOU KNOW THAT... 
THE FORT WORTH DIVISION , MAKER OF THE F-16 FIGHTING 
FALCON, PAID $596 MILLION IN WAGES LAST YEAR? 
THAT EACH PAYROLL DOLLAR GENERATES $3 IN OTHER JOBS, 
BUSINESSES AND BENEFITS TO THE FORT WORTH REGIONAL 
ECONOMY FOR A TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF @2.4 BILLION 
ANNUALLY? 
THAT THE DIVISION ADDITIONALLY PAID MORE THAN $803 
MILLION FOR MATERIALS AND SERVICES IN 48 STATES AND THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA? 
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THAT PAYMENTS OF $213 MILLION WENT TO MORE THAN 2 250 
BUSINESSES IN THE STATE OF TEXAS WHICH, WHEN COMBINED 
WITH THE $596 MILLION PAYROLL, DIRECTLY INTRODUCES $809 
MILLION INTO THE TEXAS ECONOMY? 
THAT THE FORT WORTH DIVISION GENERATES AN ESTIMATED 
42,000 JOBS FOR TEXAS ALONE? 
THAT EACH 1,000 JOBS AT THE DIVISION—AND THERE ARE 
19,000 EMPLOYEES— IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EQUIVALENT OF 15 
RETAIL STORES, 2,800 AUTO REGISTRATIONS, $15.5 MILLION IN 
BANKING DEPOSITS, $22.3 MILLION IN RETAIL SALES AND $7.8 
MILLION IN PERSONAL INCOME IN TEXAS ALONE? 
THAT OF THE $213 MILLION IN PAYMENTS BY THE DIVISION TO 
TEXAS SUPPLIERS, 1,654 SMALL BUSINESSES RECEIVED $75.5 
MILLION, 52 MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES RECEIVED $2.8 
MILLION AND 99 WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES RECEIVED $8 
MILLION? 
THAT THE FORT WORTH DIVISION AND VARIOUS EMPLOYEE 
ACTIVITY GROUPS CONTRIBUTED MORE THAN $2.2 MILLION AND 
THOUSANDS OF VOLUNTEER HOURS TO CHARITIES, COMMUNITY 
EFFORTS AND NEEDY INDIVIDUALS THROUGHOUT TARRANT 
COUNTY AND SURROUNDING AREAS LAST YEAR? 
MORE THAN 800 f-16 FIGHTING FALCONS ARE IN SERVICE 
WORLDWIDE? 
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11 COUNTRIES USE THE F-16 FIGHTING FALCON AS THEIR 
FRONT LINE FIGHTER? 
THAT THESE AIR FORCES HAVE PLANS TO PURCHASE NEARLY 
3000 MORE F-16 FIGHTING FALCONS IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS? 
THAT 271 F-16 FIGHTING FALCONS WERE DELIVERED ON TIME 
AND ON BUDGET TO SEVEN DIFFERENT AIR FORCES THIS YEAR 
ALONE? 
WASHINGTON POST 
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GREEKS DENY BRIBERY CHARGES 
April 2, 1986 
Karen Baler, Staff Reporter 
Allegations of bribery in connection with champagne received by 
Greek General Robert Deweydopolis were vehemently denied by him today. 
”1 don’t take bribes” said Deweydopolis. He would not comment on the 
true nature of the transaction or the source of the gift. 
GREEK GENERALS PREFER MURAJ 2000 
Hellenic Air Force Generals Cheneterous, Deweydopolis and 
Schecteroupos were treated to demonstrations of the Muraj 2000, the F-16 
and the F-18 yesterday by the representative from Dassault, the french 
maker of the Muraj, with the aid of Howard Dyck’s Death & Destruction 
Associates, a computer consulting firm. ”We are pleased with the Muraj 
2000”, Deweydopolis stated, qualifying his preference by noting that the 
demonstration was given by the French. He is not involved in the 
negotiation of sales terms, offsets, etc. and clarified that his statement 
refers to the aircraft itself and not to any financial arrangements. 
APPENDIX D 
WRITTEN CONSENT FORM 
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WRITTEN CONSENT FORM 
DEVELOPING A CASE STUDY SIMULATION FOR GRADUATE 
LEVEL BUSINESS EDUCATION 
1. I, Guido Slangen, am a faculty member at the School of Management at 
Hartford Graduate Center. I have been working for the last three years 
doing research on teaching methodologies for adult graduate business 
students. 
2. You are asked to participate in this study. I will distribute student 
evaluation forms at the end of the International Business Negotiations course 
to evaluate the materials used in the course. 
3. In all written materials which I may use, I will not use your name, the 
name of your company, or any names you might mention. This information 
will be used in my dissertation at the University of Massachusetts. It may 
also be used in subsequent journal articles and.or book. 
4. While consenting at this time to participate in the evaluation of your 
learning experience, you may at any time withdraw from this process. 
5. Furthermore, while having consented to participate, you may withdraw 
your consent to have specific excerpts from your survey used in any printed 
materials if you notify me within thirty days after the last class session. 
6. In signing this form, you are also ensuring me that you will make no 
financial claims on me for the use of your written comments. 
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7. Finally, in signing this you are stating that no medical treatment will be 
required by you from the University of Massachusetts, should any physical 
injury result from participating in this research. 
**---.have read the above statement and agree to 
participate as a student in the evaluation of the course under the conditions 
delineated above. 
signature of Participant Date 
Signature of Faculty Member Date 
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